Narrative:

Training was being conducted on ground control; and local 2; with a tower rated controller working the local 1 position. The flm came upstairs and plugged in to the local 1 position and told the controller working local 1 to give him a briefing; and when he was done he was to slide over to start training on cab radar. I was sitting about 2 feet away from the controller being relieved and only had 2 or 3 aircraft on my scope and frequency. I overheard the briefing; and part of the briefing was that local 2 was 2 out landing runway X. The flm then sat down next to me. After about a minute or so; I heard the local 2 trainee coordinate with local 1 '2 out landing 4 with another'; to which the flm said 'no traffic and gave his initials'; then I observed the flm writing something down on a notepad; and noticed the P3 on a right midfield downwind to yyr. I then heard the 2 minute timer we use for the 2 minute overlap go off; and the flm got up and walked over to the ARTS computer on the other side of the cab. As the flm got about half way across the cab I heard him ask the local 2 position if there guy was holding short; to which they responded that he was; the flm then said that he should have been down by then; he then informed the P3 who was just touching down yyr that the sundowner arriving runway X would hold short of the midfield. I looked out the window and noticed that the sundowner was approaching juliet 2 taxiway and was still moving pretty good. The flm then made a statement that he didn't know there was a 2nd aircraft landing X to hold short; and that if we see this we should tell him about it. I remember saying quietly to the previous local 1 controller that the local 2 controller did tell him and that the flm gave his initials; to the operation. I then looked back out the window; and the sundowner was now past juliet 2 and still moving; I noticed the flm typing on the computer in the ARTS program; and also noticed that the P3 was starting to speed up. With about 300 feet to the hold short line on runway X I noticed sundowner rotate; and I immediately yelled; he is lifting off; by this time sundowner was going past juliet 3; and the P3 was fastly approaching juliet intersection on yyr. I remember thinking that if the P3 rotated there would be no way they wouldn't hit. I then observed the P3 cut the power as he was entering the midfield intersection; and the sundowner about 30 feet above the tail of the P3; at this point the flm instructed the P3 to abort. The P3 went about 1500 feet down yyr before stopping; and I heard the flm say to him that the sundowner was suppose to hold short. I also heard the local 2 trainee ask the sundowner his intentions; and then instruct the sundowner to enter a right base for xx and then clear him for the option. The local 1 controller gave his initials for the 2 minute overlap; and then came over and I briefed him for the cab radar position. After about 5 minutes; the flm said that we were going to have to button things up and get everyone who was involved in this off position and downstairs. I took the position; and heard the ground controller ask the flm if they needed the pilot of the sundowner to call. The flm said no. Recommendation; this procedure is used hundreds of times a month at our facility; without any problems; I have been doing this for almost 14 years and have never seen this occur. I believe that the positions were not all that busy; but that the players involved were not paying total attention to the operation. I do not know why the local 2 instructor; and the flm did not pick up on the fact that the sundowner was landing as long as he was; and not slowing down. That is what keyed me in to looking away from my scope; and keeping and eye on the sundowner. I also feel that the flm did not look to see where local 2's traffic was that was landing; and if it was going to be a factor for his aircraft. In talking to the local 2 controllers after they hadlistened to the tapes; and that it was a read back error; I believe it was just a fluke instance that I have no recommendations to prevent it from happening again.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Tower controller described a loss separation event utilizing intersecting Runways YYR and X; reporter indicating a flawed relief briefing and lack of controller awareness by all involved led to this very critical event.

Narrative: Training was being conducted on Ground Control; and Local 2; with a Tower rated controller working the Local 1 position. The FLM came upstairs and plugged in to the Local 1 position and told the Controller working Local 1 to give him a briefing; and when he was done he was to slide over to start training on Cab Radar. I was sitting about 2 feet away from the controller being relieved and only had 2 or 3 aircraft on my scope and frequency. I overheard the briefing; and part of the briefing was that Local 2 was 2 out landing Runway X. The FLM then sat down next to me. After about a minute or so; I heard the Local 2 Trainee coordinate with Local 1 '2 out landing 4 with another'; to which the FLM said 'No traffic and gave his initials'; then I observed the FLM writing something down on a notepad; and noticed the P3 on a right Midfield downwind to YYR. I then heard the 2 minute timer we use for the 2 minute overlap go off; and the FLM got up and walked over to the ARTS computer on the other side of the cab. As the FLM got about half way across the cab I heard him ask the Local 2 position if there guy was holding short; to which they responded that he was; the FLM then said that he should have been down by then; He then informed the P3 who was just touching down YYR that the Sundowner arriving Runway X would hold short of the midfield. I looked out the window and noticed that the sundowner was approaching Juliet 2 taxiway and was still moving pretty good. The FLM then made a statement that he didn't know there was a 2nd aircraft landing X to hold short; and that if we see this we should tell him about it. I remember saying quietly to the previous Local 1 controller that the Local 2 controller did tell him and that the FLM gave his initials; to the operation. I then looked back out the window; and the Sundowner was now past Juliet 2 and still moving; I noticed the FLM typing on the computer in the ARTS program; and also noticed that the P3 was starting to speed up. With about 300 feet to the hold short line on Runway X I noticed sundowner rotate; and I immediately yelled; he is lifting off; by this time sundowner was going past Juliet 3; and the P3 was fastly approaching Juliet intersection on YYR. I remember thinking that if the P3 rotated there would be no way they wouldn't hit. I then observed the P3 cut the power as he was entering the midfield intersection; and the Sundowner about 30 feet above the tail of the P3; at this point the FLM instructed the P3 to abort. The P3 went about 1500 feet down YYR before stopping; and I heard the FLM say to him that the Sundowner was suppose to hold short. I also heard the Local 2 trainee ask the sundowner his intentions; and then instruct the sundowner to enter a right base for XX and then clear him for the option. The Local 1 controller gave his initials for the 2 minute overlap; and then came over and I briefed him for the Cab Radar position. After about 5 minutes; the FLM said that we were going to have to button things up and get everyone who was involved in this off position and downstairs. I took the position; and heard the Ground Controller ask the FLM if they needed the pilot of the sundowner to call. The FLM said No. Recommendation; this procedure is used hundreds of times a month at our facility; without any problems; I have been doing this for almost 14 years and have never seen this occur. I believe that the positions were not all that busy; but that the players involved were not paying total attention to the operation. I do not know why the Local 2 Instructor; and the FLM did not pick up on the fact that the Sundowner was landing as long as he was; and not slowing down. That is what keyed me in to looking away from my scope; and keeping and eye on the sundowner. I also feel that the FLM did not look to see where Local 2's traffic was that was landing; and if it was going to be a factor for his aircraft. In talking to the Local 2 controllers after they hadlistened to the tapes; and that it was a read back error; I believe it was just a fluke instance that I have no recommendations to prevent it from happening again.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.