Narrative:

Landed 31. Took high speed taxiway to gate. Did not pre-state or coordinate with the first officer of possible intentions of being able to take taxiway to gate. Conversation between captain and ATC at time of turning off 31 did not allow for adequate communication between ground control; subsequently continuing to gate. In retrospect; captain should have stated potential of turning off at delta; if there were no aircraft blocking that taxiway/intersection. There was an aircraft that had pushed off the gate and was observed by the captain just subsequently to taking control of the jet and turning off at the high speed taxiway. Tower controller had stated;'to continue to rwy 36...' and captain came on radio and stated '...unable; already committed to the turnoff...' this conversation did not lend itself for 'official' clearance to gate. Subsequently; just about the time the jet was turning from the high speed taxiway into the safety area of gate the first officer called ground and said we were at the gate. The ground controller asked for a phone call. Captain called; discussed with tower supervisor; and was advised in the future just ask for the taxiway before turning off the runway at that point. Captain acknowledged the advisory; thanked the controller for listening; and ended the conversation. Subsequent to the end of the trip; captain and first officer discussed the situation previously encountered. Captain called back to tower; talked to a supervisor on duty; and he was working with the tower controller that was involved with the flight. Captain advised there would be paperwork/report submitted and wanted to know if there was anything else he needed to do. At this time the captain was just advised that it was of those 'don't do it again' type situations and the airport had no further intentions of needing to file any reports. In short; captain (pm) failed to coordinate potential intentions with the first officer and put the first officer in a compromising situation; along with the tower controller. The aircraft should have been slowed to a taxi speed or stopped and allowed for more time to get proper clearance into the gate. Having reviewed it all again; the captain feels there is adequate space to do a safe turnoff from 31 to the high speed taxiway; provided the clearance is obtained; the aircraft is slowed; and crew has time to get clearance further on the high speed taxiway or subsequently into the gate areas. Tower supervisor did confirm all this on the last conversation with the captain.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737 Captain turned off a Runway onto a high speed taxiway after being told to continue on the Runway. The Captain reviewed his actions with ATC.

Narrative: Landed 31. Took high speed taxiway to Gate. Did not pre-state or coordinate with the First Officer of possible intentions of being able to take taxiway to gate. Conversation between Captain and ATC at time of turning off 31 did not allow for adequate communication between Ground Control; subsequently continuing to Gate. In retrospect; Captain should have stated potential of turning off at Delta; if there were no aircraft blocking that taxiway/intersection. There was an aircraft that had pushed off the gate and was observed by the Captain just subsequently to taking control of the jet and turning off at the high speed taxiway. Tower Controller had stated;'to continue to Rwy 36...' and Captain came on radio and stated '...unable; already committed to the turnoff...' This conversation did not lend itself for 'official' clearance to Gate. Subsequently; just about the time the jet was turning from the high speed taxiway into the safety area of Gate the First Officer called Ground and said we were at the gate. The Ground Controller asked for a phone call. Captain called; discussed with Tower Supervisor; and was advised in the future just ask for the taxiway before turning off the runway at that point. Captain acknowledged the advisory; thanked the Controller for listening; and ended the conversation. Subsequent to the end of the trip; Captain and First Officer discussed the situation previously encountered. Captain called back to Tower; talked to a Supervisor on duty; and he was working with the Tower Controller that was involved with the flight. Captain advised there would be paperwork/report submitted and wanted to know if there was anything else he needed to do. At this time the Captain was just advised that it was of those 'don't do it again' type situations and the Airport had no further intentions of needing to file any reports. In short; Captain (PM) failed to coordinate potential intentions with the First Officer and put the First Officer in a compromising situation; along with the Tower Controller. The aircraft should have been slowed to a taxi speed or stopped and allowed for more time to get proper clearance into the gate. Having reviewed it all again; the Captain feels there IS adequate space to do a safe turnoff from 31 to the high speed taxiway; provided the clearance IS obtained; the aircraft is slowed; and Crew has time to get clearance further on the high speed taxiway or subsequently into the gate areas. Tower Supervisor did confirm all this on the last conversation with the Captain.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.