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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 859272 |
Time | |
Date | 200911 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B717 (Formerly MD-95) |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Parked |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Flight Dynamics |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical |
Narrative:
On the aircraft's inbound leg at 20;900 ft the crew experienced a versatile integrated avionics (via) failure and about 20 engine and alert (ead) messages that accompany a via failure. The crew got off and me and my first officer watched the maintenance people power down the airplane and do a return to service test. The errors were gone and the aircraft passed the rts test. We flew to ZZZ uneventfully. While pushing back in ZZZ we got 3 intermittent via failures. We continued to start the engines assuming the airplane would clear the errors by itself. Finally the via failed a final time. We got the via fail alert and at least 17 other ead messages. I returned to the gate. Maintenance control called contract maintenance. While sitting at the gate I realized that running the primary pitch trim made the cockpit lights dim. The contract mechanic rebooted the airplane and the alerts were gone. We then ran the engines and verified that the aircraft lights only dimmed when the airplane was powered by the APU. Maintenance control then decided to MEL the APU. This had done nothing to address the via failure other than make the alerts go away the same way as they had done previously. Maintenance control was convinced that meling the APU would prevent further via failures. The aircraft has 2 issues. Only one was addressed. In fact; they were now removing a source of power from an airplane with electrical problems. Each and every mechanic I spoke to had no idea what he was talking about and wanted whatever it took to get me to take the airplane. No mechanic wanted to listen to what I was saying. Maintenance's only goal was making the error on the ead go away. Each time I spoke to maintenance control their attitude (loudly) was 'the alert is gone; what's the problem?' in both instances they were only trying to 'silence' the warning system not fix the problem. This silence the warning and not fix the problem is very common. This is the electronic equivalent of putting tape over the warning light so you can't see the warning. While I never had to flat out refuse the airplane I had my phone in my hand and was dialing when the mechanic came off the plane and told me maintenance control took the aircraft out of service. Maintenance pressured me to take and non-airworthy airplane for almost 3 hours before finally removing the aircraft from service. I understand that maintenance flew to ZZZ and spent the night working on the airplane. It still had a mechanical for its expected repair time and did not leave on schedule. For a quick understanding for the non-pilots reading this. When the via fails the 717 looses all the dashboard screens for a few seconds. When the via fails intermittently; like this one did; all of the screens flash and the information bounces around while the airplane hunts for what is working and what is not. This means that while you may have all the info you want; but with all the screens changing and flashing so fast; you can't find it. Kind of like if you were driving on the highway and only got to open your eyes for 1 second on random intervals. This situation will continue until the via fails completely or the system stabilizes. Maintenance control needs to listen to the pilot and start fixing things instead of hiding the warning system and pressuring the pilot to take the plane to move the problem around the system. Management has pressured maintenance into just hiding problems and not fixing the planes.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B717 Captain laments the propensity of maintenance to MEL or reset computers after VIA failures (versatile integrated avionics) on two flights.
Narrative: On the aircraft's inbound leg at 20;900 FT the crew experienced a Versatile Integrated Avionics (VIA) failure and about 20 engine and alert (EAD) messages that accompany a VIA failure. The crew got off and me and my First Officer watched the maintenance people power down the airplane and do a return to service test. The errors were gone and the aircraft passed the RTS test. We flew to ZZZ uneventfully. While pushing back in ZZZ we got 3 intermittent VIA failures. We continued to start the engines assuming the airplane would clear the errors by itself. Finally the VIA failed a final time. We got the VIA fail alert and at least 17 other EAD messages. I returned to the gate. Maintenance Control called contract maintenance. While sitting at the gate I realized that running the primary pitch trim made the cockpit lights dim. The Contract Mechanic rebooted the airplane and the alerts were gone. We then ran the engines and verified that the aircraft lights only dimmed when the airplane was powered by the APU. Maintenance Control then decided to MEL the APU. This had done nothing to address the VIA failure other than make the alerts go away the same way as they had done previously. Maintenance Control was convinced that MELing the APU would prevent further VIA failures. The aircraft has 2 issues. Only one was addressed. In fact; they were now removing a source of power from an airplane with electrical problems. Each and every mechanic I spoke to had no idea what he was talking about and wanted whatever it took to get me to take the airplane. No mechanic wanted to listen to what I was saying. Maintenance's only goal was making the error on the EAD go away. Each time I spoke to Maintenance Control their attitude (loudly) was 'the alert is gone; what's the problem?' In both instances they were only trying to 'silence' the warning system not fix the problem. This silence the warning and not fix the problem is VERY common. This is the electronic equivalent of putting tape over the warning light so you can't see the warning. While I never had to flat out refuse the airplane I had my phone in my hand and was dialing when the Mechanic came off the plane and told me Maintenance Control took the aircraft out of service. Maintenance pressured me to take and non-airworthy airplane for almost 3 hours before finally removing the aircraft from service. I understand that maintenance flew to ZZZ and spent the night working on the airplane. It still had a mechanical for its expected repair time and did not leave on schedule. For a quick understanding for the non-pilots reading this. When the VIA fails the 717 looses all the dashboard screens for a few seconds. When the VIA fails intermittently; like this one did; all of the screens flash and the information bounces around while the airplane hunts for what is working and what is not. This means that while you may have all the info you want; but with all the screens changing and flashing so fast; you can't find it. Kind of like if you were driving on the highway and only got to open your eyes for 1 second on random intervals. This situation will continue until the VIA fails completely or the system stabilizes. Maintenance Control needs to listen to the Pilot and start fixing things instead of hiding the warning system and pressuring the pilot to take the plane to move the problem around the system. Management has pressured Maintenance into just hiding problems and not fixing the planes.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.