Narrative:

At takeoff the power was advanced and set. I then looked up at the runway alignment then down to scan the instruments. At this time I noticed a flicker in my pfd and mfd. I initially thought of a failure but everything came back with no noticeable changes or missing information; so as non flying pilot I didn't say anything. Then I noticed the yaw damper D2 status message appear but when I looked down at the airspeed we were about 105 KTS and I made the 100 KT call instead of the yaw damper. I did this because the captain had specifically briefed 'above 100 KTS I will only abort for engine fire failure or perception it won't fly.' the yd was not in that so I didn't call it. Upon climb out the gen 2 message appeared then the mach trim. I did call out those messages but below 1000 feet we held calling for checklists. At 1000 feet I called 1000 feet and the captain called 'flaps up; climb thrust; climb check.' I hesitated because I expected him to ask for the QRH; but I decided the climb check would not hurt anything; so I completed that checklist. I didn't realize that I should not have shutdown the APU until right after I did it. Fortunately; the gen reset during the QRH; all systems were restored and the flight continued uneventfully. Suggestions: I believe the first problem was I didn't call the malfunctions on the runway. Because the captain specifically briefed what he would and would not abort for; I feel I was predisposed and made the decision instead of involving him. He might have aborted. I also think that my lack of recent experience in the right seat lead to being preoccupied at 1000 feet and shutting down the APU prematurely. I was distracted with calling ATC; the captain not calling for the checklist I expected and getting the checklists completed as well as being observed by an FAA jumpseater.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CRJ50 Check Airman in the right seat reported an improper crew alert notification procedure during takeoff following a Generator trip and also an incorrect checklist procedure after takeoff.

Narrative: At takeoff the power was advanced and set. I then looked up at the runway alignment then down to scan the instruments. At this time I noticed a flicker in my PFD and MFD. I initially thought of a failure but everything came back with no noticeable changes or missing information; so as non flying pilot I didn't say anything. Then I noticed the Yaw Damper D2 status message appear but when I looked down at the airspeed we were about 105 KTS and I made the 100 KT call instead of the Yaw Damper. I did this because the Captain had specifically briefed 'above 100 KTS I will only abort for engine fire failure or perception it won't fly.' The YD was not in that so I didn't call it. Upon climb out the GEN 2 message appeared then the MACH Trim. I did call out those messages but below 1000 feet we held calling for checklists. At 1000 feet I called 1000 feet and the Captain called 'flaps up; climb thrust; climb check.' I hesitated because I expected him to ask for the QRH; but I decided the climb check would not hurt anything; so I completed that checklist. I didn't realize that I should not have shutdown the APU until right after I did it. Fortunately; the GEN reset during the QRH; all systems were restored and the flight continued uneventfully. Suggestions: I believe the first problem was I didn't call the malfunctions on the runway. Because the Captain specifically briefed what he would and would not abort for; I feel I was predisposed and made the decision instead of involving him. He might have aborted. I also think that my lack of recent experience in the right seat lead to being preoccupied at 1000 feet and shutting down the APU prematurely. I was distracted with calling ATC; the Captain not calling for the checklist I expected and getting the checklists completed as well as being observed by an FAA jumpseater.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.