Narrative:

I was on an IFR flight to ZZZ. Enroute cruise was at 8;000 in and out of the clouds. Partway through the flight I was passed off to a new controller that ended up being the final controller all the way to ZZZ. As I checked in with him; it was clear that he was very busy. As the flight progressed; his situation got worse. He had several military flights in the air (some doing refueling ops) and apparently the flight plans were changed once they got airborne and there was a bunch of confusion as to what they were doing. He kept on getting 'stepped on' multiple times during the flight he had to announce for everyone on the frequency to stop calling him so he could deal with the situation. You could tell it was a very stressful situation for him. I'm not writing this to complain about him. Actually; I felt sorry for the guy - he was obviously overloaded. All things considered; he was really doing a remarkable job for the situation he was in. So that was the environment I was in as I approached ZZZ. He did come on the frequency and told me that the ceilings at ZZZ were 8;000 or 8;500 (can't remember which) and that I was to expect a visual approach. As I neared ZZZ; he said to descend to 4;000 and cleared me for a visual. Upon reaching 4;000 I called him and told him I was still in the clouds and would need lower to see the field. He cleared me down to 3;800. Upon reaching 3;800 I was still in the clouds. I tried multiple times to reach him with no response. I suspect the low altitude and clouds were making an already weak signal unusable. Since I was cleared for a visual and nearing the field and had no radio contact; I tried going lower to see if I would break out. That didn't work so I climbed back up to 3;800 and kept trying the frequency to reach him. No luck. I was out of radio contact and last clearance was for a visual that I did not have. Carefully watching the TAS; I climbed to get out of the clouds trying the whole time to reach center. Com signal was re-established and the controller answered as I cleared the clouds at 4;500. I told him I climbed to 4;500 to get clear of clouds and regain radio contact. I also explained the conditions and I would need the ILS in order to get into ZZZ as the reported conditions were wrong. He told me to maintain 4;500; cleared me for the approach and told me to advise when I was established. After getting established I reported to the controller and he cleared me for the landing and advised to cancel in the air with him or with flight service. I acknowledged and continued the approach. As I was descending and began to slow the aircraft to put down the gear; I experienced a jamming issue with the verneer throttle control. It took a bit of my concentration to get the issue resolved but by the time I did; it put we well above the glideslope and too high to make a safe landing. About this time I had also broken out of the clouds (laterally) and had a clear view of the field. I considered two choices - 1) cancel IFR and land VFR 2) continue to the map and then go missed. Given the extreme workload of the controller and his stress level and the fact that there was no traffic in the area on the TAS; I decided to cancel IFR and visually land. I called the controller; and announced 'field in sight - cancel IFR'. Radio communications were garbled on the response. I executed a quick 360 to lose altitude and made a safe landing in visual conditions. The ceilings right over ZZZ where quite high; but the surrounding area to the south and east were not. In hindsight; I regret not executing a missed approach when the IFR cancellation response was inaudible. I even called flight service once I got out of the plane to insure that the flight plan was closed; flight service did not indicate if it was already closed. The controller was expecting me to execute a visual approach and so was I. That expectation made me choose the visual rather than continue the ILS when iexperienced the throttle issue. In addition; technically; I should also have maintained 3;800 when I lost radio contact but my last clearance was for a visual approach but I was supposed to maintain 3;800 until the visual was established. First I thought going lower would give me the visual when that didn't work I thought it would be best to climb to re-establish com. I couldn't just continue at 3;800 expecting a visual when I was in the clouds and no comm. Next time; I will not allow the frustration of a busy controller to effect my judgment. My primary responsibility is to operate the aircraft safely within the regulations; not to try and reduce his workload. Additionally; I think that when things went wrong with the 5 or more military aircraft that the controller was working with; that another controller should have taken them over; or ATC should have assigned the non-military flights to another controller. Essentially; some way of dividing the workload. Again; this is nothing against the controller; he did fine given the circumstances. It's just that it sounded like the circumstances were more than one guy could handle safely in my opinion.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An IFR small aircraft pilot reported communication difficulty with ATC in IMC as he began his arrival descent. After climbing to an altitude where communications were restablished another approach was attempted this time with a minor equipment problem; the reporter elected to circle over the field rather than execute a missed approach again; with Controller workload being a primary concern.

