Narrative:

This incident involved two multiple failures both by this pilot and the tower controller. There was an accident chain developing and a much too close encounter between two aircraft under positive tower control. The incident began when I failed to correctly hear the ATIS. I was listening to both ATC and ATIS simultaneously; and missed a key NOTAM in the ATIS: that runway 17L was closed. From the time I picked up ATIS; about 90 miles out; until short final; I belabored under the mistaken assumption that I would be landing on 17L. Without listening to the ATC tapes I can't be sure what transpired with approach; although my right seat passenger distinctly remembered hearing; '17 left;' from approach. Be that as it may; I was given a clearance for a visual approach and to maintain 8000 ft until joining final at the north shore of the local reservoir. As we approached the reservoir's north shore at 8000 ft; which means a long right downwind to this airport; we saw another aircraft below us heading east (or right base). We wondered out loud where it was going; and whether or not it was landing at the same airport. It would not make sense for that aircraft to be in that relative position and also be approaching to land at the same time; so we were curious. As we were turning base; approach told us to contact the tower. I called and said; 'aircraft X visual 17 left;' and tower responded; 'aircraft X roger; continue.' so I continued to prepare for landing and line up for the runway. We could now see the other aircraft ahead of us and at a lower altitude; also lined up for landing. It appeared that our spacing wasn't good. Tower called the other aircraft and said; 'I extended you too far; make a left 360 and rejoin final; you will be behind tbm (aircraft X).' we saw the other aircraft immediately begin the left 360 as we continued down final. However; it was quickly obvious that the other aircraft would complete its 360 too quickly and turn right into us; making for a total lack of separation. As the other aircraft came around just past the 180 point in its turn; its pilot evidently saw us and stopped the turn; thus putting it on a left downwind about 200 ft to our left. We passed at the same altitude. At this point I noticed that runway 17L was not clear and it appeared that there was an aircraft on the arrival end; as if to depart. Within seconds I saw that it wasn't an aircraft at all; but the X marking a closed runway. I immediately side stepped to land on 17R and simultaneously reported to the tower that I had lined up for 17L and was side-stepping to 17R. There was no response from the tower (again; we would have to listen to the tapes to be certain). We landed; and as we approached the turnoff; tower called and told us to exit the runway at the next turnoff and to contact ground and to have a nice day. In retrospect; thinking through all of the tower communications during this approach; the following comes to mind: 1) tower did not correct me when I reported 'visual to 17 left;' but was told to continue. 2) we were never informed of the husky traffic either before it was told to make a 360 or later. 3) there is no way a 360 turn could provide adequate spacing for a husky and a trailing tbm; given their relative speeds and turning radii. 4) we were never cleared to land. Had there been a transmission stating; 'cleared to land on 17 right;' that would have broken the tunnel vision since I would have read it back. 5) there was no response to our transmission about side-stepping to 17R. The fact that I had missed the closed runway NOTAM in the ATIS was a contributing factor to this incident and it made us even closer to the husky once it had completed its 180 degree turn than we would have been had e been lined up for 17R. Part of the mental 'tunnel vision' of this situation is that it appeared that we were lined up behind the husky while on final; as if it too was heading for 17L. We turned final at about 6 miles out; so the anglesof view to the two runways would have been very close. Also; we were a bit to the right of the final approach line fort 17L when we were first established on final. All of that allowed for a perception that was consistent with my faulty mental assumption about which runway I would land on. It is fair to say that there were serious shortcomings in the tower; and a serious failure on my part to respect to the ATIS. Also; the alertness of the husky pilot broke the developing accident chain despite these failures. I believe that had the husky completes its 360; we would have been able to avoid a collision; as we were acutely aware of its position and maneuvering. My take away from this incident is to amend my method of picking up ATIS to place a special emphasis on clearly hearing the NOTAM section of the ATIS.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Socata TBM 850 pilot reported pilot and controller errors led to a near miss by two aircraft under positive ATC control in Class D airspace.

