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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 852644 |
Time | |
Date | 200909 |
Local Time Of Day | 0001-0600 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | SNA.Airport |
State Reference | CA |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | A320 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Parked Taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | APU |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Flying Check Pilot |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 146 Flight Crew Total 14500 Flight Crew Type 3392 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control |
Narrative:
Before preflight the aircraft had the APU generator deferred inop from the prior leg. During the preflight the APU was running and we were; of course; on the gate's external electric power cord. A gentleman working the ramp came up to the aircraft and banged on the fuselage below the cockpit. Line crews have come to learn this means they want to disconnect external power. I looked out my window and shook my head 'no' to the ramp worker. I called operations and asked him to verify that all ramp workers understand that the APU electrics are not working; and that we will have to start an engine at the gate using external power. He said he would make sure all ramp workers are aware. Several minutes later; a female ramp worker again came up to the nose of the aircraft and wanted to disconnect external power. I opened my window to talk with her. She asked; 'is the APU running?' I said yes it was; but the electrics aren't working. She made a comment about the lights must not be working. I closed my window; and shortly thereafter the aircraft completely lost power as she pulled the external power cord. I again opened my window and told her to re-connect power as the APU electrics are not working. This occurred approx. 5 min before scheduled pushback; causing the aircraft to 'reboot' and run through its power-up. A ramp worker came on the headset; and I told him I had called into ops to ensure everybody understood our situation with the inop APU electrics. He said 'everyone with a radio' had gotten the word on the ramp. Unbelievable. We ended up pushing back 6 minutes late due to the ramper pulling the power cord. It was clear that the ramp workers were very focused on obtaining an on-time pushback; rather than focusing on the irregular configuration of our aircraft. Pushback commenced normally. About half way through the push--while we were going about five knots backwards--I suddenly heard on headset; 'set brakes! Set brakes!' there was no noise of a disconnected or broken tow bar; and the voice was very frantic. I immediately knew what had happened. The aircraft continued rolling backwards angled toward the edge of the taxi-way with the disconnected tug now coming into view. Rather than set the brakes going backwards and risk the aircraft rocking back on its tail; I smoothly applied brakes and stopped the aircraft. We advised sna ground control of what had occurred and that we would need to check for any aircraft damage. We called into ops to ask what had happened and to have ramp workers check for damage. There was none. Aside from the fact that the tug driver did not use the correct 'breakaway' callout that is SOP; the whole sequence of events proved to be very disturbing and illuminating. From their actions and performance; sna personnel were more concerned with getting an on-time departure than focusing on and paying attention to operational details. This was demonstrated by the earlier pulling of the power cord; and I suspect the cause of the breakaway had similar roots. There also was little communication between workers at the aircraft despite my call to operations to ensure such. This lack of attention to detail and non-adherence to SOP will cause an injury or aircraft damage in the future.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: An A320 Captain reported poor ramp technique and lack of system awareness by ground personnel with respect to non-normal aircraft configurations.
Narrative: Before preflight the aircraft had the APU Generator deferred inop from the prior leg. During the preflight the APU was running and we were; of course; on the gate's external electric power cord. A gentleman working the ramp came up to the aircraft and banged on the fuselage below the cockpit. Line crews have come to learn this means they want to disconnect external power. I looked out my window and shook my head 'No' to the ramp worker. I called operations and asked him to verify that all ramp workers understand that the APU electrics are not working; and that we will have to start an engine at the gate using external power. He said he would make sure all ramp workers are aware. Several minutes later; a female ramp worker again came up to the nose of the aircraft and wanted to disconnect external power. I opened my window to talk with her. She asked; 'Is the APU running?' I said yes it was; but the electrics aren't working. She made a comment about the lights must not be working. I closed my window; and shortly thereafter the aircraft completely lost power as she pulled the external power cord. I again opened my window and told her to re-connect power as the APU electrics are not working. This occurred approx. 5 min before scheduled pushback; causing the aircraft to 'reboot' and run through its power-up. A ramp worker came on the headset; and I told him I had called into ops to ensure everybody understood our situation with the inop APU electrics. He said 'everyone with a radio' had gotten the word on the ramp. Unbelievable. We ended up pushing back 6 minutes late due to the Ramper pulling the power cord. It was clear that the ramp workers were very focused on obtaining an on-time pushback; rather than focusing on the irregular configuration of our aircraft. Pushback commenced normally. About half way through the push--while we were going about five knots backwards--I suddenly heard on headset; 'Set brakes! Set brakes!' There was no noise of a disconnected or broken tow bar; and the voice was very frantic. I immediately knew what had happened. The aircraft continued rolling backwards angled toward the edge of the taxi-way with the disconnected tug now coming into view. Rather than set the brakes going backwards and risk the aircraft rocking back on its tail; I smoothly applied brakes and stopped the aircraft. We advised SNA ground control of what had occurred and that we would need to check for any aircraft damage. We called into ops to ask what had happened and to have ramp workers check for damage. There was none. Aside from the fact that the tug driver did not use the correct 'Breakaway' callout that is SOP; the whole sequence of events proved to be very disturbing and illuminating. From their actions and performance; SNA personnel were more concerned with getting an on-time departure than focusing on and paying attention to operational details. This was demonstrated by the earlier pulling of the power cord; and I suspect the cause of the breakaway had similar roots. There also was little communication between workers at the aircraft despite my call to operations to ensure such. This lack of attention to detail and non-adherence to SOP will cause an injury or aircraft damage in the future.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.