Narrative:

The southeast area was being impacted with severe weather. The controllers were constantly telling the flm (flight line manager) that we could not continue taking aircraft with all the weather that was in the area; and the constant need from the pilots to want to deviate into the departure corridor. We had a pilot that was flying to ord via the watsn arrival. After communication was transferred to the fwa controller the flight was given a new routing to ord via watsn esspo ord. When we got the flight the aircraft was deviating for weather. We also had aircraft destined to mdw and the looth sector next to us had a stream of aircraft for ord and mdw as well. Both sectors had deviations and all aircraft had to be descended to 11000 or 12000 ft.; prior to being handed off to the approach controls. When air carrier X flight passed the halie intersection C90 called and told us that both we and the looth sector were in the hold. My trainee then informed air carrier X that he was going to have to hold and proceeded to give him vectors to turn him to the holding fix. The pilot did not have halie in his data base and questioned the clearance. My trainee had to spell the holding fix then issue the instructions for the hold. While this was taking place we had a lifeguard flight off of sbn to ind. The aircraft was level at 11000 ft but was getting a bad ride; and requested higher. My trainee gave the aircraft 13000 ft. I informed the trainee that that was not the best plan because now we would have a hard time getting the aircraft through the holding pattern. We decided to tell air carrier X to start his inbound leg early; and then we gave the other aircraft an expedited descent. Air carrier X read back the descent clearance and other aircraft questioned who the clearance was for. We told the other aircraft pilot again to descend and then went back to the air carrier X pilot and verified his altitude. He informed us that he did indeed take the other aircraft's clearance and was climbing back up to 12000 ft. At no time did I feel that the airplanes were going to get together. The air carrier X pilot then asked us what holding pattern we wanted him to hold on since the pattern is different depending on which RNAV arrival you are flying. It appears that the first officer and the captain pulled out two different arrivals and wanted clarification. We told him we didn't care and that he could hold at whatever one he wanted. Recommendation; when ZAU decided to go to this two stream arrival there was a lot of concern on what would happen when there was any weather involved; and C90 abruptly put us into the hold. There is very little room for error; and with having to work all of the mdw and ord arrivals the airspace is very tight. Once you get west of the oxi (knox) VOR the controller has very little room to make adjustments without having to call for point outs. Also we were told that we would never be one stream to ord but when weather is present; it seems that the answer to C90 is one stream. Also when we are on an east flow every aircraft has to be rerouted at least once and if we are put in the hold two times. It adds a tremendous amount of work for the controller as well as the pilots. There was no input from the controllers when the management of ZAU implemented these new procedures and the training that was received at ZAU and C90 was inadequate and in many instances different depending on whom the trainer was. We have a serious issue with the flm;s in our area. Most do not work the sector and they don't really understand what the impact of their decisions.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: The ORD and MDW arrival flows leave little room for maneuvering and FLM's don't understand the sector traffic according to a ZAU controller who described a confusing holding situation that occurred when C90 stopped arrivals unexpectedly.

Narrative: The southeast area was being impacted with severe weather. The controllers were constantly telling the FLM (Flight Line Manager) that we could not continue taking aircraft with all the weather that was in the area; and the constant need from the pilots to want to deviate into the departure corridor. We had a pilot that was flying to ORD via the Watsn Arrival. After communication was transferred to the FWA Controller the flight was given a new routing to ORD via WATSN ESSPO ORD. When we got the flight the aircraft was deviating for weather. We also had aircraft destined to MDW and the Looth Sector next to us had a stream of aircraft for ORD and MDW as well. Both sectors had deviations and all aircraft had to be descended to 11000 or 12000 ft.; prior to being handed off to the approach controls. When Air Carrier X flight passed the Halie Intersection C90 called and told us that both we and the Looth Sector were in the hold. My trainee then informed Air Carrier X that he was going to have to hold and proceeded to give him vectors to turn him to the holding fix. The pilot did not have Halie in his data base and questioned the clearance. My trainee had to spell the holding fix then issue the instructions for the hold. While this was taking place we had a lifeguard flight off of SBN to IND. The aircraft was level at 11000 ft but was getting a bad ride; and requested higher. My trainee gave the aircraft 13000 ft. I informed the trainee that that was not the best plan because now we would have a hard time getting the aircraft through the holding pattern. We decided to tell Air Carrier X to start his inbound leg early; and then we gave the other aircraft an expedited descent. Air Carrier X read back the descent clearance and other aircraft questioned who the clearance was for. We told the other aircraft pilot again to descend and then went back to the Air Carrier X pilot and verified his altitude. He informed us that he did indeed take the other aircraft's clearance and was climbing back up to 12000 ft. At no time did I feel that the airplanes were going to get together. The Air Carrier X pilot then asked us what holding pattern we wanted him to hold on since the pattern is different depending on which RNAV arrival you are flying. It appears that the First Officer and the Captain pulled out two different arrivals and wanted clarification. We told him we didn't care and that he could hold at whatever one he wanted. Recommendation; when ZAU decided to go to this two stream arrival there was a lot of concern on what would happen when there was any weather involved; and C90 abruptly put us into the hold. There is very little room for error; and with having to work all of the MDW and ORD arrivals the airspace is very tight. Once you get west of the OXI (KNOX) VOR the controller has very little room to make adjustments without having to call for point outs. Also we were told that we would never be one stream to ORD but when weather is present; it seems that the answer to C90 is one stream. Also when we are on an east flow every aircraft has to be rerouted at least once and if we are put in the hold two times. It adds a tremendous amount of work for the controller as well as the pilots. There was no input from the controllers when the management of ZAU implemented these new procedures and the training that was received at ZAU and C90 was inadequate and in many instances different depending on whom the trainer was. We have a serious issue with the FLM;s in our area. Most do not work the sector and they don't really understand what the impact of their decisions.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.