Narrative:

The day of this event began on the fourth day of a four day trip and was our third early morning report this week. This was my seventh straight day on the road. I started the week on day 1 with a ready reserve; day 2 with an out and back; and day 3 I sat all day at my crash pad because my schedule would not allow me to commute home. We reported the next day for our four day trip. The first three days went very smoothly and were uneventful. On day four we reported very early and flew to ZZZ1 then ZZZ2 to ZZZ3 (line check); sat for three hours and then flew from ZZZ3 back to ZZZ2. Prior to operating our flight from ZZZ3 to ZZZ2 I conducted my normal pre-flight walk around and did not notice anything out of the norm with the main and nose wheels. There were no deep cuts; bald spots; or abnormalities. The flight inbound to ZZZ3 concluded with a smooth and uneventful landing that did not suspect anything wrong with the wheels. We taxied out for a flaps 8 takeoff. With our given weight and temperature we had a V1 of 139 and a vr of 143. We reached our wheels up time and were given clearance to takeoff and fly runway heading. The takeoff roll was smooth without anything out of the norm. I was the pilot not flying and made the 100 KTS call; and V1 call. A split second before I made the 'rotate' call we experienced violent vibrations that seemed to be coming from the wheels. We continued our takeoff safely and continued to feel the vibrations until the landing gear was indicated as 'up and locked.' we continued our climb and made a few remarks about the duration; feel; and source of the vibrations. The vibrations were very violent; and seemed to feel like the front of the aircraft was skipping up and down because of the high speed of the flaps 8 takeoff. All engine indications were all normal and I 'stepped' through all of the synoptic pages on the EICAS to find all systems were operating normal. From the size and length of the vibrations felt in the flight deck we both determined that from our best knowledge that it was coming from the nose gear. Passing through 10;000 ft I called back to the flight attendant to let her know everything was operating normally and to see if she felt or heard the vibrations. She said that she definitely felt them and all of the passengers were alarmed as well. A few passengers as far back as row 11 also felt it. Now; almost at cruise that captain and I started discussing all possible scenarios. We felt it could have been either a faulty shimmy damper on the nose gear; a combination of a rough runway with the takeoff speed started a vibration and continued to oscillate until the gear was up; or having a blown tire. It was obvious to both of us that continuing the flight on to ZZZ2 was fine because the aircraft was operating normally in flight; we knew that weather conditions in ZZZ2 were good; and with a 60 KT tail wind the flight time was only 56 minutes; time that we needed to discuss the problem and notify dispatch and maintenance anyways. We both came to the conclusion that it was probably a shimmy damper because of how the vibrations felt to us in the flight deck. We called maintenance and notified them of the issue. After giving them all of the information they agreed with us and told us to continue to ZZZ2; land; and call them when we got to the gate and they would check it out. I believe that hearing this gave us both the peace of mind that everything was okay.during cruise we continued to stay in contact with the flight attendant to make sure everyone in the back was okay. She told us that she was given a note from a commuting flight attendant and that she felt this vibration before when she experienced a blown tire. We discussed the possibility that this could be the problem. Once on with approach we requested to have emergency fire and rescue trucks standing by. We did not declare an emergency for the fact that we did not really know what we were dealing with but as a precaution we both felt very strongly that we should have trucks standing by 'just in case'. We were vectored around for the ILS. The weather was ten and clear with a pretty stiff wind out of the northwest; which gave us a pretty good left crosswind. The captain and I briefed several different scenarios; and one in particular is if we felt vibrations when the gear was extended we would discontinue the approach. We said that if we felt vibrations again or if the aircraft was yawing in any way when the gear was down then we would 'go-around'; call maintenance; and consider declaring an emergency. The gear came down smooth and everything felt normal so far. He turned off the autopilot to get a feel for it and the captain told me everything seemed normal. It was the captain's leg and he briefed that he would keep the nose gear off the ground as long as possible. Because of the left crosswind he set the left main down first; bled off some speed and then set down the right very smoothly. As soon as he set down the right main the vibrations came back and the captain described that the aircraft was pulling to the right. He kept the aircraft on the center line and we taxied off the high speed. As we taxied off the runway we both monitored the brake temperatures and they were normal. It was obvious to both of us that there was damage on the right mains so we requested to clear the runway and stop until we knew the problem. Fire and rescue were