Narrative:

Due to severe weather in the area; we were operating behind schedule. Our destination runway 10/28 was scheduled to close at XA00Z for construction. Dispatcher arranged to keep the runway open until XA30Z so that the flight could land. In cruise flight; at 11000'; 280 kts received a flaps fail caution message. Without the malfunction; we estimated that we would land at XA25Z. Now with the malfunction and having to run the QRH and perform calculations to determine our new landing distance; I estimated that we would not land before XA30Z (runway closure time). I tried to call our dispatcher on the radio; but they could not hear me because I was too low and too far away. I ACARS messaged the dispatcher; 'flaps fail at 0. Returning to departure airport.' the dispatcher concurred with; 'roger' over the ACARS. The ILS 28 at our destination was NOTAM'ed OTS. And there was no PAPI/VASI to be seen. I did not feel safe landing on a runway at night with flaps 0 and no vertical guidance. I made the decision to return to our departure airport where I could land on a 12000' runway with ILS and PAPI available. With the limited time I had to run calculations for landing distance; I did not feel safe landing on runway 28 with flaps stuck at 0 degrees. I was racing against the clock before the runway was scheduled to close.today the chief pilot called me to ask about why I decided to divert back rather than continue. I explained that I had no radio contact with my dispatcher and that the runway was going to close by the time I estimated I would land. He did some calculations to prove to me that I could have landed with the runway available. I felt like he was pressuring me to find a loop hole in my decision making process. It had been an exhausting day; with many ATC/weather delays and a cancellation of 2 legs. By the time this event occurred; I was feeling fatigued and had to make the best decision available based on what limited information I had available.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An air carrier Captain reported distress over his Chief Pilot second guessing his decision to return to the departure airport after receiving a FLAPS FAIL EICAS message; as he descended toward his destination. Contributing factors were a nighttime arrival; a runway closure deadline; ILS out of service and now glide path guidance.

Narrative: Due to severe weather in the area; we were operating behind schedule. Our destination Runway 10/28 was scheduled to close at XA00Z for construction. Dispatcher arranged to keep the runway open until XA30Z so that the flight could land. In cruise flight; at 11000'; 280 kts received a FLAPS FAIL caution message. Without the malfunction; we estimated that we would land at XA25Z. Now with the malfunction and having to run the QRH and perform calculations to determine our new landing distance; I estimated that we would not land before XA30Z (runway closure time). I tried to call our Dispatcher on the radio; but they could not hear me because I was too low and too far away. I ACARS messaged the Dispatcher; 'FLAPS FAIL AT 0. RETURNING TO DEPARTURE AIRPORT.' The Dispatcher CONCURRED with; 'ROGER' over the ACARS. THE ILS 28 at our destination was NOTAM'ed OTS. And there was no PAPI/VASI to be seen. I did not feel safe landing on a runway at night with flaps 0 and no vertical guidance. I made the decision to return to our departure airport where I could land on a 12000' runway with ILS and PAPI available. With the limited time I had to run calculations for landing distance; I did not feel safe landing on runway 28 with flaps stuck at 0 degrees. I was racing against the clock before the runway was scheduled to close.Today the Chief Pilot called me to ask about why I decided to divert back rather than continue. I explained that I had no radio contact with my Dispatcher and that the runway was going to close by the time I estimated I would land. He did some calculations to prove to me that I could have landed with the runway available. I felt like he was pressuring me to find a loop hole in my decision making process. It had been an exhausting day; with many ATC/Weather delays and a cancellation of 2 legs. By the time this event occurred; I was feeling fatigued and had to make the best decision available based on what limited information I had available.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.