Narrative:

In route to the destination airport; the crew determined that the lda/DME runway 25 approach plate for eagle county regional (kege) possessed ambiguous notations for which interpretation could not be agreed upon. Both efbs (electronic flight bags) were set up to display commercial charts for the approach in question; while the first officer utilized a handier print-out version (nos chart). For planning purposes; if utilizing the glide slope; it was observed that the two charts displayed two different geographical points for missed approach initial climb-out. The commercial chart clearly states cipku (i-esj 3.5 DME) as the missed approach point (map); and that the anticipated missed approach climb-out would commence prior to cipku; whereas; the nos chart shows the missed approach climb-out is anticipated to commence at cipku. The other ambiguity lay in the notations section of the approach plate; specifically: '*for lda/GS fly visual to airport 246 degrees/4.3 NM; and *fly visual to airport authorized during day only.' the minimum visibility for the approach (during the day) is 3 miles. However; cipku is at 3.5 DME; and the asterisk notation says to fly visually from 4.3 NM. Clear interpretation of the approach plates (commercial vs nos); especially the asterisk notations could not be agreed upon; therefore; it was determined that the pilot flying (captain) would fly the glide slope while the non-flying pilot (first officer) would monitor the DME and altitudes at the various approach fixes; including cipku. While on the visual approach; and prior to the final approach fix; the tower controller instructed the crew to report a five mile final. However; since both pilots were cognitively absorbed in interpretation of the approach plate; this reporting point was neglected. Subsequently; a landing clearance was not obtained. The crew landed on the intended runway without incident. Upon touch-down; the tower controller notified the crew that they had not reported the ATC requested 5 mile final; and that they (crew) had not been issued a landing clearance. The tower controller then issued a taxi clearance to the ramp. The crew acknowledged air traffic control (ATC). After the passengers disembarked; the crew convened; assessed the issue; and determined that the captain should call the tower on the telephone; after which; the captain assured the first officer that the tower controller would consider the event as a non-issue. The crew's cognitive processes were engulfed in deciphering the ambiguity regarding the approach plate. The crew discussed possible prevention techniques. The first officer suggested tuning the ground control frequency in channel two on the number one radio upon the issuance of a landing clearance. Another possible technique is to make a check mark on a need board next to cleared to land; or include landing clearance on the check list.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A First Officer reported landing without clearance at EGE after the flight crew completed a LDA DME RWY 25 approach. The crew was distracted and confused by the differences between the EFB displayed Commercial chart missed approach display and the NOS missed approach depiction.

Narrative: In route to the destination airport; the crew determined that the LDA/DME RWY 25 approach plate for Eagle County Regional (KEGE) possessed ambiguous notations for which interpretation could not be agreed upon. Both EFBs (electronic flight bags) were set up to display Commercial charts for the approach in question; while the FO utilized a handier print-out version (NOS chart). For planning purposes; if utilizing the glide slope; it was observed that the two charts displayed two different geographical points for missed approach initial climb-out. The Commercial chart clearly states CIPKU (I-ESJ 3.5 DME) as the missed approach point (MAP); and that the anticipated missed approach climb-out would commence prior to CIPKU; whereas; the NOS chart shows the missed approach climb-out is anticipated to commence at CIPKU. The other ambiguity lay in the notations section of the approach plate; specifically: '*For LDA/GS fly visual to airport 246 degrees/4.3 NM; and *Fly visual to airport authorized during day only.' The minimum visibility for the approach (during the day) is 3 miles. However; CIPKU is at 3.5 DME; and the asterisk notation says to fly visually from 4.3 NM. Clear interpretation of the approach plates (Commercial vs NOS); especially the asterisk notations could not be agreed upon; therefore; it was determined that the pilot flying (captain) would fly the glide slope while the non-flying pilot (FO) would monitor the DME and altitudes at the various approach fixes; including CIPKU. While on the visual approach; and prior to the final approach fix; the tower controller instructed the crew to report a five mile final. However; since both pilots were cognitively absorbed in interpretation of the approach plate; this reporting point was neglected. Subsequently; a landing clearance was not obtained. The crew landed on the intended runway without incident. Upon touch-down; the Tower Controller notified the crew that they had not reported the ATC requested 5 mile final; and that they (crew) had not been issued a landing clearance. The Tower Controller then issued a taxi clearance to the ramp. The crew acknowledged Air Traffic Control (ATC). After the passengers disembarked; the crew convened; assessed the issue; and determined that the Captain should call the tower on the telephone; after which; the Captain assured the First Officer that the tower controller would consider the event as a non-issue. The crew's cognitive processes were engulfed in deciphering the ambiguity regarding the approach plate. The crew discussed possible prevention techniques. The First Officer suggested tuning the ground control frequency in channel two on the number one radio upon the issuance of a landing clearance. Another possible technique is to make a check mark on a need board next to Cleared to land; or include Landing Clearance on the check list.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.