Narrative:

We were flying a part 91 maintenance ferry flight. Reserve minimum call-out. Captains leg. Flight was uneventful and VMC with a 1000ft cloud layer giving a 4700 ft overcast ceiling. Vectors to short visual final with multiple traffic calls in the area. Captain leveled at 3000 and slowed down and called for flaps 1 and 5. I got a good ILS signal and we proceeded down the glidepath. Passing 2500; captain called for flaps 20 and gear down. Gear came down normally; but the flaps remained at 5 and we got a te flap disagree message. I grabbed the QRH and said we should go into holding because the checklist takes a while to run. I feel there was a breakdown in communication at this point because I suggested going into holding and the captain disagreed and stated we do this all the time in the simulator and was comfortable landing with this configuration. I quickly reviewed the checklist which read if flaps indicated less than 20; to use flaps 20 vref for landing. I again asked the captain if they would like to level off and we take vectors back around. The captain said they were very comfortable with the configuration and didn't want to go around unless I was not comfortable. The captain slowed to flaps 20 speed; and we landed uneventfully in the touchdown zone. (Flaps 30 speed was 107) we did not go through the altitude flap procedure and elected to land with flaps 5. I noticed the aircraft was slightly nose high than normal and we floated an extra couple seconds. A little different than most lightweight flaps 30 landings; but overall not much different than normal. I ran the after landing checklist and said we should not move the flap handle to prevent any further damage in case we had a broken jack-screw and the captain confirmed. We were met by a company maintenance manager and we told them of the problem we had and that we had not moved the flap handle. He said; 'great; that's the problem we've been having in folks moving the flap handle after landing.' that's when we were told the aircraft has had ongoing te flap disagree problems and they can't figure out what the problem is. This aircraft has been up at this maintenance facility for the past few months trying to find the problem. We were never notified of the ongoing issues with the flaps; or that that's why the aircraft was flying here. The captain reviewed the logbook back to the last flight release; but no notes detailing the flap problems were there. Of course; several pages prior to that; we discovered the logbook entries of the flap issue. Also; this was a saturday afternoon with no other aircraft launches. No maintenance personnel ever met us at the aircraft and there was nothing in the paperwork to relay to the crew of the ongoing flight control problems with this aircraft. The 3 MEL's in the paperwork were right ap inoperative; #2 cargo fire loop inoperative and the electronic flight bag database out of date. I'd like to finish by stating that the captain and I were a bit rushed in the last couple minutes of the flight and our comfort levels were definitely pushed to the edge; unnecessarily. The current logbook procedures of not reviewing past the last signed flight release as well as no paperwork messages of MEL's; and the lack of any message of the ongoing flap problems with this aircraft was just the start of an error-chain that needed to be broken before I put the flap handle to 20 at 2000ft above the ground.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B757-200 crew described a maintenance ferry flight for a repeat Trailing Edge Flap Asymmetry problem which they were not told about prior to flight. The flap asymmetry occurred again and the Captain elected to land without completing the checklist.

Narrative: We were flying a Part 91 Maintenance Ferry flight. Reserve minimum call-out. Captains leg. Flight was uneventful and VMC with a 1000ft cloud layer giving a 4700 ft overcast ceiling. Vectors to short visual final with multiple traffic calls in the area. Captain leveled at 3000 and slowed down and called for Flaps 1 and 5. I got a good ILS signal and we proceeded down the glidepath. Passing 2500; Captain called for Flaps 20 and Gear down. Gear came down normally; but the flaps remained at 5 and we got a TE FLAP DISAGREE message. I grabbed the QRH and said we should go into holding because the checklist takes a while to run. I feel there was a breakdown in communication at this point because I suggested going into holding and the Captain disagreed and stated we do this all the time in the simulator and was comfortable landing with this configuration. I quickly reviewed the checklist which read if flaps indicated less than 20; to use Flaps 20 Vref for landing. I again asked the Captain if they would like to level off and we take vectors back around. The Captain said they were very comfortable with the configuration and didn't want to go around unless I was not comfortable. The Captain slowed to Flaps 20 Speed; and we landed uneventfully in the touchdown zone. (Flaps 30 speed was 107) We did not go through the ALT Flap procedure and elected to land with Flaps 5. I noticed the aircraft was slightly nose high than normal and we floated an extra couple seconds. A little different than most lightweight Flaps 30 landings; but overall not much different than normal. I ran the After landing checklist and said we should not move the flap handle to prevent any further damage in case we had a broken jack-screw and the Captain confirmed. We were met by a Company Maintenance Manager and we told them of the problem we had and that we had not moved the flap handle. He said; 'Great; that's the problem we've been having in folks moving the flap handle after landing.' That's when we were told the aircraft has had ongoing TE FLAP DISAGREE problems and they can't figure out what the problem is. This aircraft has been up at this maintenance facility for the past few months trying to find the problem. We were never notified of the ongoing issues with the Flaps; OR that that's why the aircraft was flying here. The Captain reviewed the logbook back to the last flight release; but no notes detailing the Flap problems were there. Of course; several pages prior to that; we discovered the logbook entries of the Flap issue. Also; this was a Saturday afternoon with no other aircraft launches. No Maintenance personnel ever met us at the aircraft and there was nothing in the paperwork to relay to the crew of the ongoing Flight Control problems with this aircraft. The 3 MEL's in the paperwork were Right AP INOP; #2 Cargo Fire Loop INOP and the Electronic Flight Bag database out of date. I'd like to finish by stating that the Captain and I were a bit rushed in the last couple minutes of the flight and our comfort levels were definitely pushed to the edge; unnecessarily. The current logbook procedures of not reviewing past the last signed flight release as well as no paperwork messages of MEL's; and the lack of any message of the ongoing Flap problems with this aircraft was just the start of an error-chain that needed to be broken before I put the flap handle to 20 at 2000ft above the ground.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.