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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 862597 |
Time | |
Date | 200911 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | SAN.Airport |
State Reference | CA |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B767-300 and 300 ER |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Climb |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Navigational Equipment and Processing |
Person 1 | |
Function | First Officer Pilot Not Flying |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Deviation - Procedural Clearance Deviation - Speed All Types |
Narrative:
Due to lack of familiarity with the flight instrument upgrade installed on our aircraft we exceeded RNAV departure speed restriction at san and max speed restriction below 10;000 ft. Our max speed was 263 KTS. Lack of familiarity with the flight instrument upgrade prevented our being able to achieve an effective instrument crosscheck and notice the deviation in a timely manner. Autopilot not engaged at 500 ft due to fixation on unfamiliar flight instrument upgrade instrumentation. This speed placed us on the outside (right) of planned departure track; max cross-track error on the FMC did not exceed 0.4 NM. We corrected back to proper speed and track with no comment from socal departure control. During the flight I attempted to reference our aircraft operating manual for more information about the flight instrument upgrade; but it contained little more information than was contained on the flight instrument upgrade quick reference guide. Our flight had been asked to accomplish a flight confidence check; sometimes referred to as a practice autoland approach. Our actual clearance was for a visual approach to runway 31L. The captain attempted to configure the flight guidance system for the approach; but the aircraft did not seem to be properly intercepting or tracking the approached guidance signals; so he disengaged and re-engaged the auto flight system and re-configured the flight guidance system for the approach; and this time the aircraft seemed to perform normally. Both jfk approach control and tower had been informed of our practice autoland approach intentions; and ILS critical area protection had been requested and denied. Due to unfamiliarity with the flight instrument upgrade we missed or were late on several required call-outs. The aircraft touched down on center line within the touchdown zone; but the auto flight system was disengaged shortly after nosewheel touchdown (approximately 120 KTS) due to continued unfamiliarity with the flight instrument upgrade indications and we later realized we may not have complied with the flight confidence check requirement to ensure centerline tracking down to a reasonable speed for normal turn-off. I entered the flight confidence check ACARS code at the captain's direction; but we later both realized that this may have been done in error. Throughout the flight I felt that safety was being compromised because I had never before flown a flight instrument upgrade aircraft or simulator; and because the captain had last operated a flight instrument upgrade simulator 5 months ago and to his recollection had not ever flown a flight instrument upgrade aircraft. During preflight; the captain asked if I would fly the leg. I told him that 'I was not comfortable with' flying the leg because my only experience with the flight instrument upgrade was having completed a flight instrument upgrade computer based training module on 2 occasions. Had I been given a choice I would have declined to fly this aircraft because of my unfamiliarity and lack of proficiency with the flight instrument upgrade. Because I know that I was considered 'qualified' to operate the flight instrument upgrade equipped aircraft based on my completion of the flight instrument upgrade computer based training lesson; and because I had been told that my company had attempted to discipline several pilots who had refused to take a check ride in a flight instrument upgrade simulator after requesting and being denied additional training I believed I had no choice in the matter. I had been told that other pilots had been allowed to take as much time as they needed during the preflight checks when assigned to fly a flight instrument upgrade equipped aircraft for the first time or after an extended time; but our greater difficulties occurred during flight; not preflight. I believe that there should be greater qualification and currency requirement for the flight instrument upgrade. Our current qualification training consists only of viewing a flight instrument upgrade computer based training lesson; but I believe that the minimum qualification training should include 2 full simulator periods (4 hours each) in a flight instrument upgrade equipped simulator; followed by a minimum of 2 legs in a flight instrument upgrade equipped aircraft with a check airman. The difficulties I experienced are typical to those experienced by many other pilots without adequate or recent experience in the flight instrument upgrade with whom I have talked. There is no flight instrument upgrade currency requirement. I believe that there should be a minimum currency requirement of accomplishing a flight instrument upgrade flight (preflight; takeoff; and landing) in a flight instrument upgrade equipped simulator or aircraft at least every 90 days. The difficulties experienced by the captain after 5 months without operating a flight instrument upgrade equipped simulator or aircraft are typical of those experienced by pilots with a previous flight instrument upgrade training or operating event; but without recent experience in the flight instrument upgrade with whom I have talked. Pilots with prior experience in flight instrument upgraded aircraft--737; 777; MD11; F100--report fewer difficulties in adjusting to the 757-767 flight instrument upgrade. I report all of this information not to criticize our training; qualification and currency requirements but to encourage additional qualification and currency requirements in the interest of safety. I truly believe that the difficulties we experienced; given different circumstances--such as an engine failure at night and/or in the weather--could contribute to or result in an accident or incident.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A B767-300 flight crew reported lack of familiarity due to inadequate training on an upgraded flight instrument system contributed to a flap overspeed and an improperly completed auto-landing performance check.
