Narrative:

We were abeam ebber and direct eloyi and were just turned over to oceanic frequencies when we noticed a 'rt center fuel pump' light and associated EICAS message. We also had a 'rt bleed off' light and message as well. We coordinated with ATC and were able to divert back to hnl. We held for over an hour as we burned down fuel for landing. An overweight landing was considered but the conditions did not dictate that it would be safer to land heavy than to continue burning down to landing weight. We landed under max landing weight. Inasmuch as continuing the flight from hnl would have put us close to; or even over 9 hours of flight time in a 24 hour period; and that contract time would become an issue; we coordinated with scheduling through dispatch. We were then advised that we would be ok if we could get airborne again by XB50Z. The flight attendants however; would time out contractually if not airborne by XB05Z. This seemed reasonable (and upon reviewing the contract afterwards it appears correct.) it was at or about XA55Z when we received that message however; and we hadn't received any new release. We had started refueling and were just talking with maintenance concerning our write ups when we received that message. Does the 'good to start; good to finish' interpretation hold true in the case of far 121.481 (a) and (b) as it is applied to the domestic side of the operation? As we are so focused into saving fuel these days; getting rid of a bunch in a hurry seems to be a forgotten art. Only later in the chain of events did I lower the gear to create more drag. Turns out that I was able to get a 40% greater fuel burn that way. The burn down time and subsequent delays could have been avoided. As it was; we were dealing with the loss of a right center fuel pump; right bleed; and a right N3 indication that had gone to zero. We were so much into the QRH that increased burn down rate was low on our priorities.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757 Captain experiences RT CTR FUEL PUMP and RT BLEED OFF EICAS messages entering oceanic airspace. Captain elects to divert for maintenance and to burn down to landing weight. Reporter laments not extending the landing gear early in the evolution which may have prevented large delays due to flight time limitations.

Narrative: We were abeam EBBER and direct ELOYI and were just turned over to oceanic frequencies when we noticed a 'RT CTR FUEL PUMP' light and associated EICAS message. We also had a 'RT BLEED OFF' light and message as well. We coordinated with ATC and were able to divert back to HNL. We held for over an hour as we burned down fuel for landing. An overweight landing was considered but the conditions did not dictate that it would be safer to land heavy than to continue burning down to landing weight. We landed under max landing weight. Inasmuch as continuing the flight from HNL would have put us close to; or even over 9 hours of flight time in a 24 hour period; and that contract time would become an issue; we coordinated with Scheduling through Dispatch. We were then advised that we would be OK if we could get airborne again by XB50Z. The flight attendants however; would time out contractually if not airborne by XB05Z. This seemed reasonable (and upon reviewing the contract afterwards it appears correct.) It was at or about XA55Z when we received that message however; and we hadn't received any new release. We had started refueling and were just talking with maintenance concerning our write ups when we received that message. Does the 'good to start; good to finish' interpretation hold true in the case of FAR 121.481 (a) and (b) as it is applied to the domestic side of the operation? As we are so focused into saving fuel these days; getting rid of a bunch in a hurry seems to be a forgotten art. Only later in the chain of events did I lower the gear to create more drag. Turns out that I was able to get a 40% greater fuel burn that way. The burn down time and subsequent delays could have been avoided. As it was; we were dealing with the loss of a right center fuel pump; right bleed; and a right N3 indication that had gone to zero. We were so much into the QRH that increased burn down rate was low on our priorities.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.