Narrative:

I was working the combined radar approach control. Staffing as usual is always short. We have several controllers out sick and flm's (front line manager's) routinely are required to fill position rotations; however; at the request of our atm (air traffic manager) the flm's normally fill these positions in the tower. With such terrible weather in previous months; this was a severe VFR day. There was many practice approaches being conducted and requested. There were many VFR aircraft in the system. There was an exercise going on over the weekend and the pilots have been troublesome with radical maneuvers and trying to accommodate there requests so close to the airport. At the time; there were four flights airborne; two VFR and two IFR going in opposite directions; respectively. One of the VFR flights was being difficult; wanting to terminate radar service within class C airspace because he could not get on course sooner. He was obviously not familiar with the obligations of ATC and class C services. There was OJT (on job training) being conducted in several positions. Meaningful OJT is always a premium when you experience many months of slow traffic. At the time of the incident; I would say this was the busiest and complex traffic I have seen in years. I restricted/stopped departures; curtailed practice approaches; reduced workload by not taking on more VFR service and still was barely able to keep up. I was scanning my jurisdiction and working a situation with an IFR departure to climb to center and a VFR overflight; applying the proper visual separation procedure; when I noticed I had this situation developing. I quickly issued a vector to aircraft Y; my arrival; to avoid aircraft X; my departure established on an outbound airway. I was aware that my vector was going to be rather close to maintaining 3 miles of separation; I was attempting to maintain 4 miles because I did not need aircraft Y too far off because I was trying to fit him within my sequence. He was compatible; on final; with other aircraft following him and there was very fast jet traffic to follow these. It was close enough to notice and I later replied the scenario to make a measurement. I found 2.9 miles separation. Note: it may be relevant that the atm; insisted; and unilaterally imposed; a comprehensive change to the SOP; that affected the very long time established departure and arrival responsibilities of the radar and tower positions. These new procedures shifted and multiplied responsibilities from the tower controller to the radar controller; creating additional workload upon the radar controller; who is; by national directive; responsible for applying requirements for class C services. These new procedures were not incremental in deployment but were changed all at once. This incident may or may not have been attributed to the changes; however I still remain certain that there is an increased workload placed upon the radar approach/departure controller; all over the interpretation of 'pre-arranged coordination.' recommendation; more staffing. Better and effective managerial techniques to maintain a smarter system.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LFT RADAR Controller experienced a conflict during a heavy traffic period; the reporter alleging new RADAR Controller responsibility changes contributed to the event.

Narrative: I was working the combined Radar Approach Control. Staffing as usual is always short. We have several controllers out sick and FLM's (Front Line Manager's) routinely are required to fill position rotations; however; at the request of our ATM (Air Traffic Manager) the FLM's normally fill these positions in the Tower. With such terrible weather in previous months; this was a severe VFR day. There was many practice approaches being conducted and requested. There were many VFR aircraft in the system. There was an exercise going on over the weekend and the pilots have been troublesome with radical maneuvers and trying to accommodate there requests so close to the airport. At the time; there were four flights airborne; two VFR and two IFR going in opposite directions; respectively. One of the VFR flights was being difficult; wanting to terminate RADAR service within Class C airspace because he could not get on course sooner. He was obviously not familiar with the obligations of ATC and Class C Services. There was OJT (on job training) being conducted in several positions. Meaningful OJT is always a premium when you experience many months of slow traffic. At the time of the incident; I would say this was the busiest and complex traffic I have seen in years. I restricted/stopped departures; curtailed practice approaches; reduced workload by not taking on more VFR service and still was barely able to keep up. I was scanning my jurisdiction and working a situation with an IFR departure to climb to Center and a VFR overflight; applying the proper visual separation procedure; when I noticed I had this situation developing. I quickly issued a vector to Aircraft Y; my arrival; to avoid Aircraft X; my departure established on an outbound airway. I was aware that my vector was going to be rather close to maintaining 3 miles of separation; I was attempting to maintain 4 miles because I did not need Aircraft Y too far off because I was trying to fit him within my sequence. He was compatible; on final; with other aircraft following him and there was very fast jet traffic to follow these. It was close enough to notice and I later replied the scenario to make a measurement. I found 2.9 miles separation. Note: It may be relevant that the ATM; insisted; and unilaterally imposed; a comprehensive change to the SOP; that affected the very long time established departure and arrival responsibilities of the RADAR and Tower positions. These new procedures shifted and multiplied responsibilities from the Tower Controller to the RADAR Controller; creating additional workload upon the RADAR Controller; who is; by National directive; responsible for applying requirements for Class C Services. These new procedures were not incremental in deployment but were changed all at once. This incident may or may not have been attributed to the changes; however I still remain certain that there is an increased workload placed upon the RADAR Approach/Departure Controller; all over the interpretation of 'Pre-arranged Coordination.' Recommendation; more staffing. Better and effective managerial techniques to maintain a smarter system.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.