all around us and the fire chief inspected the aircraft and told us the right main outboard tire had blown. It was now obvious to us that the right main outboard tire blew on takeoff roll out of ZZZ3 at a speed of about 140 KTS. We had buses meet the aircraft and all of the passengers deplaned without any injuries. Everyone seemed to be very comfortable and pleased with how the crew handled the event. Over the next few hours we stayed with the aircraft as the tire was being changed and then taxied to the gate without any further incident. I believed that CRM played a big part in this event. Mostly because we had no idea what we were dealing with. We had no indications in the flight deck of anything being wrong. So we had to use our own knowledge and experience to estimate the issue and make the best decision with the given information. I think the fact that we really didn't know what we were dealing with forced us to call for the trucks to be standing by as a precaution. Neither of us had ever experienced a blown tire and didn't know what it felt like. So that option was standing by in our head but never became the clear cut problem until after we landed. I believed one of the most useful tools of CRM in this situation came from the commuting flight attendant. She experienced this vibration before and felt it was the same. Instead of telling our flight attendant out loud; she calmly handed her a piece of paper so she wouldn't alarm the passengers. Once our flight attendant passed the word on to us we increased our hunch that this is what we might be dealing with. The captain and I both worked well together with sharing duties; communicating with each other; and dividing tasks. We had everyone involved. We even had luck on our side because of the left crosswind. We had no idea that it was the right main blown until we were on the ground. It just happened that the crosswind was from the left and the right main came down last when we were at a lower speed.this event was obviously unavoidable. After coming home and replaying this scenario over and over in my head I felt as if we did a good job. The only question that might be raised is if we should have put the gear up; instead of leaving it down in case it was damaged. But; after discussing it we both believed that we made the correct decision because we did not know what was wrong with it. It could have been anything. So our best judgment was to stick to standards and complete the takeoff as we are trained to do. So after thinking about the event I feel as if we would not have done anything different.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ50 First Officer describes the events surrounding a tire failure on takeoff that is not positively identified until landing at destination airport.

Narrative: The day of this event began on the fourth day of a four day trip and was our third early morning report this week. This was my seventh straight day on the road. I started the week on day 1 with a ready reserve; day 2 with an out and back; and day 3 I sat all day at my crash pad because my schedule would not allow me to commute home. We reported the next day for our four day trip. The first three days went very smoothly and were uneventful. On day four we reported very early and flew to ZZZ1 then ZZZ2 to ZZZ3 (Line Check); sat for three hours and then flew from ZZZ3 back to ZZZ2. Prior to operating our flight from ZZZ3 to ZZZ2 I conducted my normal pre-flight walk around and did not notice anything out of the norm with the main and nose wheels. There were no deep cuts; bald spots; or abnormalities. The flight inbound to ZZZ3 concluded with a smooth and uneventful landing that did not suspect anything wrong with the wheels. We taxied out for a flaps 8 takeoff. With our given weight and temperature we had a V1 of 139 and a VR of 143. We reached our wheels up time and were given clearance to takeoff and fly runway heading. The takeoff roll was smooth without anything out of the norm. I was the pilot not flying and made the 100 KTS call; and V1 call. A split second before I made the 'Rotate' call we experienced violent vibrations that seemed to be coming from the wheels. We continued our takeoff safely and continued to feel the vibrations until the landing gear was indicated as 'Up and Locked.' We continued our climb and made a few remarks about the duration; feel; and source of the vibrations. The vibrations were very violent; and seemed to feel like the front of the Aircraft was skipping up and down because of the high speed of the flaps 8 takeoff. All engine indications were all normal and I 'stepped' through all of the synoptic pages on the EICAS to find all systems were operating normal. From the size and length of the vibrations felt in the flight deck we both determined that from our best knowledge that it was coming from the nose gear. Passing through 10;000 FT I called back to the Flight Attendant to let her know everything was operating normally and to see if she felt or heard the vibrations. She said that she definitely felt them and all of the passengers were alarmed as well. A few passengers as far back as row 11 also felt it. Now; almost at cruise that Captain and I started discussing all possible scenarios. We felt it could have been either a faulty shimmy damper on the nose gear; a combination of a rough runway with the takeoff speed started a vibration and continued to oscillate