Narrative:

During the walk around; I found two rear tires on the left main gear in a condition that I have never seen in my 27 years of flying. There were bald flat spots on those two tires that made me question first - why they had not blown out and secondly - what could cause this to happen. The flat spots were located near the pavement on the rear of the tires. There was also a definite rubbed spot on the tops of both tires but these different rubbed spots did not expose any cord layers. I was then surrounded by 5 ramp service people. They stated that they had seen the flat spots and wanted to see my reaction. I asked the ramp workers to confirm that if I had missed this that they would have brought it to my attention. They said yes and stated that they had already called maintenance to report the tires. I then wondered why maintenance was not there by now as it was about 20 minutes to departure but I did not know when the ramp workers had called maintenance about this problem. I then went up the jetway stairs to call maintenance and informed the captain. I told the captain that we have two tires that need replaced and that in my opinion; we have a serious brake issue. He went down to look at the tires and I placed the call to maintenance. The person on the other end of the maintenance phone asked if this was the flat spot issue. I said yes it was and asked if they knew about it. The maintenance person said that they had heard through the grapevine that this was an issue but had heard nothing official. I requested an aircraft maintenance technician (amt) to meet us at the aircraft and he said he would send one. I then returned to the main gear where the captain was. The captain said there were 10 cords in the body of the tire and we counted 5 visible cords showing on the inboard tire and 9 cords showing on the outboard tire. The center of the flat spot on the outboard tire was bulging out and made me concerned to stand near it as I felt it could explode. An amt then drove up and said right away that this aircraft has a history of antiskid issues. I do not know what drove him to immediately pin this problem on the antiskid but he said that the log history had flat spots on many different tires and not just on the left gear but the right gear also. As I later examined the log history; I found nothing questioning the antiskid but did see the tire flat spot reports to which he referred. He said he felt strongly enough about this that he was not going to sign this aircraft off and he thoroughly expected us to refuse to fly the aircraft. The captain asked him what the plan was and the amt said that the tires will be replaced and the antiskid will be deferred. The captain then asked the amt if the brakes were good. The amt said that the brakes were good and continued to say that they were working too well because they were almost making the tires blow. The captain then said that he was comfortable taking the aircraft with the antiskid deferred. The captain stated to the amt and me that it would be hard to justify refusing the aircraft for the deferred antiskid because the length of the dry departure runway combined with the length of an expected dry destination runway would make the normal operation safe. I said that my concern was not the normal operation. I felt that the possibility of a rejected take off or a problem on landing requiring maximum braking could cause the tires to explode. I wanted someone to really troubleshoot this and not jump to a conclusion because of a perceived time crunch. I was also concerned about the bottoms of 6 other tires that I could not inspect. The rubbed spot on the tops of both bad tires indicated to me that the brakes had malfunctioned not just once but twice on these two tires and I wondered if the other tires were also compromised. I stated to the captain with the amt present that I did not have confidence in the aircraft and that we should do what the amt suggested and turn down the aircraft. I then turned to the amt and pointedly asked him to confirm that he would not sign off this aircraft to fly. He again stated that he would not sign off the aircraft. We then left the amt and returned to the cockpit. As the captain and I walked up the stairs of the jetway to return to the cockpit; the captain again voiced his concern that this aircraft refusal would be hard to justify due to the dry runway length and he felt that normal operations would not be compromised. I also stated that I was new on the aircraft having just finished training in april 2009 and maybe I was uncomfortable due to my lack of experience on the aircraft. But I suggested that we return to the cockpit to see what the takeoff data looked like with antiskid deferred. Once in the cockpit; a different amt entered saying that the tires were being replaced and the antiskid deferral was being processed. At that point; I felt the rubber stamp deferral of the antiskid system did not adequately address the maintenance issue. I correctly worked through the antiskid inoperative runway limit weight and v-speed calculations and had the captain confirm my results. The captain agreed with my calculations and then I said to the captain; 'if I had the guts; I would have you find another first officer to fly this aircraft.' the captain then said; 'if that is your decision; I will not be upset or angry with you and will work to find another first officer.' I