37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 875505 |
Time | |
Date | 201002 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B777-200 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Parked |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Hydraulic System Lines Connectors Fittings |
Person 1 | |
Function | Technician |
Qualification | Maintenance Powerplant Maintenance Airframe |
Person 2 | |
Function | Technician |
Qualification | Maintenance Powerplant Maintenance Airframe |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical Deviation - Procedural Maintenance Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
On returning to work after my days off; I was notified that during a internal quality assurance (qa) audit the #2 eng hydraulic pump depressurization valve connector was found disconnected with no related documentation. After reviewing my action [for] february 2010; I recalled working the item on a B777-200 aircraft on the above date. While accomplishing this job (removal of the#1 igniter boss); I had a difficult time loosening the boss. Some heavier than normal tool was required to break to boss loose. The use of these tools came in the vicinity of the hydraulic pump connector and wiring. In anticipation of the possible slipping of the tool and damage to the connector or wiring; I decided to remove the connector precautionary. After removing the boss there was some delay obtaining the parts to complete the job; this lead to a job turnover at end of shift. Several write-ups were made regarding the job; however the removal of the hydraulic pump connector was not included.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: Two mechanics report they were notified that an internal Quality Assurance (QA) Audit found a # 2 engine hydraulic pump Depressurization Valve connector had been disconnected on a B777-200 with no related documentation. One Mechanic had disconnected the valve connector as a precautionary action while removing the # 1 Ignitor boss with heavy tools.
Narrative: On returning to work after my days off; I was notified that during a internal Quality Assurance (QA) Audit the #2 eng hydraulic pump Depressurization Valve connector was found disconnected with no related documentation. After reviewing my action [for] February 2010; I recalled working the item on a B777-200 aircraft on the above date. While accomplishing this Job (removal of the#1 igniter boss); I had a difficult time loosening the boss. Some heavier than normal tool was required to break to boss loose. The use of these tools came in the vicinity of the hydraulic pump connector and wiring. In anticipation of the possible slipping of the tool and damage to the connector or wiring; I decided to remove the connector precautionary. After removing the boss there was some delay obtaining the parts to complete the job; this lead to a job turnover at end of shift. Several write-ups were made regarding the job; however the removal of the hydraulic pump connector was not included.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.