Narrative:

Poor decision-making about weather; and mission fixation lead to a potentially dangerous situation with low level maneuvering in marginal VMC; and a possible airspace boundary violation. Weather briefings the night before had indicted the weather would probably not clear up in time for a meeting near 1w1. On arrival at bfi in the morning; with the expectation of cancelling the flight; the weather looked and was reported (via internet) as better than expected. Ceilings were reported as visible to the southeast; near the route of the flight. The pilot waited for about 45 minutes to see it there was any trend towards the weather improving even further. During this period; some lower cloud blew through south of bfi. This delay meant that the meeting time could not be met if the flight was cancelled; and the pilot was to drive instead. The pilot then decided to launch; partly in the belief that the unexpectedly better weather at bfi would also imply faster than expected improvement along the rest of the route. On departure; the pilot flew the VFR departure towards the south. This route stays below the seattle class B; below 2000 ft along the kent valley towards auburn. On entering the kent valley; it became obvious there was some ground fog or very low under cast below. The pilot made a poor choice to carry on between layers above this low cloud; offsetting to the east to stay below the 3000 ft base of the class B. The pilot called seattle departure to request flight following at this time; but did not request clearance through the class B. The low cloud below made ground features hard to see; and increased the workload in avoiding the class B airspace considerably.it became obvious at this time that the distance between layers was narrowing; so the pilot made a considerable deviation off course towards the east to find a gap to climb above the 3000 ft layer. This deviation took the course closer to mountainous terrain; though not at this point dangerously so. Once above the broken layer; a course was established in clear VFR conditions between layers; at 5500 ft. The high terrain in the area (mt. Rainer; tatoosh; mount st helens; adams and hood) was clearly visible between the layers; and posed no special risk. The low undercast did persist; however; most of the way towards the portland area. On arrival in the portland area; the pilot checked the ATIS and ASOS at various stations (including pdx; ttd; vuo); with varying results. The ASOS at vuo was reporting clear below 12000 ft; however pdx and ttd were reporting few or overcast at fairly low altitudes. The area between btg; spb and S50 was clear of low cloud; with some scattered and broken low cloud increasing towards the intended destination. The pilot descended to fly underneath this layer to the destination. The cloud base at the edge of the layer was 2000 ft; however as the pilot proceeded towards 1w1; it became ragged and lower in some places; requiring frequent course deviations. Portland approach cancelled flight following; calling the distance to 1w1 at 4 miles. The airfield was not in sight; and the pilot confirmed distance and direction of the airfield with approach. A lake just to the west of 1w1 was visible at this time; however the pilot was distressed to note that the deviations for the lowering and ragged ceiling were requiring maneuvering flight at pattern altitude with raising terrain ahead. With the airfield still not in sight; the pilot initiated a climb through the broken cloud layer to escape; and contacted portland approach requesting a clearance through the class C. The plane was on a southerly course upon initiating the climb; and so may have entered the ttd class D almost immediately. The pilot was in contact with portland approach; who noted the direction and proximity of ttd; however it was not visible through the clouds. The pilot initially suggested a diversion further south to clear weather at uao; but then diverted to ttd when it becamevisible. A turn onto final and an uneventful landing was made. The pilot has 31 hours of instrument training; which undoubtedly assisted in retaining control of the plane during the climb. The pilot failed to consider landing at vuo; even though the ASOS was reporting clear; in part because he had dismissed it as a landing field during flight planning. Vuo was less suitable for the pilot's purposes than 1w1; because its proximity to pdx requires arrivals and departures northbound only; and the pilot wished to depart 1w1 after his meeting for an ongoing leg southbound. The pilot's meeting could just as easily have been served from vuo as 1w1. This failure to consider a good alternate destination was probably a result of a mission fixation. The decision to launch for a cross-country flight in a plane with a low equipment level was poor. A GPS and/or DME would have greatly assisted with situational awareness; especially in VFR over the top operations.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A non-instrument rated private pilot aboard a C172 allowed personal business considerations to outweigh his good judgment regarding a cross-country flight in marginal weather conditions.

