Enroute controller in charge described loss of separation event when a developmental misunderstood a...

Narrative:

At the time of the incident I was preforming controller-in-charge (controller in charge) duties at the watch desk. I had assigned the controller to the sector xx radar position; knowing that he was not yet a full cpc (certified professional controller); but was qualified to work that position. There were no factors that would increase the sector difficulty (weather; military activity; equipment issues; traffic projections from metering alert...) so an assistant was not assigned to sector xx RA position. My first indication that there was any problem was when the omic (operations manager in charge) called down with an oedp (operational error detection program) alert. Recommendation; perhaps the new policy of letting a developmental controller work a sector alone prior to his/her 4th sector qualification may be looked at again. The controller expressed some confusion over the vertical separation requirements outside rvsm airspace; specifically at or above FL410. Perhaps a briefing of some type; encouraging developmental controllers to ask questions or request assistance if there is any doubt whatsoever about procedures or separation from the front line manager (flm)/controller in charge or any cpc nearby. That doing this will not make them look 'weak' or inferior but it is simply another tool insuring safety.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Enroute CIC described loss of separation event when a developmental misunderstood altitude separation requirements above FL410 applying less than the 2000 feet required.

Narrative: At the time of the incident I was preforming Controller-In-Charge (CIC) duties at the watch desk. I had assigned the controller to the sector XX RADAR position; knowing that he was not yet a full CPC (Certified Professional Controller); but was qualified to work that position. There were no factors that would increase the sector difficulty (weather; military activity; equipment issues; traffic projections from metering alert...) so an assistant was not assigned to sector XX RA position. My first indication that there was any problem was when the OMIC (Operations Manager In Charge) called down with an OEDP (Operational Error Detection Program) alert. Recommendation; perhaps the new policy of letting a developmental controller work a sector alone prior to his/her 4th sector qualification may be looked at again. The controller expressed some confusion over the vertical separation requirements outside RVSM airspace; specifically at or above FL410. Perhaps a briefing of some type; encouraging developmental controllers to ask questions or request assistance if there is any doubt whatsoever about procedures or separation from the Front Line Manager (FLM)/CIC or any CPC nearby. That doing this will not make them look 'weak' or inferior but it is simply another tool insuring safety.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

Attributes
ACN	863635
Time
Date	200912
Local Time Of Day	1801-2400
Place
Locale Reference	ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference	FO
Aircraft 1
Make Model Name	Light Transport Low Wing 2 Turbojet Eng
Flight Phase	Climb
Flight Plan	IFR
Aircraft 2
Make Model Name	Medium Transport Low Wing 2 Turbojet Eng
Flight Phase	Cruise
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Function	Supervisor / CIC
Qualification	Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Person 2
Function	Enroute
Qualification	Air Traffic Control Developmental
Events
Anomaly	ATC Issue All Types Conflict Airborne Conflict Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Miss Distance	Vertical 1400

Enroute controller in charge described loss of separation event when a developmental misunderstood altitude separation requirements above FL410 applying less than the 2000 feet required.