Narrative:

Inside the final approach fix for the ILS runway 9R. I feathered the right engine after it started to surge; and I suspected possible fuel starvation. I then continued the approach; landed and then taxied to the ramp on my remaining engine. ATC had not been notified of the incident as it occurred; and no emergency services or any other agency was involved. Once I had parked the aircraft on the ramp. I left my personal belongings in the airplane; and began to look for my assistant chief pilot who was in his office at the time. I then asked him if he had a minute. And began to tell him what had happened. In the morning we had left with full tanks; though we always get some fuel when we land at an intermediate station for the trip home. This fuel is normally just reserve fuel that we rarely burn in to. Normally this would be anywhere between 15 and 20 gallons total. Today I got 46 total. Today's flight had begun with solid IFR conditions all the way to our first destination picking up ice and shooting the approach. The rest of the legs for the day would be the same way. I anticipated this when I made the fuel purchase. The evening flight home seemed no different than our first flight this morning; and we had had no abnormal flight delays. Before the last flight home I had asked my first officer to calculate our fuel burn for the leg and let me know how much fuel we had remaining; while I loaded and signed paperwork for the customers. He calculated that we had 360 lbs remaining; I recalculated and confirmed that that was the fuel we had remaining. We did the math and both concurred that we had enough fuel and reserves for the final leg of our flight; I used my phone to recheck the destination and alternate weather; and we then proceeded to depart runway 29. This was his leg. I monitored him until we reached our cruise altitude of 8000 ft; and then began doing the paperwork for the flight; to include the air bills; and the maintenance log for the day. I would periodically check up to scan altitude; heading; course; I was also making all of the radio calls. And should have been monitoring our progress much more along the route. We contacted approach and had started our decent from 8000 ft to 6000 ft; and had been told that we should expect vectors for the ILS runway 9R. Upon being vectored for the approach is when I became uncomfortable with what the fuel gauges said; I then told the first officer that this would be my approach and then took control of the aircraft. I was in disbelief of what the gauges told me based on our calculation. We were on base and cleared for the approach; and intercepted the localizer; and began our final step-down when the fuel light came on. We reached the final approach fix and started the decent when the engine began to surge. I expected fuel starvation at that point. I ensured the fuel pumps were in the on position; identified; verified; feathered; and cutoff the mixture. Upon clean-up I decided to keep the gear in the down position and continued; broke out well above minimums; landed and taxied to the ramp; where I shutdown; secured the aircraft; and then went to find my assistant chief pilot. After landing the aircraft and reviewing the events that occurred; I was still in disbelief that we had to shut the engine down due to starvation. Though I had done this route quite a few times before I had never had any weather like this before. Even previous flights where pilots had had bad weather tonight's flight apparently had been the longest on record for the run. Yes; I have had tailwinds and headwinds; and had to shoot approaches for this run; but the leg time ended up much longer than normal. Going into our home airport all the time I have been up here in a calm wind situation when the ILS for runway 27 has been in use. Which has been a fairly straight in vector for the approach coming in from the east; though on this night I would be vectored about 15 miles west of the airport for the ILS runway 9R;which added an unexpected extra 15 minutes to the flight; compared to the ILS runway 27L. The obstacle departure procedures departing out of two of our airports today also may have added for some unaccounted time at climb power; and extra fuel burn. For this aircraft I found that I would climb at 34 gph rather than 30 to keep the cht's down. We also had 1.6 hours extra for block time for the entire route. Though the companies fuel policy of 36 gph accounts for taxi climb-out and cruise; we may have used more. After review of the run-sheet; that night's last leg was definitely longer than I or my first officer had expected it to be. The extra time spent at climb power for the flight; and the extra block time on the ground for the day had burned the fuel that still should have been there at the time of the incident. According to the paperwork after the incident there still should have been 16 minutes of fuel remaining in the tanks. Fatigue I am sure was a likely factor though it did not seem apparent at the time due to adrenaline. But the block time for the day had been 7.7 hours of about only 20 minutes of it were in VFR conditions; otherwise we were hand-flying the aircraft in IMC; picking up ice and frequent turbulence.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A PA31 Captain shut an engine down on final approach after it began surging because of fuel starvation. Wind and weather were the primary factors for excessive fuel usage.