Narrative: Poor decision-making about weather; and mission fixation lead to a potentially dangerous situation with low level maneuvering in marginal VMC; and a possible airspace boundary violation. Weather briefings the night before had indicted the weather would probably not clear up in time for a meeting near 1W1. On arrival at BFI in the morning; with the expectation of cancelling the flight; the weather looked and was reported (via internet) as better than expected. Ceilings were reported as visible to the southeast; near the route of the flight. The pilot waited for about 45 minutes to see it there was any trend towards the weather improving even further. During this period; some lower cloud blew through south of BFI. This delay meant that the meeting time could not be met if the flight was cancelled; and the pilot was to drive instead. The pilot then decided to launch; partly in the belief that the unexpectedly better weather at BFI would also imply faster than expected improvement along the rest of the route. On departure; the pilot flew the VFR departure towards the south. This route stays below the Seattle Class B; below 2000 FT along the Kent Valley towards Auburn. On entering the Kent Valley; it became obvious there was some ground fog or very low under cast below. The pilot made a poor choice to carry on between layers above this low cloud; offsetting to the east to stay below the 3000 FT base of the Class B. The pilot called Seattle Departure to request flight following at this time; but did not request clearance through the Class B. The low cloud below made ground features hard to see; and increased the workload in avoiding the Class B airspace considerably.It became obvious at this time that the distance between layers was narrowing; so the pilot made a considerable deviation off course towards the east to find a gap to climb above the 3000 FT layer. This deviation took the course closer to mountainous terrain; though not at this point dangerously so. Once above the broken layer; a course was established in clear VFR conditions between layers; at 5500 FT. The high terrain in the area (Mt. Rainer; Tatoosh; Mount St Helens; Adams and Hood) was clearly visible between the layers; and posed no special risk. The low undercast did persist; however; most of the way towards the Portland area. On arrival in the Portland area; the pilot checked the ATIS and ASOS at various stations (including PDX; TTD; VUO); with varying results. The ASOS at VUO was reporting clear below 12000 FT; however PDX and TTD were reporting few or overcast at fairly low altitudes. The area between BTG; SPB and S50 was clear of low cloud; with some scattered and broken low cloud increasing towards the intended destination. The pilot descended to fly underneath this layer to the destination. The cloud base at the edge of the layer was 2000 FT; however as the pilot proceeded towards 1W1; it became ragged and lower in some places; requiring frequent course deviations. Portland Approach cancelled flight following; calling the distance to 1W1 at 4 miles. The airfield was not in sight; and the pilot confirmed distance and direction of the airfield with Approach. A lake just to the west of 1W1 was visible at this time; however the pilot was distressed to note that the deviations for the lowering and ragged ceiling were requiring maneuvering flight at pattern altitude with raising terrain ahead. With the airfield still not in sight; the pilot initiated a climb through the broken cloud layer to escape; and contacted Portland Approach requesting a clearance through the Class C. The plane was on a southerly course upon initiating the climb; and so may have entered the TTD Class D almost immediately. The pilot was in contact with Portland Approach; who noted the direction and proximity of TTD; however it was not visible through the clouds. The pilot initially suggested a diversion further south to clear weather at UAO; but then diverted to TTD when it becamevisible. A turn onto final and an uneventful landing was made. The pilot has 31 hours of instrument training; which undoubtedly assisted in retaining control of the plane during the climb. The pilot failed to consider landing at VUO; even though the ASOS was reporting clear; in part because he had dismissed it as a landing field during flight planning. VUO was less suitable for the pilot's purposes than 1W1; because its proximity to PDX requires arrivals and departures northbound only; and the pilot wished to depart 1W1 after his meeting for an ongoing leg southbound. The pilot's meeting could just as easily have been served from VUO as 1W1. This failure to consider a good alternate destination was probably a result of a mission fixation. The decision to launch for a cross-country flight in a plane with a low equipment level was poor. A GPS and/or DME would have greatly assisted with situational awareness; especially in VFR over the top operations.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.