Narrative:

Mia runway 8R. Winds 070/27. Wet runway. The aircraft weighed 155;000 pounds. OAT 30 degrees C. There was a large cell directly ahead of the 8L/right runways and closing. The departing aircraft in front of us was issued a right turn to 120 degrees after takeoff. We were cleared into position and hold runway 8R and we scanned the departure corridor with our radar. The rain shower was now over the field and rain was intensifying. We changed the power setting to max power and reduced V1 by 5 KTS. We were cleared for takeoff runway 8R and given a right turn to 140 degrees to avoid the weather. We both agreed that the 140 heading was acceptable. At approximately 100 KTS; I could see a B757 out of my left side window between 50 and 100 ft in altitude. He was low enough that I could not tell if he was taking off or performing a go-around on runway 8L. The B757 had not called the tower yet announcing his go-around. Tower had not yet issued heading instructions. There was a large thunder cell directly in front of us and tower had issued instructions to all departing aircraft to turn right to the southeast to avoid the cells. Without a clear understanding of which direction the B757 would turn to avoid the thundershower; I had no choice but to abort the takeoff to avoid a potentially catastrophic incident. The rain intensity would have shielded the tower views of the low altitude go around. We did not hear a go around call from the B757 or any tower instructions. The only radio transmissions during our takeoff and abort were the tower clearing us to takeoff and our abort call to tower. I was not comfortable doing a formation takeoff in IMC conditions; so I announced abort and took the only safe action given the circumstances. The abort was initiated at 120 KIAS. All systems worked as advertised. Full reverse; spoilers; maximum braking. Rejected takeoff works great on very wet payment. The aircraft stopped on the centerline just prior to M6 intersection. I announced on the PA to 'stay seated; stay seated!' we cleared the runway and stopped the aircraft on mike taxiway. I called the flight attendants to inform them that everything was okay. The first officer reviewed the aborted takeoff procedures; and calculated the recommended cooling time of 55 minutes. While we were in the wait mode; I made another PA to inform the passengers what had just happened. I had the first officer get a discrete tower frequency from the ground controller; I contacted the mia tower supervisor; I also contacted dispatch to inform them of the abort and to order us more fuel. The first officer listened to ground frequency to get the call sign for the B757 that had now just landed on runway 8R. The first officer contacted ramp tower for a gate and a start cart (no APU). Then he called maintenance to request an inspection. I made one more PA informing the passengers of our intentions. We taxied back to our gate. We waited 1 hour from the time of the abort and then had the brakes and aircraft inspected. I called the dispatcher via cell phone to provide greater detail and work out our next plan. I also spoke with the chief of maintenance; signed the logbook and we proceed to our destination.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737 Captain rejected the takeoff at 120 KTS in MIA uncertain about a B757's action after he saw the B757 either executing a go-around or taking off on the parallel runway in heavy rain.

Narrative: MIA Runway 8R. Winds 070/27. Wet Runway. The aircraft weighed 155;000 LBS. OAT 30 degrees C. There was a large cell directly ahead of the 8L/R Runways and closing. The departing aircraft in front of us was issued a right turn to 120 degrees after takeoff. We were cleared into position and hold Runway 8R and we scanned the departure corridor with our radar. The rain shower was now over the field and rain was intensifying. We changed the power setting to max power and reduced V1 by 5 KTS. We were cleared for takeoff Runway 8R and given a right turn to 140 degrees to avoid the weather. We both agreed that the 140 heading was acceptable. At approximately 100 KTS; I could see a B757 out of my left side window between 50 and 100 FT in altitude. He was low enough that I could not tell if he was taking off or performing a go-around on Runway 8L. The B757 had not called the Tower yet announcing his go-around. Tower had not yet issued heading instructions. There was a large thunder cell directly in front of us and Tower had issued instructions to all departing aircraft to turn right to the southeast to avoid the cells. Without a clear understanding of which direction the B757 would turn to avoid the thundershower; I had no choice but to abort the takeoff to avoid a potentially catastrophic incident. The rain intensity would have shielded the Tower views of the low altitude go around. We did not hear a go around call from the B757 or any Tower instructions. The only radio transmissions during our takeoff and abort were the Tower clearing us to takeoff and our abort call to Tower. I was not comfortable doing a formation takeoff in IMC conditions; so I announced abort and took the only safe action given the circumstances. The abort was initiated at 120 KIAS. All systems worked as advertised. Full reverse; spoilers; maximum braking. RTO works great on very wet payment. The aircraft stopped on the centerline just prior to M6 intersection. I announced on the PA to 'stay seated; stay seated!' We cleared the runway and stopped the aircraft on Mike Taxiway. I called the flight attendants to inform them that everything was okay. The First Officer reviewed the aborted takeoff procedures; and calculated the recommended cooling time of 55 minutes. While we were in the wait mode; I made another PA to inform the passengers what had just happened. I had the First Officer get a discrete Tower frequency from the Ground Controller; I contacted the MIA Tower Supervisor; I also contacted Dispatch to inform them of the abort and to order us more fuel. The First Officer listened to ground frequency to get the call sign for the B757 that had now just landed on Runway 8R. The First Officer contacted Ramp Tower for a gate and a start cart (no APU). Then he called Maintenance to request an inspection. I made one more PA informing the passengers of our intentions. We taxied back to our gate. We waited 1 hour from the time of the abort and then had the brakes and aircraft inspected. I called the Dispatcher via cell phone to provide greater detail and work out our next plan. I also spoke with the Chief of Maintenance; signed the logbook and we proceed to our destination.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.