Narrative:

Our first aircraft was refused due to both windshear detection systems being inop. Local conditions were thunderstorms and lightning on ramp disrupting ground operations. The second aircraft; which we ultimately accepted; had an inop APU bleed valve. It also had atsu lockup and an inop lav in the rear of the aircraft; which was deferred; yet left full of fluid; which later spilled in turbulence. I spoke with the dispatcher as the only notice of the inop APU bleed was on the flight plan under dispatcher notes. Nothing in the deferred listing and not shown as long term deferred. Myself and my first officer briefed the ground supervisor and other personnel in the operations office that we would need to do a start at the gate and need a huffer for air. They acted as though this was understood but I should have possibly used the words 'ground pneumatic start. Ramp fueling operations were interrupted by lightning and rain causing ground stops; yet temperatures were still reaching near 90 degrees. After addressing maintenance issues and loading passengers we had to deal with some passengers not feeling well due to heat in the cabin. Ground personnel pulled the ground air conditioning without consulting the flight deck. They apparently do not understand that crew and passengers could not take a long delay with temperatures in the cabin reaching to 80s. After completing fueling; we got the door closed and jetway pulled. When I contacted the ramper about getting us ready for an air start he stated; 'I thought you were starting an engine at the gate'. We said 'yes; how about some air to start it'; he replied: 'that's going to take a few minutes' proceeded to run off to retrieve an air cart and start it. Took nearly 10 minutes to do and temps in cabin reached about 86 degrees with passengers complaining and getting sick and wanting off the airplane. We did get the engine started with cross bleed for second engine and got the cabin cooled down eventually. I am quite sure you will have some complaints about this situation. Despite being briefed; ground personnel were totally unprepared and do not understand what complications arise from dispatching airplanes with inop APU or APU bleed valves. This is not acceptable at a station like this that has high ambient temperatures regularly in summer. They have to be johnny on the spot with ground air conditioning and pneumatics for engine start or the passengers start getting sick. Our air carrier sees fit to issue aircraft for service with defects. Ground personnel have to know the impact on operations; the aircraft and crews and passengers. In this case it was a poor result. I think it was complicated by the sizable number of aircraft being handled; irregular operations and aircraft defects that were being accommodated. Because the end result ended up affecting the health of passengers I saw fit to submit this report so the company can adjust its procedures to avoid difficult ground operations like we experienced. As far as the crew's action; we were experiencing a high level of distractions; dealing with maintenance personnel; ramp and fueling personnel; sick passengers; flight attendants calling for assistance on top of cockpit duties; during storms at night. Better organization would have made this a lot safer.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 Captain addressed the need for environmentally appropriate dispatch requirements for aircraft scheduled to operate from stations with historically extreme temperatures. Peripherally addressed lack of knowledge of ramp personnel when non-normal procedures are required to adequately control cabin temperatures at the gate due to inoperative aircraft equipment.

Narrative: Our first aircraft was refused due to both windshear detection systems being inop. Local conditions were thunderstorms and lightning on ramp disrupting ground operations. The second aircraft; which we ultimately accepted; had an inop APU bleed valve. It also had ATSU lockup and an inop lav in the rear of the aircraft; which was deferred; yet left full of fluid; which later spilled in turbulence. I spoke with the dispatcher as the only notice of the inop APU bleed was on the flight plan under dispatcher notes. Nothing in the deferred listing and not shown as long term deferred. Myself and my First Officer briefed the Ground Supervisor and other personnel in the Operations Office that we would need to do a start at the gate and need a huffer for air. They acted as though this was understood but I should have possibly used the words 'ground pneumatic start. Ramp fueling operations were interrupted by lightning and rain causing ground stops; yet temperatures were still reaching near 90 degrees. After addressing maintenance issues and loading passengers we had to deal with some passengers not feeling well due to heat in the cabin. Ground personnel pulled the ground air conditioning without consulting the flight deck. They apparently do not understand that crew and passengers could not take a long delay with temperatures in the cabin reaching to 80s. After completing fueling; we got the door closed and jetway pulled. When I contacted the ramper about getting us ready for an air start he stated; 'I thought you were starting an engine at the gate'. We said 'yes; how about some air to start it'; He replied: 'that's going to take a few minutes' proceeded to run off to retrieve an air cart and start it. Took nearly 10 minutes to do and temps in cabin reached about 86 degrees with passengers complaining and getting sick and wanting off the airplane. We did get the engine started with cross bleed for second engine and got the cabin cooled down eventually. I am quite sure you will have some complaints about this situation. Despite being briefed; ground personnel were totally unprepared and do not understand what complications arise from dispatching airplanes with inop APU or APU bleed valves. This is not acceptable at a station like this that has high ambient temperatures regularly in summer. They have to be johnny on the spot with ground air conditioning and pneumatics for engine start or the passengers start getting sick. Our air carrier sees fit to issue aircraft for service with defects. Ground personnel have to know the impact on operations; the aircraft and crews and passengers. In this case it was a poor result. I think it was complicated by the sizable number of aircraft being handled; irregular operations and aircraft defects that were being accommodated. Because the end result ended up affecting the health of passengers I saw fit to submit this report so the company can adjust its procedures to avoid difficult ground operations like we experienced. As far as the crew's action; we were experiencing a high level of distractions; dealing with maintenance personnel; ramp and fueling personnel; sick passengers; flight attendants calling for assistance on top of cockpit duties; during storms at night. Better organization would have made this a lot safer.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.