Narrative:

Prior to operation of this flight; a tsa directive had been issued requiring that the moving map; airshow; not be displayed in the cabin for flights inbound to the united states (us) from foreign airports. Since this flight departs the us for japan; it was not subject to the directive. For reasons unknown; however; our air carrier maintenance had attempted to disable the airshow capability and had entered such in the aircraft log. No additional information was provided to the flight crew. While enroute; it was discovered that the cabin entertainment/movie system was not functioning properly. In the course of troubleshooting this problem; it was discovered that the crew was unable to remove power from the in-flight entertainment system (ife's). It was quickly realized that this could lead to catastrophic results in the event of a fire or overheat of the system. In particular; item six of our carrier approved operating manual 'smoke; fire or fumes' checklist would not produce its required effect. In discussion of the situation with our carrier's maintenance engineering; it was determined that the loss of ability to de-power the ife system was an unintended consequence of the attempted disabling of the airshow/map. This attempt at disabling the airshow/map consisted of pulling and collaring the 'hb' circuit breaker (circuit breaker) on panel 210 in the ee compartment. Enroute and several hours into the flight; we consequently had the following situation. It seemed obvious that the aircraft had been inappropriately dispatched in the given maintenance configuration. This gave rise to questions of safety and legality. In consultation with carrier engineering; the crew determined that the flight could be continued safely by supplementing the 'smoke; fire or fumes' checklist with an additional step of resetting the H8 circuit breaker in the ee compartment. We realized that this would require additional time in a possibly time critical situation. This additional time could be minimized; however; by preliminary preparation and review of specific steps required. This left the question of legality. Arguably; the flight crew does not have the authority to generate modifications to the air carrier's approved emergency checklists for the sole purpose on continuing a flight that was inappropriately dispatched. These safety and legality considerations were discussed with carrier chief pilot via company dispatch. Chief pilot consulted with the FAA. Chief pilot reported that the FAA supported either decision; a diversion or continuing to destination. Chief pilot concurred and provided specific company authorization for the crew to continue to destination relying on the modified 'smoke; fire or fumes' procedure. Given the above; the crew elected to continue to destination. The safe operation of the flight was not in question. It was not possible; however; to definitively resolve the legality question. Given the resources available; we elected to rely on the input from chief pilot and FAA as well as our company flight department approval provided by the chief pilot.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B777 Captain reports the H8 Circuit Breaker (CB) was pulled and collared on Panel 210 in the E/E compartment for a TSA Directive to remove the moving Map/Airshow from being displayed in the cabin for flights inbound from foreign countries. An inflight incident later revealed that power to the Inflight Entertainment System (IFE) could not be disconnected.

Narrative: Prior to operation of this flight; a TSA Directive had been issued requiring that the moving Map; Airshow; not be displayed in the cabin for flights inbound to the United States (U.S.) from foreign airports. Since this flight departs the U.S. for Japan; it was not subject to the Directive. For reasons unknown; however; our air carrier Maintenance had attempted to disable the airshow capability and had entered such in the aircraft Log. No additional information was provided to the Flight Crew. While enroute; it was discovered that the Cabin Entertainment/Movie system was not functioning properly. In the course of troubleshooting this problem; it was discovered that the Crew was unable to remove power from the In-flight Entertainment System (IFE's). It was quickly realized that this could lead to catastrophic results in the event of a fire or overheat of the system. In particular; Item six of our carrier approved Operating Manual 'Smoke; Fire or Fumes' Checklist would not produce its required effect. In discussion of the situation with our carrier's Maintenance Engineering; it was determined that the loss of ability to de-power the IFE system was an unintended consequence of the attempted disabling of the Airshow/Map. This attempt at disabling the Airshow/Map consisted of pulling and collaring the 'HB' Circuit Breaker (CB) on Panel 210 in the EE compartment. Enroute and several hours into the flight; we consequently had the following situation. It seemed obvious that the aircraft had been inappropriately dispatched in the given Maintenance configuration. This gave rise to questions of safety and legality. In consultation with carrier Engineering; the Crew determined that the flight could be continued safely by supplementing the 'Smoke; Fire or Fumes' Checklist with an additional step of resetting the H8 CB in the EE compartment. We realized that this would require additional time in a possibly time critical situation. This additional time could be minimized; however; by preliminary preparation and review of specific steps required. This left the question of legality. Arguably; the Flight Crew does not have the authority to generate modifications to the air carrier's approved Emergency Checklists for the sole purpose on continuing a flight that was inappropriately dispatched. These safety and legality considerations were discussed with carrier Chief Pilot via company Dispatch. Chief Pilot consulted with the FAA. Chief Pilot reported that the FAA supported either decision; a diversion or continuing to destination. Chief Pilot concurred and provided specific company authorization for the Crew to continue to destination relying on the modified 'Smoke; Fire or Fumes' procedure. Given the above; the Crew elected to continue to destination. The safe operation of the flight was not in question. It was not possible; however; to definitively resolve the legality question. Given the resources available; we elected to rely on the input from Chief Pilot and FAA as well as our company Flight Department approval provided by the Chief Pilot.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.