Narrative:

I was on a.M. Home reserve. I was called to report at noon to ferry an aircraft and then deadhead back. My captain met me at the airport and we discussed the situation with the aircraft. We were able to speak with maintenance personnel as well as the pilots that had flown the aircraft in earlier that morning; concerning the problem that warranted the maintenance ferry flight; as well as consulting the maintenance logbook. Apparently; the aircraft had several recurrences of a flap power caution during several different flights; with maintenance unable to successfully troubleshoot/fix the issue. For background; a flap power caution illuminates when a malfunction of the flaps has occurred; and the flaps will no longer move regardless of what flap setting is selected. According to the maintenance log; on two occasions the pilots performed the flap power caution checklist; which entailed resetting a circuit breaker; and the flaps operated properly after that. On one occasion; the logbook stated the checklist directed circuit breaker reset did not work; and the pilots performed a zero flap landing.the corrective action after two previous flights seemed to be similar; in that they troubleshot; tested; and [signed off the write up as] 'ops checked good'. We had been called in to perform a maintenance ferry flight to another maintenance base. The justification for this; from our duty officer; was that the appropriate facilities did not exist to troubleshoot the flap problem adequately. The proposed ferry flight would take place with the flaps in the 15 degree position; with instructions to the pilots on the ferry permit that the flaps were not to be touched. The pilots that had flown the aircraft in that morning and had experienced the most recent flap power caution stated to my captain and I that they had refused to perform the maintenance ferry flight themselves; since obviously something was wrong that maintenance could not figure out. Unfortunately; I have personally experienced situations similar to this before; in that one crew refuses to fly an aircraft; and the company calls in a new crew to see if they are willing to fly the aircraft; instead of fixing the problem that caused the original crew to reject the aircraft. The captain and I did not end up performing this flight in the end; and a new reserve crew was called out to perform the flight. I am uncertain of the final outcome of this proposed maintenance ferry flight. What follows are the objections that the captain and/or I personally gave to the duty officer/dispatch supervisor as to why we viewed this flight as in violation of fars and company policy. One both the duty officer and the dispatch supervisor stated that we were in compliance with the fom and fars to fly enroute with our flaps set at 15 degrees. This despite the fact that dispatch admitted that they had no cruise profile in their flight planning software that accounted for the performance (fuel burn; etc.) associated with the flaps staying at 15 degrees throughout the flight. We also would be restricted to 170 KIAS due to our flap position; which was also not accounted for in either the performance or our filed flight plan (it was planned at 250 KIAS). Two; not touching the flaps throughout a flight is contrary to all training I have ever received at this airline; whether for regular or irregular operations. One of the main points that is ingrained in us during our simulator training is that during a missed approach or engine out procedure; one of the first things we do is to bring up the flaps. With specific instructions not to do this; I asked a flight manager to provide us with new written procedures for this specific flight. I also said that we did not have access to a checklist that would be appropriate for an emergency situation such as an engine failure. He stated he would not be writing a new checklist; and we'd just have to 'be real pilots.' he did add direction in the ferry permit that the flaps could be brought up 'in case of emergency' but while discussing this with him; he stated that we would probably receive another flap power caution; which would mean that the flaps wouldn't come up anyway. Fortunately; the debate between me; the captain; dispatch; and the duty officer prolonged our day such that duty limitations became a concern. The captain and I were both morning reserves; which meant we were initially contactable at xa:30. It was now xr:00; 30 minutes past our normally scheduled release from being contactable. When I asked a crew scheduler about this; she stated that since it was now part 91 flying; we could work for up to 16 hours from when we showed up at the airport. Under this line of thinking; we were legal to work until xa:00 the following morning; regardless of when we were contactable. I argued the legality of this interpretation; finally involving the chief pilot. I was told by the crew scheduling supervisor that the chief pilot did not like the idea of us working that long; and that he instructed scheduling to release the captain and I. Neither the crew scheduler nor I was sure of the legality of her previous interpretation; and she said she would be seeking guidance on the issue; and recommended I do the same. To my knowledge; the airport reserve pilots were then called out to perform the maintenance ferry flight of the aircraft. I am not familiar with the events surrounding that flight.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: When advised that the flaps would be restricted to 15 degrees for the entire flight; a Q400 flight crew refused to perform a maintenance ferry flight for which they felt they were not properly qualified and legality of which they questioned.