Narrative: Inside the final approach fix for the ILS Runway 9R. I feathered the right engine after it started to surge; and I suspected possible fuel starvation. I then continued the approach; landed and then taxied to the ramp on my remaining engine. ATC had not been notified of the incident as it occurred; and no emergency services or any other agency was involved. Once I had parked the aircraft on the ramp. I left my personal belongings in the airplane; and began to look for my Assistant Chief Pilot who was in his office at the time. I then asked him if he had a minute. And began to tell him what had happened. In the morning we had left with full tanks; though we always get some fuel when we land at an intermediate station for the trip home. This fuel is normally just reserve fuel that we rarely burn in to. Normally this would be anywhere between 15 and 20 gallons total. Today I got 46 total. Today's flight had begun with solid IFR conditions all the way to our first destination picking up ice and shooting the approach. The rest of the legs for the day would be the same way. I anticipated this when I made the fuel purchase. The evening flight home seemed no different than our first flight this morning; and we had had no abnormal flight delays. Before the last flight home I had asked my First Officer to calculate our fuel burn for the leg and let me know how much fuel we had remaining; while I loaded and signed paperwork for the customers. He calculated that we had 360 lbs remaining; I recalculated and confirmed that that was the fuel we had remaining. We did the math and both concurred that we had enough fuel and reserves for the final leg of our flight; I used my phone to recheck the destination and alternate weather; and we then proceeded to depart Runway 29. This was his leg. I monitored him until we reached our cruise altitude of 8000 FT; and then began doing the paperwork for the flight; to include the air bills; and the maintenance log for the day. I would periodically check up to scan altitude; heading; course; I was also making all of the radio calls. And should have been monitoring our progress much more along the route. We contacted Approach and had started our decent from 8000 FT to 6000 FT; and had been told that we should expect vectors for the ILS Runway 9R. Upon being vectored for the approach is when I became uncomfortable with what the fuel gauges said; I then told the First Officer that this would be my approach and then took control of the aircraft. I was in disbelief of what the gauges told me based on our calculation. We were on Base and cleared for the approach; and intercepted the localizer; and began our final step-down when the fuel light came on. We reached the final approach fix and started the decent when the engine began to surge. I expected fuel starvation at that point. I ensured the fuel pumps were in the on position; identified; verified; feathered; and cutoff the mixture. Upon clean-up I decided to keep the gear in the down position and continued; broke out well above minimums; landed and taxied to the ramp; where I shutdown; secured the aircraft; and then went to find my Assistant Chief Pilot. After landing the aircraft and reviewing the events that occurred; I was still in disbelief that we had to shut the engine down due to starvation. Though I had done this route quite a few times before I had never had any weather like this before. Even previous flights where pilots had had bad weather tonight's flight apparently had been the longest on record for the run. Yes; I have had tailwinds and headwinds; and had to shoot approaches for this run; but the leg time ended up much longer than normal. Going into our home airport all the time I have been up here in a calm wind situation when the ILS for Runway 27 has been in use. Which has been a fairly straight in vector for the approach coming in from the east; though on this night I would be vectored about 15 miles west of the airport for the ILS Runway 9R;which added an unexpected extra 15 minutes to the flight; compared to the ILS Runway 27L. The Obstacle Departure Procedures departing out of two of our airports today also may have added for some unaccounted time at climb power; and extra fuel burn. For this aircraft I found that I would climb at 34 GPH rather than 30 to keep the CHT's down. We also had 1.6 hours extra for block time for the entire route. Though the companies fuel policy of 36 GPH accounts for taxi climb-out and cruise; we may have used more. After review of the run-sheet; that night's last leg was definitely longer than I or my First Officer had expected it to be. The extra time spent at climb power for the flight; and the extra block time on the ground for the day had burned the fuel that still should have been there at the time of the incident. According to the paperwork after the incident there still should have been 16 minutes of fuel remaining in the tanks. Fatigue I am sure was a likely factor though it did not seem apparent at the time due to adrenaline. But the block time for the day had been 7.7 hours of about only 20 minutes of it were in VFR conditions; otherwise we were hand-flying the aircraft in IMC; picking up ice and frequent turbulence.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.