Narrative:

I was giving a captain upgrade candidate VOR orientation training in the area of the pottstown VOR. Our flight attitude was cruise, low cruise confign with standard rate turns. We were intentionally flying at an 'odd' altitude (3700' MSL) to avoid conflicts with other cruising altitudes. The philadelphia approach frequency was very busy, so rather than obtain a transponder code, we monitored the frequency for traffic in our area. Small transport Y airliner was working phl approach and was inbound to phl via a transition off of ptw VOR. The small transport Y pilot angrily complained to approach that he had passed within 500' of my small transport X and asked if approach was talking to us. The controller replied that he was not. The small transport Y pilot was quite coarse with the ATC person and said he wanted this logged as a near miss. The controller made a call in the blind 'is there a commuter small transport X in the vicinity of pottstown on the frequency?' I replied that we were on frequency and had been monitoring and were looking for traffic, but had not seen the small transport Y pass over head. The controller asked me to go to another frequency where I exchanged some information with another controller who was handling the report. (Note: our altitude setting was within .01' of the current local setting.) the controller was pleasant and efficient in handling the report. I gave my director of operations a report which was to be forwarded to phl. Two significant points to this incident: for the past year I have made it a point to do flight training at altitudes that would not be in conflict with IFR cruising or VFR altitudes. I will continue this practice, as I think this procedure may have saved us in this situation. Also, I think less experienced pilots fly at whole number altitudes (1500,2000,2500,3000,etc). I believe the small transport Y crew in this incident was complacent in their watch for traffic. We were in very good VFR conditions. The crew was surprised with our presence, and was upset with the fact that the controller had not called us out as traffic. As an instrument instrument for many years, I always cautioned my students to look for traffic when in VFR conditions even though they are on an IFR clearance. My personal opinion: I am of course thankful that this event was only a sighting and not a fatal midair. In my opinion, the only casualty in this incident was the small transport Y captain's ego. I believe he greatly over-reacted and chose to take it out on the controller working that sector. His tone through the entire approach segment with that ATC specialist was one of arrogance. I have been flying in the phl area for twenty years, and have been reminded of our high density environment on many occasions.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CLOSE PROX COMMUTER SMT COMMUTER SMT NEAR PTW VOR.

Narrative: I WAS GIVING A CAPT UPGRADE CANDIDATE VOR ORIENTATION TRAINING IN THE AREA OF THE POTTSTOWN VOR. OUR FLT ATTITUDE WAS CRUISE, LOW CRUISE CONFIGN WITH STANDARD RATE TURNS. WE WERE INTENTIONALLY FLYING AT AN 'ODD' ALT (3700' MSL) TO AVOID CONFLICTS WITH OTHER CRUISING ALTS. THE PHILADELPHIA APCH FREQ WAS VERY BUSY, SO RATHER THAN OBTAIN A TRANSPONDER CODE, WE MONITORED THE FREQ FOR TFC IN OUR AREA. SMT Y AIRLINER WAS WORKING PHL APCH AND WAS INBND TO PHL VIA A TRANSITION OFF OF PTW VOR. THE SMT Y PLT ANGRILY COMPLAINED TO APCH THAT HE HAD PASSED WITHIN 500' OF MY SMT X AND ASKED IF APCH WAS TALKING TO US. THE CTLR REPLIED THAT HE WAS NOT. THE SMT Y PLT WAS QUITE COARSE WITH THE ATC PERSON AND SAID HE WANTED THIS LOGGED AS A NEAR MISS. THE CTLR MADE A CALL IN THE BLIND 'IS THERE A COMMUTER SMT X IN THE VICINITY OF POTTSTOWN ON THE FREQ?' I REPLIED THAT WE WERE ON FREQ AND HAD BEEN MONITORING AND WERE LOOKING FOR TFC, BUT HAD NOT SEEN THE SMT Y PASS OVER HEAD. THE CTLR ASKED ME TO GO TO ANOTHER FREQ WHERE I EXCHANGED SOME INFO WITH ANOTHER CTLR WHO WAS HANDLING THE RPT. (NOTE: OUR ALT SETTING WAS WITHIN .01' OF THE CURRENT LCL SETTING.) THE CTLR WAS PLEASANT AND EFFICIENT IN HANDLING THE RPT. I GAVE MY DIRECTOR OF OPS A RPT WHICH WAS TO BE FORWARDED TO PHL. TWO SIGNIFICANT POINTS TO THIS INCIDENT: FOR THE PAST YEAR I HAVE MADE IT A POINT TO DO FLT TRAINING AT ALTS THAT WOULD NOT BE IN CONFLICT WITH IFR CRUISING OR VFR ALTS. I WILL CONTINUE THIS PRACTICE, AS I THINK THIS PROC MAY HAVE SAVED US IN THIS SITUATION. ALSO, I THINK LESS EXPERIENCED PLTS FLY AT WHOLE NUMBER ALTS (1500,2000,2500,3000,ETC). I BELIEVE THE SMT Y CREW IN THIS INCIDENT WAS COMPLACENT IN THEIR WATCH FOR TFC. WE WERE IN VERY GOOD VFR CONDITIONS. THE CREW WAS SURPRISED WITH OUR PRESENCE, AND WAS UPSET WITH THE FACT THAT THE CTLR HAD NOT CALLED US OUT AS TFC. AS AN INSTRUMENT INSTR FOR MANY YEARS, I ALWAYS CAUTIONED MY STUDENTS TO LOOK FOR TFC WHEN IN VFR CONDITIONS EVEN THOUGH THEY ARE ON AN IFR CLRNC. MY PERSONAL OPINION: I AM OF COURSE THANKFUL THAT THIS EVENT WAS ONLY A SIGHTING AND NOT A FATAL MIDAIR. IN MY OPINION, THE ONLY CASUALTY IN THIS INCIDENT WAS THE SMT Y CAPT'S EGO. I BELIEVE HE GREATLY OVER-REACTED AND CHOSE TO TAKE IT OUT ON THE CTLR WORKING THAT SECTOR. HIS TONE THROUGH THE ENTIRE APCH SEGMENT WITH THAT ATC SPECIALIST WAS ONE OF ARROGANCE. I HAVE BEEN FLYING IN THE PHL AREA FOR TWENTY YEARS, AND HAVE BEEN REMINDED OF OUR HIGH DENSITY ENVIRONMENT ON MANY OCCASIONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.