Narrative:

We reported for duty at xa:05 for our first leg. A line of thunderstorms was moving through our first destination area; delaying our scheduled xb:05 departure. A ground stop program was in effect and we were released approximately 90 minutes later. Upon our arrival; we learned our next leg was further delayed due to a late inbound aircraft. We were assigned to keep this aircraft for the next three legs. The first two segments were flown without incident. However; we did notice that the cabin lights were flashing intermittently at the beginning of the second segment; creating a disco effect. They were cycled and returned to a normal state. We finally departed our second destination at xn:02 local; (12 hours after our initial report) for our last leg of the day. Approximately 30 minutes after departure; the flight attendant reported that a passenger was hearing a strange noise and vibration between rows 14 and 15. I went back to the cabin to investigate. I heard a sound similar to the ptu with an accompanying vibration from the floor. The noise lasted approximately 5 seconds and sounded like a pump was trying to pressurize and then it would stop. The ptu was not pressurized on the hydraulic system page. We were given clearance to descend via pilot discretion to FL300. Shortly thereafter; we obtained a fuel left&right wing tk lo lvl ECAM. The ECAM was present for less than one minute. We observed the ECAM and associated fuel system page and then it disappeared; returning to a 'screens normal' situation. During that period; we saw both the total fuel quantity and the center tank enclosed by an amber box. The total fuel quantity was indicating approximately 6400 pounds and the center tank contained 40 pounds. All quantities were indicating accurately for our phase of flight. The outboard tanks were draining into the inboards and the fuel system operation appeared normal. We discussed the possibility of turning back but by this time the ECAM was gone and we elected to continue to our destination. Prior to departure; I completed a fuel service check and the numbers were accurate. Additionally; this was our third leg of the day with this aircraft and we did not have any other problems besides the intermittent cabin lights. We approached an area of significant weather and began to deviate to the north. During the descent; we went through an area of light precipitation accompanied by light chop and as there was weather in the vicinity; we elected to turn the strobe lights off. We then observed st elmo's fight on the front windows. Shortly thereafter; we obtained 2 additional ecams; automatic flight a/thr off and autoflt rud trv lim system. At the same time; the auto throttles disengaged and we lost our flight directors (FD). I was flying and handling the radios and the captain successfully completed the ECAM's. All systems returned to a normal status; the fds returned and we re-engaged our auto throttles without any further problems. As we were high on the final approach; we requested a left 360 degree turn to descend back to the profile for a normal approach. Once established on final at 3;000 ft; we noticed that the airspeeds tapes on the pfd's were indicating a 30-40 KT discrepancy. We compared the pfd airspeeds to the standby airspeed indicator and ground speed readouts and determined that the captain's airspeed tape was giving incorrect information; approximately 40 KTS lower than the first officer's. Additionally; the pitch and power indications matched the first officer's airspeed. The approach was flown using the first officer's instruments and a full stop landing was safely completed. We departed with over 12 hours of duty time at xn EDT. I did not feel fatigued when we left but in retrospect; I was tired. It was a long day and I had been up for approximately 18 hours. Handling multiple ECAM's can be challenging; especially when tired and on the backside of the clock. Although it is our responsibility as pilotsto determine whether we are fatigued; the airline and schedulers should also be monitoring duty time. Conducting multiple legs with an extended duty period is challenging enough. Adding late night/early morning hours; weather deviations and multiple ECAM's at the end of a long day is a recipe for disaster. Maximum duty times need to be set by the FAA as airlines and schedulers will continue to push pilots and crews to the limits. Additionally; cumulative fatigue takes a toll on pilots and their cognitive abilities; 12 hours is more than enough; 16 hours is simply ludicrous!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An A320's ECAM displayed various alerts during flight related to the fuel system and separately the autoflight system. An ECAM was not displayed for the DC essential TR failure. In addition; before landing; a 40 KT difference developed between the Captain's and First Officer's airspeed indications. The Captain's airspeed was in error.

Narrative: We reported for duty at XA:05 for our first leg. A line of thunderstorms was moving through our first destination area; delaying our scheduled XB:05 departure. A ground stop program was in effect and we were released approximately 90 minutes later. Upon our arrival; we learned our next leg was further delayed due to a late inbound aircraft. We were assigned to keep this aircraft for the next three legs. The first two segments were flown without incident. However; we did notice that the cabin lights were flashing intermittently at the beginning of the second segment; creating a disco effect. They were cycled and returned to a normal state. We finally departed our second destination at XN:02 local; (12 hours after our initial report) for our last leg of the day. Approximately 30 minutes after departure; the flight attendant reported that a passenger was hearing a strange noise and vibration between rows 14 and 15. I went back to the cabin to investigate. I heard a sound similar to the PTU with an accompanying vibration from the floor. The noise lasted approximately 5 seconds and sounded like a pump was trying to pressurize and then it would stop. The PTU was not pressurized on the Hydraulic System page. We were given clearance to descend via pilot discretion to FL300. Shortly thereafter; we obtained a FUEL L&R WING TK LO LVL ECAM. The ECAM was present for less than one minute. We observed the ECAM and associated Fuel System page and then it disappeared; returning to a 'screens normal' situation. During that period; we saw both the total fuel quantity and the center tank enclosed by an amber box. The total fuel quantity was indicating approximately 6400 pounds and the center tank contained 40 pounds. All quantities were indicating accurately for our phase of flight. The outboard tanks were draining into the inboards and the fuel system operation appeared normal. We discussed the possibility of turning back but by this time the ECAM was gone and we elected to continue to our destination. Prior to departure; I completed a fuel service check and the numbers were accurate. Additionally; this was our third leg of the day with this aircraft and we did not have any other problems besides the intermittent cabin lights. We approached an area of significant weather and began to deviate to the north. During the descent; we went through an area of light precipitation accompanied by light chop and as there was weather in the vicinity; we elected to turn the strobe lights off. We then observed St Elmo's fight on the front windows. Shortly thereafter; we obtained 2 additional ECAMS; AUTO FLT A/THR OFF and AUTOFLT RUD TRV LIM SYS. At the same time; the auto throttles disengaged and we lost our flight directors (FD). I was flying and handling the radios and the Captain successfully completed the ECAM's. All systems returned to a normal status; the FDs returned and we re-engaged our auto throttles without any further problems. As we were high on the final approach; we requested a left 360 degree turn to descend back to the profile for a normal approach. Once established on final at 3;000 FT; we noticed that the airspeeds tapes on the PFD's were indicating a 30-40 KT discrepancy. We compared the PFD airspeeds to the standby airspeed indicator and ground speed readouts and determined that the Captain's airspeed tape was giving incorrect information; approximately 40 KTS lower than the First Officer's. Additionally; the pitch and power indications matched the First Officer's airspeed. The approach was flown using the First Officer's instruments and a full stop landing was safely completed. We departed with over 12 hours of duty time at XN EDT. I did not feel fatigued when we left but in retrospect; I was tired. It was a long day and I had been up for approximately 18 hours. Handling multiple ECAM's can be challenging; especially when tired and on the backside of the clock. Although it is our responsibility as pilotsto determine whether we are fatigued; the airline and schedulers should also be monitoring duty time. Conducting multiple legs with an extended duty period is challenging enough. Adding late night/early morning hours; weather deviations and multiple ECAM's at the end of a long day is a recipe for disaster. Maximum duty times need to be set by the FAA as airlines and schedulers will continue to push pilots and crews to the limits. Additionally; cumulative fatigue takes a toll on pilots and their cognitive abilities; 12 hours is more than enough; 16 hours is simply ludicrous!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.