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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 861670 |
Time | |
Date | 200911 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZMP.ARTCC |
State Reference | MN |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | Marginal |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | A320 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Climb |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Hydraulic System |
Person 1 | |
Function | First Officer Pilot Flying |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 270 Flight Crew Total 15000 Flight Crew Type 600 |
Person 2 | |
Function | Pilot Not Flying Captain |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 210 Flight Crew Total 19000 Flight Crew Type 720 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
On climb out of oma near cruise; we got a 'hydraulic Y res ovht' ECAM. I flew the airplane and the captain worked the ECAM. The ECAM directed us to turn off the engine 2 hydraulic pump as well as the ptu switch. We completed the ECAM and FM checklists; computed an irregular configuration landing distance and continued to destination. Per ECAM; we turned on the engine 2 hydraulic pump on final and landed normally. We advised maintenance and dispatch. We also asked both dispatch and ramp control (after landing) to advise the ramp personnel to not operate cargo doors until advised by maintenance and asked to have the wheels chocked. The cargo doors were opened immediately after block in and the wheels were not chocked right away. After talking with ramp control and maintenance; the captain said the ramp had been called; yet no one seemed to get the word.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: The failure of ground personnel to comply with appropriate handling of the aircraft at the gate following an A320 yellow system hydraulic failure enroute may be a greater hazard than the system failure itself.
Narrative: On climb out of OMA near cruise; we got a 'HYD Y RES OVHT' ECAM. I flew the airplane and the Captain worked the ECAM. The ECAM directed us to turn off the ENG 2 HYD Pump as well as the PTU switch. We completed the ECAM and FM checklists; computed an irregular configuration landing distance and continued to destination. Per ECAM; we turned on the ENG 2 HYD Pump on final and landed normally. We advised Maintenance and Dispatch. We also asked both Dispatch and Ramp Control (after landing) to advise the Ramp Personnel to not operate cargo doors until advised by Maintenance and asked to have the wheels chocked. The cargo doors were opened immediately after block in and the wheels were not chocked right away. After talking with Ramp Control and Maintenance; the Captain said the Ramp had been called; yet no one seemed to get the word.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.