Narrative:

While configuring for approach; the flying captain called for flaps 1. We received an EICAS caution message 'slats fail'. We joined the localizer but requested to cancel our approach clearance to 'deal with a flap problem'. We were told to descend to 4000 feet on the glide slope. I requested vectors off the approach and to keep us in the local area while we ran the non-normal checklist. The captain chose to continue flying while I ran the QRH procedure. I ran the slat/flap fail checklist. The slat fail message never went away so in accordance with the checklist we planned a flaps 2 slats 0 landing. Our performance was good for the planned runway. I then ran the 'spoiler fault' procedure as that message also appeared when the flaps were selected more than 0. The multiplier for the unfactored landing distance was higher for this checklist but the runway was still more than adequate. We landed with no other problems and taxied to the gate. We had received an a/I wing fail message while climbing out when the system did a self test climbing through 11;000 feet. We found out later that this was caused by a wing duct leak near a slat sensor. The heat from the duct leak caused the sensor to fail. This failure caused the flap/slat system to think that we had a slat asymmetry when we selected flaps 1. The slats were then locked out for the remainder of the flight. This event was caused by a mechanical failure and could not be avoided. That being said; I felt that the captain showed poor judgment when he continued to fly rather than run the QRH and manage the situation. I have had this same situation before although the cause was different. I briefed him on my previous experience and tried to keep him aware of what I was doing while he was flying. I feel that if he would have run the QRH and managed the aircraft and crew he might have elected to declare an emergency. I was conducting IOE and suggested that I fly and he manage; but he said he wanted me to run the procedure while he flew. This is contrary to the way he was trained. I debriefed this with him at the gate while the airplane was being worked on. I believe that in the future he will hand the aircraft over to the first officer and manage the airplane although I think he will probably always land the aircraft himself.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB190 Check Airman reports SLATS FAIL message on approach while conducting Initial Operating Experience training. QRH procedures are complied with and crew makes partial flap landing.

Narrative: While configuring for approach; the flying Captain called for flaps 1. We received an EICAS caution message 'SLATS FAIL'. We joined the localizer but requested to cancel our approach clearance to 'deal with a flap problem'. We were told to descend to 4000 feet on the glide slope. I requested vectors off the approach and to keep us in the local area while we ran the non-normal checklist. The Captain chose to continue flying while I ran the QRH procedure. I ran the SLAT/FLAP FAIL checklist. The slat fail message never went away so in accordance with the checklist we planned a flaps 2 slats 0 landing. Our performance was good for the planned runway. I then ran the 'SPOILER FAULT' procedure as that message also appeared when the flaps were selected more than 0. The multiplier for the unfactored landing distance was higher for this checklist but the runway was still more than adequate. We landed with no other problems and taxied to the gate. We had received an A/I WING FAIL message while climbing out when the system did a self test climbing through 11;000 feet. We found out later that this was caused by a wing duct leak near a slat sensor. The heat from the duct leak caused the sensor to fail. This failure caused the FLAP/SLAT system to think that we had a SLAT asymmetry when we selected Flaps 1. The SLATS were then locked out for the remainder of the flight. This event was caused by a mechanical failure and could not be avoided. That being said; I felt that the Captain showed poor judgment when he continued to fly rather than run the QRH and manage the situation. I have had this same situation before although the cause was different. I briefed him on my previous experience and tried to keep him aware of what I was doing while he was flying. I feel that if he would have run the QRH and managed the aircraft and crew he might have elected to declare an emergency. I was conducting IOE and suggested that I fly and he manage; but he said he wanted me to run the procedure while he flew. This is contrary to the way he was trained. I debriefed this with him at the gate while the airplane was being worked on. I believe that in the future he will hand the aircraft over to the First Officer and manage the airplane although I think he will probably always land the aircraft himself.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.