Narrative:

While in cruise at FL380 the number one engine N1 began to decrease and vibration was felt. Indicator showed no excessive vibration (0.7) but vibration was evident. A definite yaw was also associated with the failed engine. Oil pressure and quantity were normal. Engine would not respond to throttle inputs and N1 was stable at 55%. As captain I took over flying and the first officer requested lower and we began to descend. While descending the vibration began to move higher (1.1 to 1.3) and we decided to shut engine down to prevent any possible further damage to engine. I declared an emergency with center control while first officer prepared to run engine shutdown checklist in QRH. After completing checklist we called lead flight attendant to brief the situation. I informed her that we may be diverting but would not make that decision until contacting company. At that point we used all means to contact company. An ACARS message was sent and we began the process of contacting a commercial radio operator to get a phone patch. Aircraft was flying nicely at FL220 and we wanted to express entire situation to company prior to diverting to alternate airport. Making the contact link up was very time consuming. We were at a location where there were a number of possible frequencies and we attempted all of them with no response. We asked center if they knew the correct frequency for our area and he gave us a flight watch frequency. We called flight watch and they did not know of an appropriate frequency. We then started the process over again using the frequencies given in the operations manual. We did eventually contact maintenance control and placed a phone patch to dispatch. Once contact was made with dispatch it was evident they did not want any further information and that we should divert immediately. We informed center and requested vectors to the alternate airport; and briefed lead flight attendant that we had begun the diversion. The approach and landing were normal.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A power loss and vibration in the left engine of an air carrier aircraft caused the flight crew to shut down the engine; declare an emergency and divert. The divert decision was complicated by the inability to initially contact the company to coordinate the decision.

Narrative: While in cruise at FL380 the number one engine N1 began to decrease and vibration was felt. Indicator showed no excessive vibration (0.7) but vibration was evident. A definite yaw was also associated with the failed engine. Oil pressure and quantity were normal. Engine would not respond to throttle inputs and N1 was stable at 55%. As Captain I took over flying and the First Officer requested lower and we began to descend. While descending the vibration began to move higher (1.1 to 1.3) and we decided to shut engine down to prevent any possible further damage to engine. I declared an Emergency with Center Control while First Officer prepared to run engine shutdown checklist in QRH. After completing checklist we called lead Flight Attendant to brief the situation. I informed her that we may be diverting but would not make that decision until contacting company. At that point we used all means to contact company. An ACARS message was sent and we began the process of contacting a commercial radio operator to get a phone patch. Aircraft was flying nicely at FL220 and we wanted to express entire situation to company prior to diverting to alternate airport. Making the contact link up was very time consuming. We were at a location where there were a number of possible frequencies and we attempted all of them with no response. We asked Center if they knew the correct frequency for our area and he gave us a Flight Watch frequency. We called Flight Watch and they did not know of an appropriate frequency. We then started the process over again using the frequencies given in the operations manual. We did eventually contact Maintenance Control and placed a phone patch to Dispatch. Once contact was made with Dispatch it was evident they did not want any further information and that we should divert immediately. We informed Center and requested vectors to the alternate airport; and briefed lead Flight Attendant that we had begun the diversion. The approach and landing were normal.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.