Narrative:

The following report targets the new process of aircraft refusal by a captain. For years the captain's authority was never questioned. This has changed as was very evident during my last trip. From my experience last week; I believe that the intention of this new process is to dilute and influence captain authority with the goal of changing his/her mind after a plane is refused. This new action is flawed and could cause a serious incident with a captain's authority being questioned by multiple departments. Before a captain refuses a plane; many considerations and CRM lead to the decision. This decision should not be questioned; nor should additional information be thrown at him/her after the fact in order to persuade them to take the plane. Case in point: taxing out we get EICAS pack mode right with standby cooling showing on schematic. We taxi back to gate and maintenance wires several valves open; pulls the cannon plug and defers the pack to the standby cooling mode. We conferred with dispatch and maintenance. We were educated that in standby cooling mode a pack is inoperative on the ground; climb out and cruise until the pack internal temperature cools off; then the pack will kick in. The pack drops off in descent and low altitude so we plan on operating as if the pack will not work. Our considerations were nighttime; winter; on one pack. Maintenance guarantees that it will operate and pressurize the aircraft 'all day long'. We talk about it and since it was a short flight over land with plenty of concrete we go. Forty five minutes into cruise the pack right off light comes on along with pack right EICAS. We have lost the pack. On the ground I called maintenance and dispatch to let them know that what happened to us was what we were afraid of; and we should have not left with the aircraft in this condition. Maintenance refused to believe what we conveyed to them and responded that it was impossible for the pack to shut down in this condition and if this happened the MEL needed to be rewritten.we experienced the same problem on an over water leg of the same trip. At the gate; the identical problem shows up. Pack mode right on the EICAS and standby cooling on the schematic. Maintenance is deferring the pack in the standby mode and again wires open the same valves and pull the cannon plug as they did two days earlier. I called dispatch; maintenance and duty manager letting them know that this was a repeat of what happened to my crew before in another station and we would not take the aircraft because of what could happen to the pack while we were flying over water in the dark. Per maintenance the right pack was deferred to standby cooling mode and they said the pack would work all day long and why would we refuse the aircraft. I told the dispatcher that this problem needed to be fixed before we fly over water at night and that because of the past history we had to assume that the pack would shut down again. The dispatcher told us that three other captains had the same problem with the packs within 48 hours of each other! Finally; I made the call of refusing the aircraft; based on prior history; ETOPS and night over water. This should have ended the flight; and new plans to accommodate the passengers should have begun. But the decision was questioned.this action highlights the new process to deal with a captain's refusal of an aircraft. After the refusal is made by the captain; dispatch asks the flight crew to listen to a briefing by maintenance and the duty manager as they may have other information that may be considered. The point here is this. Why would this information not be given before the refusal was made; so that the final decision is based all existing facts? This process seems to be trying to change a captain's mind on the right of refusal. In our case; maintenance became adamant on the pack operating and again asked why we would not take the flight even though I told them what had happened two days before. Then maintenance said that if the pack shuts down then the MEL is written wrong and we needed to bring this to maintenance control's attention so that a new MEL can be written. Huh? My patience had run out. It is not maintenance place to question the decision of a captain to refuse an aircraft. It is ludicrous to hold back any relevant information for a captain to use on a decision to go or cancel. All information should be given prior to a decision being made. We refused the aircraft (since this incident; the aircraft was removed from service to fix the pack and other systemic problems.) once I refused the aircraft; the focus should have been on recovery; not try to change the captain's mind. To complicate things even more; there was a dispatcher shift change and we had to go through the whole 'would you listen to a maintenance briefing' again. Also the first dispatcher did not refuse the airplane and so the incoming dispatcher had to get up to speed and refuse airplane for us. I told her we had already been through enough. I left the aircraft with our crew and made sure the passengers and crew were accommodated overnight. This company is about flying safely and professionalism. We are also about team work. Unfortunately this new refusal process that has been implemented attempts to undermine captain's authority and questions his/her decision after the fact. This procedure needs to be stopped before someone is coerced into taking an airplane that should be grounded.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B777 Captain reports that his carrier has implemented a new procedure which attempts to change a Captain's mind when he has made a decision to refuse an aircraft. The reporter believes that this process attempts to undermine the Captain's authority.

