Narrative:

I was the PF and had been vectored onto the 27L ILS/prm approach into atl. We intercepted the glideslope at 7000 feet at the yabba intersection and descended no more than about 2000 feet on the glideslope (in a stable configuration) when I noted the approach was becoming unstable and needed to be terminated. The approach was coupled and the autopilot was not able to maintain a bank angle or pitch angle that was within +/- 30 degrees angle of bank and +/- 10 degrees of pitch. We were assigned an airspeed of 180K to depot and when I saw the airspeed drop to about 165 and then very rapidly increase to 210; I initiated the go-around. Approach initially gave us instructions to track the localizer outbound and climb and maintain 5000. Since we went missed at around 5000 we had climbed slightly and the captain responded that we were already at approximately 5600; so they cleared us to a higher altitude; I believe it was 6000. They asked the reason for the go-around and the captain responded that we had encountered extreme windshear and extreme turbulence at around 5000 feet. Atlanta approach thanked us for the report; gave us a turn to the south; and told us to expect vectors for an ILS/prm 28 approach. I transferred the controls to the captain and set up the new approach on my side; then we transferred controls back to me and the captain set up the approach. We transferred controls once again and I briefed the ILS/prm 28. After being turned to the north for the base leg of the approach we saw on the weather radar a solid pink area covering most of the screen that we determined to be on or near the runway 28 final approach course. The captain commented to me that he did not like what he saw; I agreed; and at that point he declared to atlanta approach that we were turning to a heading of 090 and were requesting vectors to sav; which was our filed alternate. Atlanta approach was initially somewhat confused by the transmission and (I think) told us to turn to 300 to intercept the ILS/prm 28 localizer. The captain said 'negative; we are already in a turn to heading 090 and are diverting to savannah.' atl approach was still a little confused; but agreed and gave us a heading and altitude and cleared us to the colliers VOR; then sav and switched us to atl center. At this point the controls were transferred back to me and the captain contacted dispatch to update them on the situation. I was not listening in; as I was the PF and also communicating with atlanta center; but the captain briefed me on what dispatch had to say. He said that it was their opinion that the weather system in atlanta was moving through very rapidly and that if we went back now; we could likely get in. At this time we had about 2200 lbs of fuel and had calculated a bingo fuel of 1800 lbs for sav and 1500 lbs for cha. We then informed atlanta center that we would like to go back to atl and were cleared direct sinca for the sinca.5 arrival. About ten minutes later we checked on with atlanta approach and were informed that the airport was closed and that all aircraft inbound were in holding. The captain tried to raise dispatch once again and was unable to do so; and in the meantime we were told to proceed and that at our speed the airport should be open by the time we got there. We elected to continue to atlanta and after dodging some more small; but fairly intense cells were able to make a very uneventful visual approach and landing on runway. It is my belief that we were the first of many aircraft to experience arrival problems in this time frame. We later learned that after leaving the atl airspace the airport closed for a period of time. There had been weather in and around atlanta all day and also during the previous few days. We were on day four of our trip; a trip which blocked 24:40 in 16 legs. We originally had a sav turn scheduled after the ZZZ turn which was cancelled. The right engine intake heat was deferred on our aircraft; so we had been flying around in the weather at 7000-9000 feet for two days due to the temperature aloft. On the leg from atl to ZZZ; we were number 40+ for take-off and a flight that originally blocked 1:30 ended up blocking 2:36. Due to the weather system in the area; we conducted almost the entire day of flying (6:32) in IMC and light to moderate turbulence. To say we were tired and that our acute stress level was significantly elevated would be an understatement. This event; the refusal of the approach clearance for the ILS/prm 28 and subsequent course deviation to the east; was made in the best interest of safety. There was no reason to fly near or into more extreme precipitation. There was frankly no reason to do it in the first place; but we arrived at the airport at the exact same time as the weather and our meeting place happened to be at 5000 feet on the ILS/prm 27L. Knowing what was out there made the decision easy. When we saw that the weather had moved over the runway 28 final approach course; which we didn't know until making our base leg turn to the north and seeing the radar paint the cells; we made the decision to put safety above the operational pressure to complete the flight as planned and our own desire to get home that afternoon. Luckily we had a great deal of fuel on board and were able to return to atl in the end. However; if we had been informed by dispatch that the atlanta airport was closed I personally would have not considered returning and would have recommended continuing to sav.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An air carrier flight crew details an encounter with rain; turbulence and windshear on final approach; an attempted diversion and an ultimate return to the destination airport.