Narrative: I was on A.M. home reserve. I was called to report at noon to ferry an aircraft and then deadhead back. My Captain met me at the airport and we discussed the situation with the aircraft. We were able to speak with maintenance personnel as well as the pilots that had flown the aircraft in earlier that morning; concerning the problem that warranted the maintenance ferry flight; as well as consulting the maintenance logbook. Apparently; the aircraft had several recurrences of a FLAP POWER caution during several different flights; with Maintenance unable to successfully troubleshoot/fix the issue. For background; a FLAP POWER caution illuminates when a malfunction of the flaps has occurred; and the flaps will no longer move regardless of what flap setting is selected. According to the maintenance log; on two occasions the pilots performed the FLAP POWER caution checklist; which entailed resetting a circuit breaker; and the flaps operated properly after that. On one occasion; the logbook stated the checklist directed circuit breaker reset did not work; and the pilots performed a zero flap landing.The corrective action after two previous flights seemed to be similar; in that they troubleshot; tested; and [signed off the write up as] 'ops checked good'. We had been called in to perform a maintenance ferry flight to another maintenance base. The justification for this; from our Duty Officer; was that the appropriate facilities did not exist to troubleshoot the flap problem adequately. The proposed ferry flight would take place with the flaps in the 15 degree position; with instructions to the pilots on the ferry permit that the flaps were not to be touched. The pilots that had flown the aircraft in that morning and had experienced the most recent FLAP POWER caution stated to my Captain and I that they had refused to perform the maintenance ferry flight themselves; since obviously something was wrong that Maintenance could not figure out. Unfortunately; I have personally experienced situations similar to this before; in that one crew refuses to fly an aircraft; and the company calls in a new crew to see if they are willing to fly the aircraft; instead of fixing the problem that caused the original crew to reject the aircraft. The Captain and I did not end up performing this flight in the end; and a new reserve crew was called out to perform the flight. I am uncertain of the final outcome of this proposed maintenance ferry flight. What follows are the objections that the Captain and/or I personally gave to the Duty Officer/Dispatch Supervisor as to why we viewed this flight as in violation of FARs and company policy. One both the Duty Officer and the Dispatch Supervisor stated that we were in compliance with the FOM and FARs to fly enroute with our flaps set at 15 degrees. This despite the fact that Dispatch admitted that they had no cruise profile in their flight planning software that accounted for the performance (fuel burn; etc.) associated with the flaps staying at 15 degrees throughout the flight. We also would be restricted to 170 KIAS due to our flap position; which was also not accounted for in either the performance or our filed flight plan (it was planned at 250 KIAS). Two; not touching the flaps throughout a flight is contrary to all training I have ever received at this airline; whether for regular or irregular operations. One of the main points that is ingrained in us during our simulator training is that during a missed approach or engine out procedure; one of the first things we do is to bring up the flaps. With specific instructions not to do this; I asked a Flight Manager to provide us with new written procedures for this specific flight. I also said that we did not have access to a checklist that would be appropriate for an emergency situation such as an engine failure. He stated he would not be writing a new checklist; and we'd just have to 'be real pilots.' He did add direction in the ferry permit that the flaps could be brought up 'in case of emergency' but while discussing this with him; he stated that we would probably receive another FLAP POWER caution; which would mean that the flaps wouldn't come up anyway. Fortunately; the debate between me; the Captain; Dispatch; and the Duty Officer prolonged our day such that duty limitations became a concern. The Captain and I were both morning reserves; which meant we were initially contactable at XA:30. It was now XR:00; 30 minutes past our normally scheduled release from being contactable. When I asked a Crew Scheduler about this; she stated that since it was now Part 91 flying; we could work for up to 16 hours from when we showed up at the airport. Under this line of thinking; we were legal to work until XA:00 the following morning; regardless of when we were contactable. I argued the legality of this interpretation; finally involving the Chief Pilot. I was told by the Crew Scheduling Supervisor that the Chief Pilot did not like the idea of us working that long; and that he instructed scheduling to release the Captain and I. Neither the Crew Scheduler nor I was sure of the legality of her previous interpretation; and she said she would be seeking guidance on the issue; and recommended I do the same. To my knowledge; the airport reserve pilots were then called out to perform the maintenance ferry flight of the aircraft. I am not familiar with the events surrounding that flight.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.