Narrative:

I dispatched a CRJ200 that had the anti-skid added as an MEL item. I followed the standard procedure of referencing the MEL in the MEL book for that aircraft; but wasn't sure if a restriction needed to be applied for that particular MEL. Not all mels require a restriction applied in the dispatching program and the MEL book will say an restriction must be applied if necessary. I asked one of my co-workers about the MEL and we looked at the book again together. Since the book didn't say that an restriction needed to be applied; we thought that an anti-skid restriction wasn't necessary. I even referenced the cfm; but didn't find any restrictions. The aircraft was dispatched for the rest of my shift without any restrictions placed on it and the crew didn't have any issues with any of the flight releases. The next day; I had the same aircraft again and I looked at the releases that the night/graveyard shift had sent out; still unsure that no restriction was to be applied. On the contrary; these releases had the anti-skid mtow restriction placed for those flights. I immediately worried that I had sent unsafe flights out the previous day. I confronted one of the assistant mangers and told him about the whole situation. We did some research and found that I reviewed the wrong part of the cfm. The assistant manager then used the computer to recreate the situation and found that only one of my flights was fully-loaded and possibly weight restricted by twenty-five bags; but that the program still generated a release. The manager had me send an email to the other managers about my mistake; although he thought that I had made an honest mistake. The head manager met with me the next day since he does not work on the weekends. He told me that I should never make that mistake again; but also told me that he admired my honesty; he believed that what had happened was also an honest mistake as a new dispatcher. He plans to tell the FAA about the dispatching error due to policy. As a new dispatcher; I have learned that the MEL book is not as specific as it should be for certain situations such as this. There are many sections in the book where an restriction must be made but in this particular situation; that was not stated. Therefore; an inference was to be made by the interpreter of the book. I was not aware that I was able to make such restrictions when the book did not recommend so. That being said; some situations are ambiguous as to what solution should be made for that particular issue. The fact that I had talked to another co-worker about the situation meant that I was unclear about how to proceed with the situation since the book obviously did not inform me of my duty. I feel that an error like this can easily be made when one references a book for some type of resolution and they are still unclear about what to do. Also; since I referenced the wrong section of the cfm as a back-up to resolving the issue that I couldn't find in the MEL; that was also unproductive. I devoted as much time to looking in the cfm as I could under busy dispatching conditions; but even that was not enough time to fully assess the problem as there are many similar situations described in the book; I obviously had not looked at the section that would have assessed this situation more clearly.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Unable to locate any operational restrictions for a deferred antiskid system on a CRJ200 in the time available; an inexperienced dispatcher released several flights without the necessary required gross weight restrictions.

Narrative: I dispatched a CRJ200 that had the anti-skid added as an MEL item. I followed the standard procedure of referencing the MEL in the MEL book for that aircraft; but wasn't sure if a restriction needed to be applied for that particular MEL. Not all MELs require a restriction applied in the dispatching program and the MEL book will say an restriction must be applied if necessary. I asked one of my co-workers about the MEL and we looked at the book again together. Since the book didn't say that an restriction needed to be applied; we thought that an anti-skid restriction wasn't necessary. I even referenced the CFM; but didn't find any restrictions. The aircraft was dispatched for the rest of my shift without any restrictions placed on it and the crew didn't have any issues with any of the flight releases. The next day; I had the same aircraft again and I looked at the releases that the night/graveyard shift had sent out; still unsure that no restriction was to be applied. On the contrary; these releases had the anti-skid MTOW restriction placed for those flights. I immediately worried that I had sent unsafe flights out the previous day. I confronted one of the assistant mangers and told him about the whole situation. We did some research and found that I reviewed the wrong part of the CFM. The assistant manager then used the computer to recreate the situation and found that only one of my flights was fully-loaded and possibly weight restricted by twenty-five bags; but that the program still generated a release. The manager had me send an email to the other managers about my mistake; although he thought that I had made an honest mistake. The head manager met with me the next day since he does not work on the weekends. He told me that I should never make that mistake again; but also told me that he admired my honesty; he believed that what had happened was also an honest mistake as a new dispatcher. He plans to tell the FAA about the dispatching error due to policy. As a new dispatcher; I have learned that the MEL book is not as specific as it should be for certain situations such as this. There are many sections in the book where an restriction must be made but in this particular situation; that was not stated. Therefore; an inference was to be made by the interpreter of the book. I was not aware that I was able to make such restrictions when the book did not recommend so. That being said; some situations are ambiguous as to what solution should be made for that particular issue. The fact that I had talked to another co-worker about the situation meant that I was unclear about how to proceed with the situation since the book obviously did not inform me of my duty. I feel that an error like this can easily be made when one references a book for some type of resolution and they are still unclear about what to do. Also; since I referenced the wrong section of the CFM as a back-up to resolving the issue that I couldn't find in the MEL; that was also unproductive. I devoted as much time to looking in the CFM as I could under busy dispatching conditions; but even that was not enough time to fully assess the problem as there are many similar situations described in the book; I obviously had not looked at the section that would have assessed this situation more clearly.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.