Narrative: I was the PF and had been vectored onto the 27L ILS/PRM approach into ATL. We intercepted the glideslope at 7000 feet at the YABBA Intersection and descended no more than about 2000 feet on the glideslope (in a stable configuration) when I noted the approach was becoming unstable and needed to be terminated. The approach was coupled and the autopilot was not able to maintain a bank angle or pitch angle that was within +/- 30 degrees angle of bank and +/- 10 degrees of pitch. We were assigned an airspeed of 180K to DEPOT and when I saw the airspeed drop to about 165 and then very rapidly increase to 210; I initiated the go-around. Approach initially gave us instructions to track the localizer outbound and climb and maintain 5000. Since we went missed at around 5000 we had climbed slightly and the Captain responded that we were already at approximately 5600; so they cleared us to a higher altitude; I believe it was 6000. They asked the reason for the go-around and the Captain responded that we had encountered extreme windshear and extreme turbulence at around 5000 feet. Atlanta approach thanked us for the report; gave us a turn to the south; and told us to expect vectors for an ILS/PRM 28 approach. I transferred the controls to the Captain and set up the new approach on my side; then we transferred controls back to me and the Captain set up the approach. We transferred controls once again and I briefed the ILS/PRM 28. After being turned to the north for the base leg of the approach we saw on the weather radar a solid pink area covering most of the screen that we determined to be on or near the Runway 28 final approach course. The Captain commented to me that he did not like what he saw; I agreed; and at that point he declared to Atlanta approach that we were turning to a heading of 090 and were requesting vectors to SAV; which was our filed alternate. Atlanta approach was initially somewhat confused by the transmission and (I think) told us to turn to 300 to intercept the ILS/PRM 28 localizer. The Captain said 'Negative; we are already in a turn to heading 090 and are diverting to Savannah.' ATL approach was still a little confused; but agreed and gave us a heading and altitude and cleared us to the Colliers VOR; then SAV and switched us to ATL center. At this point the controls were transferred back to me and the Captain contacted Dispatch to update them on the situation. I was not listening in; as I was the PF and also communicating with Atlanta center; but the Captain briefed me on what Dispatch had to say. He said that it was their opinion that the weather system in Atlanta was moving through very rapidly and that if we went back now; we could likely get in. At this time we had about 2200 lbs of fuel and had calculated a bingo fuel of 1800 lbs for SAV and 1500 lbs for CHA. We then informed Atlanta center that we would like to go back to ATL and were cleared direct SINCA for the SINCA.5 arrival. About ten minutes later we checked on with Atlanta approach and were informed that the airport was closed and that all aircraft inbound were in holding. The Captain tried to raise Dispatch once again and was unable to do so; and in the meantime we were told to proceed and that at our speed the airport should be open by the time we got there. We elected to continue to Atlanta and after dodging some more small; but fairly intense cells were able to make a very uneventful visual approach and landing on runway. It is my belief that we were the first of many aircraft to experience arrival problems in this time frame. We later learned that after leaving the ATL airspace the airport closed for a period of time. There had been weather in and around Atlanta all day and also during the previous few days. We were on day four of our trip; a trip which blocked 24:40 in 16 legs. We originally had a SAV turn scheduled after the ZZZ turn which was cancelled. The right engine intake heat was deferred on our aircraft; so we had been flying around in the weather at 7000-9000 feet for two days due to the temperature aloft. On the leg from ATL to ZZZ; we were number 40+ for take-off and a flight that originally blocked 1:30 ended up blocking 2:36. Due to the weather system in the area; we conducted almost the entire day of flying (6:32) in IMC and light to moderate turbulence. To say we were tired and that our acute stress level was significantly elevated would be an understatement. This event; the refusal of the approach clearance for the ILS/PRM 28 and subsequent course deviation to the East; was made in the best interest of safety. There was no reason to fly near or into more extreme precipitation. There was frankly no reason to do it in the first place; but we arrived at the airport at the exact same time as the weather and our meeting place happened to be at 5000 feet on the ILS/PRM 27L. Knowing what was out there made the decision easy. When we saw that the weather had moved over the Runway 28 final approach course; which we didn't know until making our base leg turn to the north and seeing the radar paint the cells; we made the decision to put safety above the operational pressure to complete the flight as planned and our own desire to get home that afternoon. Luckily we had a great deal of fuel on board and were able to return to ATL in the end. However; if we had been informed by dispatch that the Atlanta airport was closed I personally would have not considered returning and would have recommended continuing to SAV.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.