Narrative: The following report targets the new process of aircraft refusal by a Captain. For years the Captain's authority was never questioned. This has changed as was very evident during my last trip. From my experience last week; I believe that the intention of this new process is to dilute and influence Captain authority with the goal of changing his/her mind after a plane is refused. This new action is flawed and could cause a serious incident with a Captain's authority being questioned by multiple departments. Before a Captain refuses a plane; many considerations and CRM lead to the decision. This decision should not be questioned; nor should additional information be thrown at him/her after the fact in order to persuade them to take the plane. Case in point: Taxing out we get EICAS PACK MODE R with Standby cooling showing on Schematic. We taxi back to gate and Maintenance wires several valves open; pulls the cannon plug and defers the pack to the standby cooling mode. We conferred with Dispatch and Maintenance. We were educated that in standby cooling mode a pack is inoperative on the ground; climb out and cruise until the pack internal temperature cools off; then the pack will kick in. The pack drops off in descent and low altitude so we plan on operating as if the pack will not work. Our considerations were nighttime; winter; on one pack. Maintenance guarantees that it will operate and pressurize the aircraft 'all day long'. We talk about it and since it was a short flight over land with plenty of concrete we go. Forty five minutes into cruise the Pack R OFF light comes on along with Pack R EICAS. We have LOST the pack. On the ground I called Maintenance and Dispatch to let them know that what happened to us was what we were afraid of; and we should have not left with the aircraft in this condition. Maintenance refused to believe what we conveyed to them and responded that it was impossible for the pack to shut down in this condition and if this happened the MEL needed to be rewritten.We experienced the same problem on an over water leg of the same trip. At the gate; the identical problem shows up. PACK MODE R on the EICAS and standby cooling on the schematic. Maintenance is deferring the pack in the standby mode and again wires open the same valves and pull the cannon plug as they did two days earlier. I called Dispatch; Maintenance and Duty Manager letting them know that this was a repeat of what happened to my crew before in another station and we would not take the aircraft because of what could happen to the pack while we were flying over water in the dark. Per Maintenance the right pack was deferred to standby cooling mode and they said the pack would work all day long and why would we refuse the aircraft. I told the Dispatcher that this problem needed to be fixed before we fly over water at night and that because of the past history we had to assume that the pack would shut down again. The Dispatcher told us that three other Captains had the same problem with the packs within 48 hours of each other! Finally; I made the call of refusing the aircraft; based on prior history; ETOPS and night over water. This should have ended the flight; and new plans to accommodate the passengers should have begun. But the decision was questioned.This action highlights the new process to deal with a Captain's refusal of an aircraft. After the refusal is made by the Captain; Dispatch asks the flight crew to listen to a briefing by Maintenance and the Duty Manager as they may have other information that may be considered. The point here is this. Why would this information not be given BEFORE the refusal was made; so that the final decision is based all existing facts? This process seems to be trying to change a Captain's mind on the right of refusal. In our case; Maintenance became adamant on the pack operating and again asked why we would not take the flight even though I told them what had happened two days before. Then Maintenance said that if the pack shuts down then the MEL is written wrong and WE needed to bring this to Maintenance Control's attention so that a new MEL can be written. HUH? My patience had run out. It is not Maintenance place to question the decision of a Captain to refuse an aircraft. It is ludicrous to hold back any relevant information for a Captain to use on a decision to go or cancel. All information should be given prior to a decision being made. We refused the aircraft (Since this incident; the aircraft was removed from service to fix the pack and other systemic problems.) Once I refused the aircraft; the focus should have been on recovery; not try to change the Captain's mind. To complicate things even more; there was a Dispatcher shift change and we had to go through the whole 'would you listen to a Maintenance briefing' again. Also the first Dispatcher did not refuse the airplane and so the incoming Dispatcher had to get up to speed and refuse airplane for us. I told her we had already been through enough. I left the aircraft with our crew and made sure the passengers and crew were accommodated overnight. This company is about flying safely and professionalism. We are also about team work. Unfortunately this new refusal process that has been implemented attempts to undermine Captain's authority and questions his/her decision after the fact. This procedure needs to be stopped before someone is coerced into taking an airplane that should be grounded.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.