Narrative:

This report describes an unsafe situation that has been induced in our cockpits by repeated implementations of new procedures on a large scale with no associated training. This narrative is in reference to the flight I was a crew member on; however it is not specific to a particular incident rather it applies to all flights; all phases as a result of the new procedures that have been implemented. The repeated issuance of major changes to cockpit procedures with little or no associated training violates nearly all of the principles compiled in studies by the FAA and outlined in the FAA publication 'fundamentals of instruction.' the scope of these new procedures is so great it cannot be encompassed in a 'read file' memo. Primarily; when the human mind learns something new; it is learned most thoroughly and ingrained most deeply. If the person then realizes the information was wrong and must be replaced with a new set of correct ideas; the mind struggles to make the change and the new ideas are not learned as deeply or quickly. This is referred to as the law of primacy in learning. The pilots at my air carrier have been subjected to 3 to 4 major procedural changes since the introduction of the airbus. Regardless of the procedures the airplanes have flown successfully in spite of these procedures. These procedural changes notably occur as changes occur in management personnel. True learning takes place only after practice (muscle memory theory states the human mind learns instinctive repetition to an input after 1800 repetitions of a process) and are added to rote memory and understanding. With no associated training (practice and repetition) the pilots are being asked to fly aircraft loaded with passengers based solely on rote memory of these procedures; and to a degree of understanding we each derive from interpretation of the documents we have each read; and each are interrupting differently (this with the multiple iterations of these procedures jumbled in our minds.) finally with the FAA inspectors and check airmen dramatically increasing their scrutiny of the performance of the pilots; reducing their tolerance for deviations from prescribed procedures and limitations; an environment of high stress and anxiety has been created in the cockpit. Such stress is known to cause human beings to make mistakes and can have potentially serious consequences. I feel as a pilot; and as a member of a crew that needs to work in harmony with standard application of well understood procedures; I am now; more than at any time in the past; am very poorly prepared to maintain the high degree of safety expected of my position than I have ever been in my career. I have a very strong background and record of performance in my career; I know I am very capable; so this can not be dismissed as the weakness of an individual pilot. Every pilot with whom I have flown recently has expressed similar concerns which further underscores the point. Someone needs to 'put their foot down' on this issue. The measure of success for the person responsible for determining our procedures should be that they can come to work and put their feet up on their desk confident they have a well trained group of pilots. This will mean the pilots can learn their procedures well and continue to improve from trip to trip; day over day and year over year. Unfortunately this is not the case. Those responsible for these documents should be now; more than at any time in the history of this company; be concerned about the jeopardy they have placed the company with this poorly designed; poorly rolled out revision to the airbus procedures.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air Carrier Captain laments a series of changes promulgated by his company to flight operations; which have not been backed up with any formal classroom or simulator training. Some of the changes have reversed earlier changes resulting in confusion on the line.

Narrative: This report describes an unsafe situation that has been induced in our cockpits by repeated implementations of new procedures on a large scale with no associated training. This narrative is in reference to the flight I was a crew member on; however it is not specific to a particular incident rather it applies to all flights; all phases as a result of the new procedures that have been implemented. The repeated issuance of major changes to cockpit procedures with little or no associated training violates nearly all of the principles compiled in studies by the FAA and outlined in the FAA publication 'Fundamentals of Instruction.' The scope of these new procedures is so great it cannot be encompassed in a 'Read File' memo. Primarily; when the human mind learns something new; it is learned most thoroughly and ingrained most deeply. If the person then realizes the information was wrong and must be replaced with a new set of correct ideas; the mind struggles to make the change and the new ideas are not learned as deeply or quickly. This is referred to as the Law of Primacy in learning. The pilots at my Air Carrier have been subjected to 3 to 4 major procedural changes since the introduction of the Airbus. Regardless of the procedures the airplanes have flown successfully in spite of these procedures. These procedural changes notably occur as changes occur in management personnel. True learning takes place only after practice (muscle memory theory states the human mind learns instinctive repetition to an input after 1800 repetitions of a process) and are added to rote memory and understanding. With no associated training (practice and repetition) the pilots are being asked to fly aircraft loaded with passengers based solely on rote memory of these procedures; and to a degree of understanding we each derive from interpretation of the documents we have each read; and each are interrupting differently (this with the multiple iterations of these procedures jumbled in our minds.) Finally with the FAA Inspectors and Check Airmen dramatically increasing their scrutiny of the performance of the pilots; reducing their tolerance for deviations from prescribed procedures and limitations; an environment of high stress and anxiety has been created in the cockpit. Such stress is known to cause human beings to make mistakes and can have potentially serious consequences. I feel as a pilot; and as a member of a crew that needs to work in harmony with standard application of well understood procedures; I am now; more than at any time in the past; am very poorly prepared to maintain the high degree of safety expected of my position than I have ever been in my career. I have a very strong background and record of performance in my career; I know I am very capable; so this can not be dismissed as the weakness of an individual pilot. Every pilot with whom I have flown recently has expressed similar concerns which further underscores the point. Someone needs to 'put their foot down' on this issue. The measure of success for the person responsible for determining our procedures should be that they can come to work and put their feet up on their desk confident they have a well trained group of pilots. This will mean the pilots can learn their procedures well and continue to improve from trip to trip; day over day and year over year. Unfortunately this is not the case. Those responsible for these documents should be now; more than at any time in the history of this company; be concerned about the jeopardy they have placed the company with this poorly designed; poorly rolled out revision to the Airbus procedures.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.