Narrative:

Departed teb runway 1 on the TEB6 departure. Procedure followed correctly. Tower hand-off to departure control normal. Several subsequent heading changes and altitude changes (i.e. Climb instructions to higher altitudes) given by ATC. The third controller (to the best of my recollection) stated we did not appear to be on the course assigned. He stated he didn't know what was going on; so a heading was assigned. That heading did not seem to agree so he assigned a heading of 180 degrees and asked us to advise him when we were on that heading. When we advised the controller we were on a 180-degree heading; the controller stated he was showing 163 degrees. He next issued a heading of 090 degrees. Once established on that heading and ATC advised; the controller stated that heading matched and we were given clearance direct pvd and expect to hold; instructions for holding would be later. In the mean time; we had assessed our situation and determined the pilot side switch was in free for the dg. The heading was corrected and switch placed in slave. No further action was needed following this procedure. As a crew; we were already seeing the discrepancy before ATC said anything. As the controller was assigning new headings; we were identifying the discrepancy and correcting. The pitch function of the autopilot failed enroute to teb. Following a landing at teb; maintenance was advised; and a plan was formulated for resolving the failure. As the aircraft was being pulled from the hangar following the return to service; the lead passenger called and advised they would be at the airport in about 1 hour and 10 minutes (this was 90 minutes sooner than originally expected). We; as a crew; decided to complete a thorough preflight following maintenance; thorough checklist; including the 48+ step expanded autopilot functional test; from the afm. Also; we; as a crew; decided to obtain ATIS and obtain the ATC clearance with both of us on the radio to ensure accuracy and completeness. Note: as a crew; both of us; as a review; completed the on-line training for teb airport. When all tasks were completed; I went inside the FBO to pay for appropriate services. At the same time; the passengers walked in the door. The constant flow of phone conversations; task expectations; normal flight crew duties and responsibilities; passengers advising of earlier departure; high usage airport (i.e. Teb) to high usage airport over short distance; task saturation; at night in IMC; etc. All contributed to a compressed time table. Even when time constraints are a significant consideration; the crew must still maintain priorities. Perhaps passengers who call for earlier than planned departures should be told the crew will do what they can to move the flight departure to the earlier request; but will in no way shorten any tasks just to satisfy the request. Also; following maintenance; dispatch and all other parties involved must be aware that additional time will be necessary for the crew to determine the airworthiness of the aircraft for the purpose of flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A corporate jet flight crew deviated from the TEB6 SID track. It was found that the DG switch was in FREE instead of SLAVE. Flight operated normally after switch was repositioned.

Narrative: Departed TEB Runway 1 on the TEB6 departure. Procedure followed correctly. Tower hand-off to Departure Control normal. Several subsequent heading changes and altitude changes (i.e. climb instructions to higher altitudes) given by ATC. The third Controller (to the best of my recollection) stated we did not appear to be on the course assigned. He stated he didn't know what was going on; so a heading was assigned. That heading did not seem to agree so he assigned a heading of 180 degrees and asked us to advise him when we were on that heading. When we advised the Controller we were on a 180-degree heading; the Controller stated he was showing 163 degrees. He next issued a heading of 090 degrees. Once established on that heading and ATC advised; the controller stated that heading matched and we were given clearance direct PVD and expect to hold; instructions for holding would be later. In the mean time; we had assessed our situation and determined the pilot side switch was in FREE for the DG. The heading was corrected and switch placed in SLAVE. No further action was needed following this procedure. As a crew; we were already seeing the discrepancy before ATC said anything. As the Controller was assigning new headings; we were identifying the discrepancy and correcting. The pitch function of the autopilot failed enroute to TEB. Following a landing at TEB; maintenance was advised; and a plan was formulated for resolving the failure. As the aircraft was being pulled from the hangar following the return to service; the lead passenger called and advised they would be at the airport in about 1 hour and 10 minutes (this was 90 minutes sooner than originally expected). We; as a crew; decided to complete a thorough preflight following maintenance; thorough checklist; including the 48+ step expanded Autopilot Functional Test; from the AFM. Also; we; as a crew; decided to obtain ATIS and obtain the ATC clearance with both of us on the radio to ensure accuracy and completeness. NOTE: As a crew; both of us; as a review; completed the on-line training for TEB airport. When all tasks were completed; I went inside the FBO to pay for appropriate services. At the same time; the passengers walked in the door. The constant flow of phone conversations; task expectations; normal flight crew duties and responsibilities; passengers advising of earlier departure; high usage airport (i.e. TEB) to high usage airport over short distance; task saturation; at night in IMC; etc. all contributed to a compressed time table. Even when time constraints are a significant consideration; the crew must still maintain priorities. Perhaps passengers who call for earlier than planned departures should be told the crew will do what they can to move the flight departure to the earlier request; but will in no way shorten any tasks just to satisfy the request. Also; following maintenance; dispatch and all other parties involved must be aware that additional time will be necessary for the crew to determine the airworthiness of the aircraft for the purpose of flight.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.