Narrative: Due to lack of familiarity with the flight instrument upgrade installed on our aircraft we exceeded RNAV departure speed restriction at SAN and max speed restriction below 10;000 FT. Our max speed was 263 KTS. Lack of familiarity with the flight instrument upgrade prevented our being able to achieve an effective instrument crosscheck and notice the deviation in a timely manner. Autopilot not engaged at 500 FT due to fixation on unfamiliar flight instrument upgrade instrumentation. This speed placed us on the outside (right) of planned departure track; max cross-track error on the FMC did not exceed 0.4 NM. We corrected back to proper speed and track with no comment from SOCAL Departure Control. During the flight I attempted to reference our aircraft Operating Manual for more information about the flight instrument upgrade; but it contained little more information than was contained on the flight instrument upgrade quick Reference guide. Our flight had been asked to accomplish a flight confidence check; sometimes referred to as a practice autoland approach. Our actual clearance was for a visual approach to Runway 31L. The Captain attempted to configure the flight guidance system for the approach; but the aircraft did not seem to be properly intercepting or tracking the approached guidance signals; so he disengaged and re-engaged the auto flight system and re-configured the flight guidance system for the approach; and this time the aircraft seemed to perform normally. Both JFK Approach Control and Tower had been informed of our practice autoland approach intentions; and ILS critical Area Protection had been requested and denied. Due to unfamiliarity with the flight instrument upgrade we missed or were late on several required call-outs. The aircraft touched down on center line within the Touchdown Zone; but the auto flight system was disengaged shortly after nosewheel touchdown (approximately 120 KTS) due to continued unfamiliarity with the flight instrument upgrade indications and we later realized we may not have complied with the flight confidence check requirement to ensure centerline tracking down to a reasonable speed for normal turn-off. I entered the flight confidence check ACARS code at the Captain's direction; but we later both realized that this may have been done in error. Throughout the flight I felt that safety was being compromised because I had never before flown a flight instrument upgrade aircraft or simulator; and because the Captain had last operated a flight instrument upgrade simulator 5 months ago and to his recollection had not ever flown a flight instrument upgrade aircraft. During preflight; the Captain asked if I would fly the leg. I told him that 'I was not comfortable with' flying the leg because my only experience with the flight instrument upgrade was having completed a flight instrument upgrade Computer Based Training module on 2 occasions. Had I been given a choice I would have declined to fly this aircraft because of my unfamiliarity and lack of proficiency with the flight instrument upgrade. Because I know that I was considered 'qualified' to operate the flight instrument upgrade equipped aircraft based on my completion of the flight instrument upgrade Computer Based Training lesson; and because I had been told that my company had attempted to discipline several pilots who had refused to take a check ride in a flight instrument upgrade simulator after requesting and being denied additional training I believed I had no choice in the matter. I had been told that other pilots had been allowed to take as much time as they needed during the preflight checks when assigned to fly a flight instrument upgrade equipped aircraft for the first time or after an extended time; but our greater difficulties occurred during flight; not preflight. I believe that there should be greater qualification and currency requirement for the flight instrument upgrade. Our current qualification training consists only of viewing a flight instrument upgrade Computer Based Training lesson; but I believe that the minimum qualification training should include 2 full simulator periods (4 hours each) in a flight instrument upgrade equipped simulator; followed by a minimum of 2 legs in a flight instrument upgrade equipped aircraft with a Check Airman. The difficulties I experienced are typical to those experienced by many other pilots without adequate or recent experience in the flight instrument upgrade with whom I have talked. There is no flight instrument upgrade currency requirement. I believe that there should be a minimum currency requirement of accomplishing a flight instrument upgrade flight (preflight; takeoff; and landing) in a flight instrument upgrade equipped simulator or aircraft at least every 90 days. The difficulties experienced by the Captain after 5 months without operating a flight instrument upgrade equipped simulator or aircraft are typical of those experienced by pilots with a previous flight instrument upgrade training or operating event; but without recent experience in the flight instrument upgrade with whom I have talked. Pilots with prior experience in flight instrument upgraded aircraft--737; 777; MD11; F100--report fewer difficulties in adjusting to the 757-767 flight instrument upgrade. I report all of this information not to criticize our training; qualification and currency requirements but to encourage additional qualification and currency requirements in the interest of safety. I truly believe that the difficulties we experienced; given different circumstances--such as an engine failure at night and/or in the weather--could contribute to or result in an accident or incident.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.