until the gear was up; or having a blown tire. It was obvious to both of us that continuing the flight on to ZZZ2 was fine because the aircraft was operating normally in flight; we knew that weather conditions in ZZZ2 were good; and with a 60 KT tail wind the flight time was only 56 minutes; time that we needed to discuss the problem and notify Dispatch and Maintenance anyways. We both came to the conclusion that it was probably a shimmy damper because of how the vibrations felt to us in the flight deck. We called Maintenance and notified them of the issue. After giving them all of the information they agreed with us and told us to continue to ZZZ2; land; and call them when we got to the gate and they would check it out. I believe that hearing this gave us both the peace of mind that everything was okay.During cruise we continued to stay in contact with the Flight Attendant to make sure everyone in the back was okay. She told us that she was given a note from a commuting Flight Attendant and that she felt this vibration before when she experienced a blown tire. We discussed the possibility that this could be the problem. Once on with Approach we requested to have emergency fire and rescue trucks standing by. We did not declare an emergency for the fact that we did not really know what we were dealing with but as a precaution we both felt very strongly that we should have trucks standing by 'Just In Case'. We were vectored around for the ILS. The weather was ten and clear with a pretty stiff wind out of the northwest; which gave us a pretty good left crosswind. The Captain and I briefed several different scenarios; and one in particular is if we felt vibrations when the gear was extended we would discontinue the approach. We said that if we felt vibrations again or if the aircraft was yawing in any way when the gear was down then we would 'Go-Around'; call Maintenance; and consider declaring an emergency. The gear came down smooth and everything felt normal so far. He turned off the autopilot to get a feel for it and the Captain told me everything seemed normal. It was the Captain's leg and he briefed that he would keep the nose gear off the ground as long as possible. Because of the left crosswind he set the left main down first; bled off some speed and then set down the right very smoothly. As soon as he set down the right main the vibrations came back and the Captain described that the aircraft was pulling to the right. He kept the aircraft on the center line and we taxied off the high speed. As we taxied off the runway we both monitored the brake temperatures and they were normal. It was obvious to both of us that there was damage on the right mains so we requested to clear the runway and stop until we knew the problem. Fire and Rescue were all around us and the Fire Chief inspected the aircraft and told us the right main outboard tire had blown. It was now obvious to us that the right main outboard tire blew on takeoff roll out of ZZZ3 at a speed of about 140 KTS. We had buses meet the aircraft and all of the passengers deplaned without any injuries. Everyone seemed to be very comfortable and pleased with how the crew handled the event. Over the next few hours we stayed with the aircraft as the tire was being changed and then taxied to the gate without any further incident. I believed that CRM played a big part in this event. Mostly because we had no idea what we were dealing with. We had no indications in the flight deck of anything being wrong. So we had to use our own knowledge and experience to estimate the issue and make the best decision with the given information. I think the fact that we really didn't know what we were dealing with forced us to call for the trucks to be standing by as a precaution. Neither of us had ever experienced a blown tire and didn't know what it felt like. So that option was standing by in our head but never became the clear cut problem until after we landed. I believed one of the most useful tools of CRM in this situation came from the commuting Flight Attendant. She experienced this vibration before and felt it was the same. Instead of telling our Flight Attendant out loud; she calmly handed her a piece of paper so she wouldn't alarm the passengers. Once our Flight Attendant passed the word on to us we increased our hunch that this is what we might be dealing with. The Captain and I both worked well together with sharing duties; communicating with each other; and dividing tasks. We had everyone involved. We even had luck on our side because of the left crosswind. We had no idea that it was the right main blown until we were on the ground. It just happened that the crosswind was from the left and the right main came down last when we were at a lower speed.This event was obviously unavoidable. After coming home and replaying this scenario over and over in my head I felt as if we did a good job. The only question that might be raised is if we should have put the gear up; instead of leaving it down in case it was damaged. But; after discussing it we both believed that we made the correct decision because we did not know what was wrong with it. It could have been anything. So our best judgment was to stick to standards and complete the takeoff as we are trained to do. So after thinking about the event I feel as if we would not have done anything different.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.