Narrative:

MEL 25-11-01 is not specific enough to insure a proper level of safety. After arriving at spot 2 on the fence in ZZZ; my first officer could not retract the seat rearward more than a few inches. She then extended it full forward and asked if I could see any obstructions behind her on the rails; but I could not. I exited first then helped her clamber over the center pedestal having to put her foot on my seat (straddling the thrust levers) just to get her out of the flight deck. I then tried to work the release handle myself; but could not move the seat full aft; unless an excessive amount of force was used; therefore a call to our maintenance control was made. I'm not sure why mainline mechanics were not used; but an FBO mechanic was called and a culture; language; and knowledge of the crj issue began to develop. After a few minutes he asked me to demonstrate what the problem was and I showed him that the seat could not fully retract with someone sitting on it. He then indicated that he did not know what to do and would have to call our company. After a few minutes; he handed the phone to me and said maintenance control needs to talk with the captain. It was mr. X in maintenance control and he wanted me to know that they were prepared to defer the adjustment if the crewmember would find the seat acceptable. I was shocked that this was even being considered; after I had given a thorough explanation on my original call to mr. X; that the seat was not working properly in a safe condition; but he stated that the MEL gave them relief on the fwd/aft adjustment if the crewmember would only find it in an acceptable position. I then looked at the MEL number he referenced 25-11-01 on the phone and he told me to only look at paragraph (a). I asked him about (b); (c) & (d); but he seemed to indicate that they weren't a factor; the seat was ok to defer if the conditions of only (a) were met. Even though (b) and (d) were not an issue; I reminded him the call to maintenance control was made in the first place because normal egress was being impaired and it was definitely unacceptable to both the first officer and me. This was an unsafe condition; and the MEL was being used improperly; to get the flight out on time and completed. Mr. X then explained that his supervisor was going to have to be given a reason why the captain was refusing a deferral and I told him he could quote (a) & (c) for the explanation. The mechanic eventually removed the seat entirely and was able to repair it and we departed an hour late. After returning the maintenance logbook containing the sign-off; the (FBO) mechanic made a passing remark to the first officer; saying as he left the aircraft; ' try using a little more force next time if you have another problem it'.my concerns are: 1. A corporate 'mentality' that first looks at completion and on-time performance rather than safety first. This is echoed by the way either mr. X; or his boss; was interpreting the MEL. (The MEL did not say; one of the following conditions is met). 2. Most of the rails on the floor of our fleet of crj 200's; are worn and regular problems arise during sudden movements or sharp angles of attack. 3. The MEL allows for three days to fix the problem (cat b); what would be acceptable to one crewmember may not be for the next. Our company would question a new crewmember refusing to fly or accept the seat position on a future flight. 4. I could see deferring it for a one-time ferry flight or even one time with passengers in order to repair it on landing; but to operate with multiple crewmembers and flights over a three day period is an unacceptable level of safety in my opinion. If the seat is full aft; controls could not be manipulated. If full forward; than normal entrance and egress is impossible. This defines unsafe when a crew member cannot sit properly on the flight deck and manipulate the flight controls in a normal; comfortable manner; especially sinceone of our crj 200's had a full rudder deflection on take-off just last month. Overall; this fwd/aft adjustment deferral should be removed or amended; to reflect a higher level of safety for the crewmembers it affects; and prevent maintenance control or management a reason to pressure pilots to fly now; fix later!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CRJ-50 Captain reports that MEL 25-11-01; regarding flight crew seat movement; is not specific enough to insure a proper level of safety.

Narrative: MEL 25-11-01 is not specific enough to insure a proper level of safety. After arriving at spot 2 on the fence in ZZZ; my First Officer could not retract the seat rearward more than a few inches. She then extended it full forward and asked if I could see any obstructions behind her on the rails; but I could not. I exited first then helped her clamber over the center pedestal having to put her foot on my seat (straddling the thrust levers) just to get her out of the Flight Deck. I then tried to work the release handle myself; but could not move the seat full aft; unless an excessive amount of force was used; therefore a call to our Maintenance Control was made. I'm not sure why mainline Mechanics were not used; but an FBO Mechanic was called and a culture; language; and knowledge of the CRJ issue began to develop. After a few minutes he asked me to demonstrate what the problem was and I showed him that the seat could not fully retract with someone sitting on it. He then indicated that he did not know what to do and would have to call our Company. After a few minutes; he handed the phone to me and said Maintenance Control needs to talk with the Captain. It was Mr. X in Maintenance Control and he wanted me to know that they were prepared to defer the adjustment if the Crewmember would find the seat acceptable. I was shocked that this was even being considered; after I had given a thorough explanation on my original call to Mr. X; that the seat was not working properly in a safe condition; but he stated that the MEL gave them relief on the fwd/aft adjustment if the crewmember would only find it in an acceptable position. I then looked at the MEL number he referenced 25-11-01 on the phone and he told me to only look at paragraph (a). I asked him about (b); (c) & (d); but he seemed to indicate that they weren't a factor; the seat was OK to defer if the conditions of only (a) were met. Even though (b) and (d) were not an issue; I reminded him the call to Maintenance Control was made in the first place because normal Egress was being impaired and it was definitely unacceptable to both the First Officer and me. This was an unsafe condition; and the MEL was being used improperly; to get the flight out on time and completed. Mr. X then explained that his Supervisor was going to have to be given a reason why the Captain was refusing a deferral and I told him he could quote (a) & (c) for the explanation. The Mechanic eventually removed the seat entirely and was able to repair it and we departed an hour late. After returning the maintenance logbook containing the sign-off; the (FBO) Mechanic made a passing remark to the First Officer; saying as he left the aircraft; ' try using a little more force next time if you have another problem it'.My concerns are: 1. A Corporate 'mentality' that first looks at completion and on-time performance rather than safety FIRST. This is echoed by the way either Mr. X; or his boss; was interpreting the MEL. (The MEL did not say; one of the following conditions is met). 2. Most of the rails on the floor of our fleet of CRJ 200's; are worn and regular problems arise during sudden movements or sharp angles of attack. 3. The MEL allows for three days to fix the problem (cat b); what would be acceptable to one crewmember may not be for the next. Our Company would question a new crewmember refusing to fly or accept the seat position on a future flight. 4. I could see deferring it for a one-time ferry flight or even one time with passengers in order to repair it on landing; but to operate with multiple crewmembers and flights over a three day period is an unacceptable level of safety in my opinion. If the seat is full aft; controls could not be manipulated. If full forward; than normal entrance and egress is impossible. This defines unsafe when a Crew member cannot sit properly on the flight deck and manipulate the flight controls in a normal; comfortable manner; especially sinceone of our CRJ 200's had a full rudder deflection on Take-off just last month. Overall; this fwd/aft adjustment deferral should be removed or amended; to reflect a higher level of safety for the crewmembers it affects; and prevent Maintenance Control or management a reason to pressure pilots to fly now; fix later!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.