then put down my pencil and the books and papers surrounding me and pictured my family being on the aircraft. My 27 years of flying experience and my instinct told me that this aircraft should not be flown and I would not risk my family being on this aircraft while in flight. So I calmly and professionally said to the captain that I would not fly this aircraft and he would have to find someone else that would. He then asked me to continue to preflight the aircraft so that another first officer could take over quickly while he informed the duty manager. When the captain returned; he said the duty manager needed to talk to me so I got off the aircraft and used the jetway phone to contact the duty manager. The conversation with the duty manager lasted about 10 minutes. I did not tell the duty manager about the amt saying he would not sign off the aircraft because I felt that this decision was mine and I wanted to blame no one else for my decision. I told the duty manager of the condition of the tires and my concern about the antiskid deferral. I told him that if I needed maximum braking; I did not have the confidence that the aircraft would stay on the runway since I was not sure in what sequence the tires would blow but that I was sure that the tires would blow if I used maximum braking. The duty manager explained that he has been a captain on the 757/767 for two years and he understood my lack of comfort with the aircraft and my limited experience on the 757. But then I politely stated to the duty manager; 'I am going to stay with my original decision and I am not going to fly this airplane.' at xa:32 I received a call on my cell phone from the assistant chief pilot of flight operations. I recognized his voice and told him that I knew who he was since we had flown together just recently. This conversation was relatively short and he just wanted to know the details of what had just occurred. At xa:56 the assistant chief pilot again called my cell phone and this conversation lasted approximately 15 minutes. The assistant chief pilot said that it would be much better for me if I returned to that aircraft and flew the trip. Upon returning to my room; there was a voicemail on my cell phone from a denver flight operations representative. She stated that I was being removed from the trip when I returned to denver and that I would be sent to the training center for a review of aircraft performance and that the alpa mec training committee chairperson had been informed of this decision and gave her approval.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B757 First Officer refused to fly an aircraft with a history of tire failures until the aircraft thoroughly inspected. He later flew another flight but the following day was removed from flight duty by his Company for further training.

Narrative: During the walk around; I found two rear tires on the left main gear in a condition that I have never seen in my 27 years of flying. There were bald flat spots on those two tires that made me question first - why they had not blown out and secondly - what could cause this to happen. The flat spots were located near the pavement on the rear of the tires. There was also a definite rubbed spot on the tops of both tires but these different rubbed spots did not expose any cord layers. I was then surrounded by 5 ramp service people. They stated that they had seen the flat spots and wanted to see my reaction. I asked the ramp workers to confirm that if I had missed this that they would have brought it to my attention. They said yes and stated that they had already called maintenance to report the tires. I then wondered why maintenance was not there by now as it was about 20 minutes to departure but I did not know when the ramp workers had called maintenance about this problem. I then went up the jetway stairs to call maintenance and informed the Captain. I told the Captain that we have two tires that need replaced and that in my opinion; we have a serious brake issue. He went down to look at the tires and I placed the call to maintenance. The person on the other end of the maintenance phone asked if this was the flat spot issue. I said yes it was and asked if they knew about it. The maintenance person said that they had heard through the grapevine that this was an issue but had heard nothing official. I requested an Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) to meet us at the aircraft and he said he would send one. I then returned to the main gear where the Captain was. The Captain said there were 10 cords in the body of the tire and we counted 5 visible cords showing on the inboard tire and 9 cords showing on the outboard tire. The center of the flat spot on the outboard tire was bulging out and made me concerned to stand near it as I felt it could explode. An AMT then drove up and said right away that this aircraft has a history of antiskid issues. I do not know what drove him to immediately pin this problem on the antiskid but he said that the log history had flat spots on many different tires and not just on the left gear but the right gear also. As I later examined the log history; I found nothing questioning the antiskid but did see the tire flat spot reports to which he referred. He said he felt strongly enough about this that he was not going to sign this aircraft off and he thoroughly expected us to refuse to fly the aircraft. The Captain