Narrative:

While working LW1; I was advised by the supervisor that the ILS for runway 36L would be released to maintenance and that arrivals would be assigned the ILS to runway 36R; the departure runway. As aircraft X turned approximately an 8 mile final; I called the east tower for release on aircraft Y heavy because his routing was not consistent with the west tower's automatic release procedure. East tower approved the release at approximately the same time as aircraft X checked in on frequency for runway 36R. I transmitted 'aircraft Y heavy; runway 36R; cleared for immediate takeoff or hold short; traffic 5 mile final' which aircraft Y acknowledged. After this acknowledgment; I cleared aircraft X to land on runway 36R with a caution for wake turbulence from the departing aircraft Y heavy and an assignment to reduce to final approach speed. Aircraft Y heavy was very slow to take the runway and I stated 'aircraft Y heavy; expedite takeoff roll or hold in position; traffic 2 mile final. Aircraft Y heavy was airborne within approximately 6;500 ft; and aircraft X crossed the landing threshold of runway 36R when aircraft Y heavy was approximately 8;000 ft down the runway and airborne to an altitude of almost 300 ft. Recommendation; I'm going to put my controller ego on a shelf and call the preplanning and execution of this operation exactly what it was: awful. I hadn't felt well for the majority of the shift because of a headache; I'm still becoming accustomed to the operating practices of a new and more experienced crew; and I didn't want to re-coordinate a release on aircraft Y heavy if I had elected to hold him short of the runway until aircraft X landed. After all of the aforementioned factors; I attempted to defy laws of physics by working extra hard to ensure that aircraft Y heavy was '6;000 and airborne' by the time that aircraft Z crossed the threshold. The plan succeeded only because aircraft Y (keep in mind; a 'heavy' jet) accepted and executed the immediate takeoff clearance and only because aircraft X slowed promptly and appeared to do shallow s-turns on final to avoid being sent around in the wake of a departing heavy twin engine. In the future; I will accept that; without immense pilot cooperation as demonstrated by both aircraft Y heavy and aircraft X; this operation will not and should not work and should never be attempted. It was a lousy call with lousy justifications for every action I took; and I became more of a 'reactor' as opposed to being a 'controller'. After aircraft X landed; I thanked him profusely for his help with speed on final and all I received in reply was an irritated acknowledgment for the switch to ground control; and I don't blame him one bit! He was given lousy service; assigned unreasonable and potentially unsafe expectations; and basically he controlled the outcome of this botched operation--not me. In the future; I'll simply call the east tower and cancel my release on the departing aircraft and have him hold short of the runway until arrival traffic lands or cross him to the outboard runway where he won't be a factor. It is my intent to never repeat this poor judgment and sub-standard providing of service again. I hate the feeling of 'woulda/coulda/shoulda'--but my poor judgment has left me feeling exactly that. In the future; I'll listen more attentively to that little inner voice that says 'don't do this--it's just plain dumb...be safe!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DFW Controller described near loss of separation event between an arrival and departure indicating the 'make it work' actions he/she took were unsafe and ill conceived.

Narrative: While working LW1; I was advised by the Supervisor that the ILS for Runway 36L would be released to maintenance and that arrivals would be assigned the ILS to Runway 36R; the departure runway. As Aircraft X turned approximately an 8 mile final; I called the East Tower for release on Aircraft Y Heavy because his routing was not consistent with the West Tower's automatic release procedure. East Tower approved the release at approximately the same time as Aircraft X checked in on frequency for Runway 36R. I transmitted 'Aircraft Y Heavy; Runway 36R; cleared for immediate takeoff or hold short; traffic 5 mile final' which Aircraft Y acknowledged. After this acknowledgment; I cleared Aircraft X to land on Runway 36R with a caution for wake turbulence from the departing Aircraft Y Heavy and an assignment to reduce to final approach speed. Aircraft Y Heavy was very slow to take the runway and I stated 'Aircraft Y Heavy; expedite takeoff roll or hold in position; traffic 2 mile final. Aircraft Y Heavy was airborne within approximately 6;500 FT; and Aircraft X crossed the landing threshold of Runway 36R when Aircraft Y Heavy was approximately 8;000 FT down the runway and airborne to an altitude of almost 300 FT. Recommendation; I'm going to put my controller ego on a shelf and call the preplanning and execution of this operation exactly what it was: AWFUL. I hadn't felt well for the majority of the shift because of a headache; I'm still becoming accustomed to the operating practices of a new and more experienced crew; and I didn't want to re-coordinate a release on Aircraft Y Heavy if I had elected to hold him short of the runway until Aircraft X landed. After all of the aforementioned factors; I attempted to defy laws of physics by working extra hard to ensure that Aircraft Y Heavy was '6;000 and Airborne' by the time that Aircraft Z crossed the threshold. The plan succeeded ONLY because Aircraft Y (keep in mind; a 'HEAVY' jet) accepted and executed the immediate takeoff clearance and only because Aircraft X slowed promptly and appeared to do shallow S-turns on final to avoid being sent around in the wake of a departing heavy twin engine. In the future; I will accept that; without IMMENSE pilot cooperation as demonstrated by both Aircraft Y Heavy AND Aircraft X; this operation will not and should not work and should NEVER be attempted. It was a lousy call with lousy justifications for every action I took; and I became more of a 'reactor' as opposed to being a 'controller'. After Aircraft X landed; I thanked him profusely for his help with speed on final and all I received in reply was an irritated acknowledgment for the switch to Ground Control; and I don't blame him one bit! He was given lousy service; assigned unreasonable and potentially unsafe expectations; and basically HE controlled the outcome of this botched operation--not me. In the future; I'll simply call the East Tower and cancel my release on the departing aircraft and have him hold short of the runway until arrival traffic lands OR cross him to the outboard runway where he won't be a factor. It is my intent to never repeat this poor judgment and sub-standard providing of service again. I hate the feeling of 'woulda/coulda/shoulda'--but my poor judgment has left me feeling EXACTLY that. In the future; I'll listen more attentively to that little inner voice that says 'Don't do this--it's just plain dumb...BE SAFE!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.