Narrative:

Following take-off we began climbing to fl 280. The #2 engine's vibration gauge started to slowly increase into the abnormal range. We ran the QRH; and were only able to maintain the normal range at approximately 70% power setting. Because that thrust setting was too low to maintain cruise flight at fl 320; we determined it was necessary to divert to ZZZ. The flight continued with no other problems and a normal landing was accomplished. We contacted dispatch and maintenance to discuss the problem. After telling dispatch where we were and that we needed an airport for diversion ZZZ was selected as the new destination airport and ATC was advised. An emergency was declared. During the discussions; maintenance control advised us to follow the QRH and shut down the #2 engine. We asked multiple questions; but the only answer given was to follow the QRH. I asked the maintenance control person if he was even looking at the QRH for this problem and he admitted he wasn't. I asked him to reference the QRH with me. They still persisted to follow the QRH. We asked to speak with a chief pilot and the program manager; but our dispatcher told us none were available and that a phone patch wouldn't work. During this conversation with maintenance; we learned that the #2 engine had experienced this same problem the week before; and that the wrong engine had been fixed. The rationale for our decision to forgo engine shutdown was the first caution note; printed in bold; in the QRH for engine fan vibration which states; 'it is not recommended that an engine be shut down unless there is another indication of a severe engine abnormality; i.e; high oil temperature; high oil pressure or abnormal vibration is felt through the airframe.' all other engine gauges and parameters were normal and comparable to the left engine. We did not feel any vibration through the air frame. We also discussed that in the descent; the thrust would be back and would most likely remain in the normal range. The descent was initiated for the diversion and we were able to control the vibration all the way to landing at ZZZ thus not needing an engine shut-down. Even though both the captain and I had talked with the flight attendants about the diversion and possible engine problem; they never mentioned that the engine sounded louder than normal. It wasn't until we were on the ground; that the aft flight attendant said that there was a louder than normal sound coming from the engine. Recommendation regarding contract maintenance. We decided not to fly the aircraft out of ZZZ due to multiple findings; including: 1) the fact that we couldn't verify the aircraft was legal to fly after corrective work had been performed on the wrong engine; 2) the very poor inspection done by contract maintenance. Even other ground crew personnel told us that they should not be trusted. It is our belief that the contract maintenance person never inspected the #2 engine. (We had questioned him how he looked at the blades and if he opened up the cowling. He said he didn't open the cowling and that he had used the belt loader because a ladder wouldn't be tall enough to reach the engine. We mentioned the belt loader was not on that side of the aircraft and he laughed and then stated 'you couldn't see anything from examining the blades anyway.' (yet he wrote in the corrective action of the log book that he inspected the blades). The only time we were able to communicate with this person was when he finally came up to the cockpit for the run-up. After the run-up; he concluded that the engine was fine; and that we were good to go. Back at the gate; he took the maintenance book to sign off the engine; but had to come back and find out which engine we experienced trouble with. (This contradicts the fact he wrote that he inspected the blades. Had he inspected the blades; he would've known which engine had the vibe). A decision to not use these contract maintenance personnel should be highly considered. Always get a chief pilot when requested. We are encouraged from day one of CRM to utilize all our resources and we requested these resources but were denied access to them. Maintenance control often appears 'disengaged' to the problems the crew is encountering and the only answer they give to any questions for help or problem solving is 'follow the QRH' even when presented with contradictory or unclear QRH procedures to follow. Isn't maintenance there to help be a useful resource and problem solve? Don't use this contract maintenance provider in the future.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: High engine vibration indications initiated an ongoing exchange with the commuter airline's dispatch and maintenance control organizations that the reporter deemed ineffective. Flight diverted and canceled

Narrative: Following take-off we began climbing to FL 280. The #2 engine's vibration gauge started to slowly increase into the abnormal range. We ran the QRH; and were only able to maintain the normal range at approximately 70% power setting. Because that thrust setting was too low to maintain cruise flight at FL 320; we determined it was necessary to divert to ZZZ. The flight continued with no other problems and a normal landing was accomplished. We contacted Dispatch and Maintenance to discuss the problem. After telling Dispatch where we were and that we needed an airport for diversion ZZZ was selected as the new destination airport and ATC was advised. An Emergency was declared. During the discussions; Maintenance Control advised us to follow the QRH and shut down the #2 engine. We asked multiple questions; but the only answer given was to follow the QRH. I asked the Maintenance Control person if he was even looking at the QRH for this problem and he admitted he wasn't. I asked him to reference the QRH with me. They still persisted to follow the QRH. We asked to speak with a Chief Pilot and the Program Manager; but our Dispatcher told us none were available and that a phone patch wouldn't work. During this conversation with Maintenance; we learned that the #2 engine had experienced this same problem the week before; and that the wrong engine had been fixed. The rationale for our decision to forgo engine shutdown was the first caution note; printed in bold; in the QRH for Engine Fan Vibration which states; 'It is not recommended that an engine be shut down unless there is another indication of a severe engine abnormality; i.e; high oil temperature; high oil pressure or abnormal vibration is felt through the airframe.' All other engine gauges and parameters were normal and comparable to the left engine. We did not feel any vibration through the air frame. We also discussed that in the descent; the thrust would be back and would most likely remain in the normal range. The descent was initiated for the diversion and we were able to control the vibration all the way to landing at ZZZ thus not needing an engine shut-down. Even though both the Captain and I had talked with the flight attendants about the diversion and possible engine problem; they never mentioned that the engine sounded louder than normal. It wasn't until we were on the ground; that the aft Flight Attendant said that there was a louder than normal sound coming from the engine. Recommendation Regarding Contract Maintenance. We decided not to fly the aircraft out of ZZZ due to multiple findings; including: 1) the fact that we couldn't verify the aircraft was legal to fly after corrective work had been performed on the wrong engine; 2) the very poor inspection done by contract maintenance. Even other ground crew personnel told us that they should not be trusted. It is our belief that the Contract Maintenance person never inspected the #2 engine. (We had questioned him how he looked at the blades and if he opened up the cowling. He said he didn't open the cowling and that he had used the belt loader because a ladder wouldn't be tall enough to reach the engine. We mentioned the belt loader was not on that side of the aircraft and he laughed and then stated 'You couldn't see anything from examining the blades anyway.' (Yet he wrote in the corrective action of the log book that he inspected the blades). The only time we were able to communicate with this person was when he finally came up to the cockpit for the run-up. After the run-up; he concluded that the engine was fine; and that we were good to go. Back at the gate; he took the maintenance book to sign off the engine; but had to come back and find out which engine we experienced trouble with. (This contradicts the fact he wrote that he inspected the blades. Had he inspected the blades; he would've known which engine had the vibe). A decision to not use these contract maintenance personnel should be highly considered. Always get a Chief Pilot when requested. We are encouraged from day one of CRM to utilize all our resources and we requested these resources but were denied access to them. Maintenance Control often appears 'disengaged' to the problems the crew is encountering and the only answer they give to any questions for help or problem solving is 'Follow the QRH' even when presented with contradictory or unclear QRH procedures to follow. Isn't maintenance there to help be a useful resource and problem solve? Don't use this contract maintenance provider in the future.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.