asked him what the plan was and the AMT said that the tires will be replaced and the antiskid will be deferred. The Captain then asked the AMT if the brakes were good. The AMT said that the brakes were good and continued to say that they were working too well because they were almost making the tires blow. The Captain then said that he was comfortable taking the aircraft with the antiskid deferred. The Captain stated to the AMT and me that it would be hard to justify refusing the aircraft for the deferred antiskid because the length of the dry departure runway combined with the length of an expected dry destination runway would make the normal operation safe. I said that my concern was not the normal operation. I felt that the possibility of a rejected take off or a problem on landing requiring maximum braking could cause the tires to explode. I wanted someone to really troubleshoot this and not jump to a conclusion because of a perceived time crunch. I was also concerned about the bottoms of 6 other tires that I could not inspect. The rubbed spot on the tops of both bad tires indicated to me that the brakes had malfunctioned not just once but twice on these two tires and I wondered if the other tires were also compromised. I stated to the Captain with the AMT present that I did not have confidence in the aircraft and that we should do what the AMT suggested and turn down the aircraft. I then turned to the AMT and pointedly asked him to confirm that he would not sign off this aircraft to fly. He again stated that he would not sign off the aircraft. We then left the AMT and returned to the cockpit. As the Captain and I walked up the stairs of the jetway to return to the cockpit; the Captain again voiced his concern that this aircraft refusal would be hard to justify due to the dry runway length and he felt that normal operations would not be compromised. I also stated that I was new on the aircraft having just finished training in April 2009 and maybe I was uncomfortable due to my lack of experience on the aircraft. But I suggested that we return to the cockpit to see what the takeoff data looked like with antiskid deferred. Once in the cockpit; a different AMT entered saying that the tires were being replaced and the antiskid deferral was being processed. At that point; I felt the rubber stamp deferral of the antiskid system did not adequately address the maintenance issue. I correctly worked through the Antiskid Inoperative Runway Limit weight and V-speed calculations and had the Captain confirm my results. The Captain agreed with my calculations and then I said to the Captain; 'If I had the guts; I would have you find another first officer to fly this aircraft.' The Captain then said; 'If that is your decision; I will not be upset or angry with you and will work to find another first officer.' I then put down my pencil and the books and papers surrounding me and pictured my family being on the aircraft. My 27 years of flying experience and my instinct told me that this aircraft should not be flown and I would not risk my family being on this aircraft while in flight. So I calmly and professionally said to the Captain that I would not fly this aircraft and he would have to find someone else that would. He then asked me to continue to preflight the aircraft so that another First Officer could take over quickly while he informed the Duty Manager. When the Captain returned; he said the Duty Manager needed to talk to me so I got off the aircraft and used the jetway phone to contact the Duty Manager. The conversation with the Duty Manager lasted about 10 minutes. I did not tell the Duty Manager about the AMT saying he would not sign off the aircraft because I felt that this decision was mine and I wanted to blame no one else for my decision. I told the Duty Manager of the condition of the tires and my concern about the antiskid deferral. I told him that if I needed maximum braking; I did not have the confidence that the aircraft would stay on the runway since I was not sure in what sequence the tires would blow but that I was sure that the tires would blow if I used maximum braking. The Duty Manager explained that he has been a Captain on the 757/767 for two years and he understood my lack of comfort with the aircraft and my limited experience on the 757. But then I politely stated to the Duty Manager; 'I am going to stay with my original decision and I am not going to fly this airplane.' At XA:32 I received a call on my cell phone from the Assistant Chief Pilot of Flight Operations. I recognized his voice and told him that I knew who he was since we had flown together just recently. This conversation was relatively short and he just wanted to know the details of what had just occurred. At XA:56 the Assistant Chief Pilot again called my cell phone and this conversation lasted approximately 15 minutes. The Assistant Chief Pilot said that it would be much better for me if I returned to that aircraft and flew the trip. Upon returning to my room; there was a voicemail on my cell phone from a Denver Flight Operations Representative. She stated that I was being removed from the trip when I returned to Denver and that I would be sent to the training center for a review of aircraft performance and that the ALPA MEC Training Committee Chairperson had been informed of this decision and gave her approval.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.