Command authority used in violation of federal aviation regulation.

Attributes
ACN	85714
Time
Date	198804
Day	Thu
Local Time Of Day	0601 To 1200
Place
Locale Reference	airport : pvd
State Reference	RI
Altitude	agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0
Environment
Flight Conditions	IMC
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Controlling Facilities	tower : mem
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	Large Transport, Low Wing, 3 Turbojet Eng
Flight Phase	climbout : takeoff descent : approach landing other
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : first officer
Qualification	pilot : flight engineer pilot : atp
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 8500 flight time type : 3000
ASRS Report	85714
Person 2
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Qualification	pilot : atp
Events
Anomaly	non adherence : far
Independent Detector	other flight crewa
Resolutory Action	none taken : anomaly accepted
Consequence	Other
Supplementary
Primary Problem	Flight Crew Human Performance
Air Traffic Incident	Pilot Deviation

Narrative:

*Reporter had been bumped back to first officer and very junior as the result of a merger. He is making every attempt to accept the demotion and be the best first officer possible. Was flying with a former company captain who was senior and was continuing to fly the left seat. Three incidents of command authority and questionable judgement came to light on this segment of trips. Gross weight information was not in the second officer flight manual and an attempt was made to get a copy from dispatch. Company ground personnel were not familiar with the required information and it could not be located. The captain called to return to the aircraft as they had the problem solved. During the taxiout the captain advised he was using weight information from a similar airport and elevation. Second incident involved landing minimums with the type of flight director on the aircraft. At the time of the merger the FAA mandated that if the flight crew had not received training on the flight director in use, the minimums would have to be 4000 and 3/4. First officer had been checked on different type flight director and felt he was not qualified. Captain elected to make the approach anyway. Third incident involved proceeding to an airport below minimums at time of departure and forecasted to remain. Captain advised if they delayed until the new forecast came out, which called for above minimum conditions, they would be legal to go. Elected to depart and at best completed the approach below minimums. Reporter finds it very difficult to be a good first officer under these conditions even thought he felt nothing was life threatening. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: gave information as to type aircraft involved. Feels the ground personnel are very limited in training and in general very lax. Finds it very difficult to operate under the conditions he now finds himself. At no time did the captain explain his decisions or apologize for his actions. The final approach ended up being made west/O the required callouts on final and the aircraft descended 100' below minimums with no comment from the captain.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: COMMAND AUTHORITY USED IN VIOLATION OF FEDERAL AVIATION REG.

Narrative: *RPTR HAD BEEN BUMPED BACK TO F/O AND VERY JUNIOR AS THE RESULT OF A MERGER. HE IS MAKING EVERY ATTEMPT TO ACCEPT THE DEMOTION AND BE THE BEST F/O POSSIBLE. WAS FLYING WITH A FORMER COMPANY CAPT WHO WAS SENIOR AND WAS CONTINUING TO FLY THE LEFT SEAT. THREE INCIDENTS OF COMMAND AUTHORITY AND QUESTIONABLE JUDGEMENT CAME TO LIGHT ON THIS SEGMENT OF TRIPS. GROSS WT INFO WAS NOT IN THE S/O FLT MANUAL AND AN ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO GET A COPY FROM DISPATCH. CGP WERE NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE REQUIRED INFO AND IT COULD NOT BE LOCATED. THE CAPT CALLED TO RETURN TO THE ACFT AS THEY HAD THE PROB SOLVED. DURING THE TAXIOUT THE CAPT ADVISED HE WAS USING WT INFO FROM A SIMILAR ARPT AND ELEVATION. SECOND INCIDENT INVOLVED LNDG MINIMUMS WITH THE TYPE OF FLT DIRECTOR ON THE ACFT. AT THE TIME OF THE MERGER THE FAA MANDATED THAT IF THE FLT CREW HAD NOT RECEIVED TRNING ON THE FLT DIRECTOR IN USE, THE MINIMUMS WOULD HAVE TO BE 4000 AND 3/4. F/O HAD BEEN CHKED ON DIFFERENT TYPE FLT DIRECTOR AND FELT HE WAS NOT QUALIFIED. CAPT ELECTED TO MAKE THE APCH ANYWAY. THIRD INCIDENT INVOLVED PROCEEDING TO AN ARPT BELOW MINIMUMS AT TIME OF DEP AND FORECASTED TO REMAIN. CAPT ADVISED IF THEY DELAYED UNTIL THE NEW FORECAST CAME OUT, WHICH CALLED FOR ABOVE MINIMUM CONDITIONS, THEY WOULD BE LEGAL TO GO. ELECTED TO DEPART AND AT BEST COMPLETED THE APCH BELOW MINIMUMS. RPTR FINDS IT VERY DIFFICULT TO BE A GOOD F/O UNDER THESE CONDITIONS EVEN THOUGHT HE FELT NOTHING WAS LIFE THREATENING. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: GAVE INFO AS TO TYPE ACFT INVOLVED. FEELS THE GND PERSONNEL ARE VERY LIMITED IN TRNING AND IN GENERAL VERY LAX. FINDS IT VERY DIFFICULT TO OPERATE UNDER THE CONDITIONS HE NOW FINDS HIMSELF. AT NO TIME DID THE CAPT EXPLAIN HIS DECISIONS OR APOLOGIZE FOR HIS ACTIONS. THE FINAL APCH ENDED UP BEING MADE W/O THE REQUIRED CALLOUTS ON FINAL AND THE ACFT DSNDED 100' BELOW MINIMUMS WITH NO COMMENT FROM THE CAPT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.