Narrative: This incident involved two multiple failures both by this pilot and the Tower Controller. There was an accident chain developing and a much too close encounter between two aircraft under positive Tower Control. The incident began when I failed to correctly hear the ATIS. I was listening to both ATC and ATIS simultaneously; and missed a key NOTAM in the ATIS: that Runway 17L was closed. From the time I picked up ATIS; about 90 miles out; until short final; I belabored under the mistaken assumption that I would be landing on 17L. Without listening to the ATC tapes I can't be sure what transpired with Approach; although my right seat passenger distinctly remembered hearing; '17 LEFT;' from Approach. Be that as it may; I was given a clearance for a visual approach and to maintain 8000 FT until joining final at the north shore of the local reservoir. As we approached the reservoir's north shore at 8000 FT; which means a long right downwind to this airport; we saw another aircraft below us heading east (or right base). We wondered out loud where it was going; and whether or not it was landing at the same airport. It would not make sense for that aircraft to be in that relative position and also be approaching to land at the same time; so we were curious. As we were turning base; Approach told us to contact the Tower. I called and said; 'Aircraft X visual 17 LEFT;' and Tower responded; 'Aircraft X roger; continue.' So I continued to prepare for landing and line up for the runway. We could now see the other aircraft ahead of us and at a lower altitude; also lined up for landing. It appeared that our spacing wasn't good. Tower called the other aircraft and said; 'I extended you too far; make a left 360 and rejoin final; you will be behind TBM (aircraft X).' We saw the other aircraft immediately begin the left 360 as we continued down final. However; it was quickly obvious that the other aircraft would complete its 360 too quickly and turn right into us; making for a total lack of separation. As the other aircraft came around just past the 180 point in its turn; its pilot evidently saw us and stopped the turn; thus putting it on a left downwind about 200 FT to our left. We passed at the same altitude. At this point I noticed that Runway 17L was not clear and it appeared that there was an aircraft on the arrival end; as if to depart. Within seconds I saw that it wasn't an aircraft at all; but the X marking a closed runway. I immediately side stepped to land on 17R and simultaneously reported to the Tower that I had lined up for 17L and was side-stepping to 17R. There was no response from the Tower (again; we would have to listen to the tapes to be certain). We landed; and as we approached the turnoff; Tower called and told us to exit the runway at the next turnoff and to contact Ground and to have a nice day. In retrospect; thinking through all of the Tower communications during this approach; the following comes to mind: 1) Tower did not correct me when I reported 'visual to 17 left;' but was told to continue. 2) We were never informed of the Husky traffic either before it was told to make a 360 or later. 3) There is no way a 360 turn could provide adequate spacing for a Husky and a trailing TBM; given their relative speeds and turning radii. 4) We were never cleared to land. Had there been a transmission stating; 'cleared to land on 17 RIGHT;' that would have broken the tunnel vision since I would have read it back. 5) There was no response to our transmission about side-stepping to 17R. The fact that I had missed the closed runway NOTAM in the ATIS was a contributing factor to this incident and it made us even closer to the Husky once it had completed its 180 degree turn than we would have been had e been lined up for 17R. Part of the mental 'tunnel vision' of this situation is that it appeared that we were lined up behind the Husky while on final; as if it too was heading for 17L. We turned final at about 6 miles out; so the anglesof view to the two runways would have been very close. Also; we were a bit to the right of the final approach line fort 17L when we were first established on final. All of that allowed for a perception that was consistent with my faulty mental assumption about which runway I would land on. It is fair to say that there were serious shortcomings in the Tower; and a serious failure on my part to respect to the ATIS. Also; the alertness of the Husky pilot broke the developing accident chain despite these failures. I believe that had the Husky completes its 360; we would have been able to avoid a collision; as we were acutely aware of its position and maneuvering. My take away from this incident is to amend my method of picking up ATIS to place a special emphasis on clearly hearing the NOTAM section of the ATIS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.