Narrative:

I rcvd 4 handoffs from atlanta center. Air carrier X was northeast bound on J14 at FL330. Center operations require dca and iad arrivals to cross 70 mi northeast of gso at FL250. Vectoring was necessary to accomplish this and lateral separation was planned. Mlt Y was swbnd J75 at FL310. Because of WX to the west of gso, this aircraft deviated to the east and refused to accept a vector to the west for traffic. This was the primary factor which caused me to lose lateral separation. Air carrier X was stopped at FL320 and turned to a 090 degree heading. Separation estimated at 1000' vertical and 3 mi lateral. There were other contributing factors to this incident. Air carrier Z at FL270, destination lga, was requesting FL330 and had to be moved so the iad arrival over him could be descended. Air carrier Z was issued a 040 degree heading and climbed to FL280. When Z cleared mlt Y he was climbed to FL330 the iad arrival was issued descent clearance and air carrier X at FL330 was issued a 040 degree heading to obtain lateral separation from the aircraft at FL290 under him and also to effect longitudinal separation between the iad arrival and issued a descent clearance. Shortly thereafter, mlt Y deviated to the east because of WX and said he could not accept a vector to the west,. Air carrier X was stopped at FL320 and turned east. Separation standard was violated. I had worked the radar position at gve high for 2 successive periods of time this afternoon. WX to the south and west was thunderstorms, there were many deviations, and traffic was heavy to very heavy. I had been on the sector this second period for 1 hour 40 min and at this particular time the traffic volume was diminishing however this traffic situation was fairly complex; it required good timing, quick decision and efficient response. Upon reflection, I feel that my timing had began to 'slip' and my decision making was not accurate enough as the incident demonstrates. I feel that working heavy traffic for 1 hour is a gracious plenty without a break, but we do not have enough people to afford the luxury. I'm not making excuses for myself, but the staffing problem does exist, and until it is corrected I'm confident that you will continue to receive these reports. Solution was to leave air carrier X at FL330 until clear of mlt Y and coordination effected.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LESS THAN STANDARD SEPARATION BETWEEN ACR AND MLT ACFT. OPERATIONAL ERROR.

Narrative: I RCVD 4 HANDOFFS FROM ATLANTA CENTER. ACR X WAS NE BOUND ON J14 AT FL330. CENTER OPERATIONS REQUIRE DCA AND IAD ARRIVALS TO CROSS 70 MI NE OF GSO AT FL250. VECTORING WAS NECESSARY TO ACCOMPLISH THIS AND LATERAL SEPARATION WAS PLANNED. MLT Y WAS SWBND J75 AT FL310. BECAUSE OF WX TO THE W OF GSO, THIS ACFT DEVIATED TO THE E AND REFUSED TO ACCEPT A VECTOR TO THE W FOR TFC. THIS WAS THE PRIMARY FACTOR WHICH CAUSED ME TO LOSE LATERAL SEPARATION. ACR X WAS STOPPED AT FL320 AND TURNED TO A 090 DEG HDG. SEPARATION ESTIMATED AT 1000' VERTICAL AND 3 MI LATERAL. THERE WERE OTHER CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THIS INCIDENT. ACR Z AT FL270, DEST LGA, WAS REQUESTING FL330 AND HAD TO BE MOVED SO THE IAD ARRIVAL OVER HIM COULD BE DESCENDED. ACR Z WAS ISSUED A 040 DEG HDG AND CLIMBED TO FL280. WHEN Z CLRED MLT Y HE WAS CLIMBED TO FL330 THE IAD ARRIVAL WAS ISSUED DSCNT CLRNC AND ACR X AT FL330 WAS ISSUED A 040 DEG HDG TO OBTAIN LATERAL SEPARATION FROM THE ACFT AT FL290 UNDER HIM AND ALSO TO EFFECT LONGITUDINAL SEPARATION BETWEEN THE IAD ARRIVAL AND ISSUED A DSCNT CLRNC. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, MLT Y DEVIATED TO THE E BECAUSE OF WX AND SAID HE COULD NOT ACCEPT A VECTOR TO THE W,. ACR X WAS STOPPED AT FL320 AND TURNED E. SEPARATION STANDARD WAS VIOLATED. I HAD WORKED THE RADAR POSITION AT GVE HIGH FOR 2 SUCCESSIVE PERIODS OF TIME THIS AFTERNOON. WX TO THE S AND W WAS TSTMS, THERE WERE MANY DEVIATIONS, AND TFC WAS HEAVY TO VERY HEAVY. I HAD BEEN ON THE SECTOR THIS SECOND PERIOD FOR 1 HR 40 MIN AND AT THIS PARTICULAR TIME THE TFC VOLUME WAS DIMINISHING HOWEVER THIS TFC SITUATION WAS FAIRLY COMPLEX; IT REQUIRED GOOD TIMING, QUICK DECISION AND EFFICIENT RESPONSE. UPON REFLECTION, I FEEL THAT MY TIMING HAD BEGAN TO 'SLIP' AND MY DECISION MAKING WAS NOT ACCURATE ENOUGH AS THE INCIDENT DEMONSTRATES. I FEEL THAT WORKING HEAVY TFC FOR 1 HR IS A GRACIOUS PLENTY WITHOUT A BREAK, BUT WE DO NOT HAVE ENOUGH PEOPLE TO AFFORD THE LUXURY. I'M NOT MAKING EXCUSES FOR MYSELF, BUT THE STAFFING PROBLEM DOES EXIST, AND UNTIL IT IS CORRECTED I'M CONFIDENT THAT YOU WILL CONTINUE TO RECEIVE THESE REPORTS. SOLUTION WAS TO LEAVE ACR X AT FL330 UNTIL CLEAR OF MLT Y AND COORDINATION EFFECTED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.