Narrative: I was on an IFR flight to ZZZ. Enroute cruise was at 8;000 in and out of the clouds. Partway through the flight I was passed off to a new controller that ended up being the Final Controller all the way to ZZZ. As I checked in with him; it was clear that he was VERY busy. As the flight progressed; his situation got worse. He had several military flights in the air (some doing refueling ops) and apparently the flight plans were changed once they got airborne and there was a BUNCH of confusion as to what they were doing. He kept on getting 'stepped on' multiple times during the flight he had to announce for everyone on the frequency to stop calling him so he could deal with the situation. You could tell it was a very stressful situation for him. I'm not writing this to complain about him. Actually; I felt sorry for the guy - he was obviously overloaded. All things considered; he was really doing a remarkable job for the situation he was in. So that was the environment I was in as I approached ZZZ. He did come on the frequency and told me that the ceilings at ZZZ were 8;000 or 8;500 (can't remember which) and that I was to expect a visual approach. As I neared ZZZ; he said to descend to 4;000 and cleared me for a visual. Upon reaching 4;000 I called him and told him I was still in the clouds and would need lower to see the field. He cleared me down to 3;800. Upon reaching 3;800 I was still in the clouds. I tried multiple times to reach him with no response. I suspect the low altitude and clouds were making an already weak signal unusable. Since I was cleared for a visual and nearing the field and had no radio contact; I tried going lower to see if I would break out. That didn't work so I climbed back up to 3;800 and kept trying the frequency to reach him. No luck. I was out of radio contact and last clearance was for a visual that I did not have. Carefully watching the TAS; I climbed to get out of the clouds trying the whole time to reach Center. Com signal was re-established and the controller answered as I cleared the clouds at 4;500. I told him I climbed to 4;500 to get clear of clouds and regain radio contact. I also explained the conditions and I would need the ILS in order to get into ZZZ as the reported conditions were wrong. He told me to maintain 4;500; cleared me for the approach and told me to advise when I was established. After getting established I reported to the Controller and he cleared me for the landing and advised to cancel in the air with him or with flight service. I acknowledged and continued the approach. As I was descending and began to slow the aircraft to put down the gear; I experienced a jamming issue with the verneer throttle control. It took a bit of my concentration to get the issue resolved but by the time I did; it put we well above the glideslope and too high to make a safe landing. About this time I had also broken out of the clouds (laterally) and had a clear view of the field. I considered two choices - 1) Cancel IFR and land VFR 2) Continue to the MAP and then go missed. Given the extreme workload of the Controller and his stress level and the fact that there was no traffic in the area on the TAS; I decided to cancel IFR and visually land. I called the Controller; and announced 'field in sight - cancel IFR'. Radio communications were garbled on the response. I executed a quick 360 to lose altitude and made a safe landing in visual conditions. The ceilings RIGHT OVER ZZZ where quite high; but the surrounding area to the south and east were not. In hindsight; I regret not executing a missed approach when the IFR cancellation response was inaudible. I even called flight service once I got out of the plane to insure that the flight plan was closed; flight service did not indicate if it was already closed. The Controller was expecting me to execute a visual approach and so was I. That expectation made me choose the visual rather than continue the ILS when Iexperienced the throttle issue. In addition; technically; I should also have maintained 3;800 when I lost radio contact but my last clearance was for a visual approach but I was supposed to maintain 3;800 UNTIL the visual was established. First I thought going lower would give me the visual when that didn't work I thought it would be best to climb to re-establish com. I couldn't just continue at 3;800 expecting a visual when I was in the clouds and no comm. Next time; I will not allow the frustration of a busy Controller to effect my judgment. My primary responsibility is to operate the aircraft safely within the regulations; not to try and reduce his workload. Additionally; I think that when things went wrong with the 5 or more military aircraft that the controller was working with; that another controller should have taken them over; or ATC should have assigned the non-military flights to another controller. Essentially; some way of dividing the workload. Again; this is nothing against the Controller; he did fine given the circumstances. It's just that it sounded like the circumstances were more than one guy could handle safely in my opinion.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.