Narrative:

Crew was flown commercial to singapore for a test flight of two aircraft on c-check. It took 24 hours of flight time and 30 hours elapsed by the time we arrived. No rest was provided and seating was coach; less than 24 hours elapsed before we were back at the airport. Time zone change: 12 hours. [I] advised director of operations that I had the wrong crew for the task at hand. First officer with very little experience and never been to the pacific. Flight engineer [was] over 65 years with history of heart problems. The day prior to the test flight the aircraft was fueled with 30000 pounds to be used for ballast. The following day; the flight plan required 115000 pounds of fuel. I was told the flight engineer to load 125000 pounds on top of the 30000 pounds we already had. The extra 10000 pounds were for an inoperative radar. I was threatened by the director of operations that if I did not take the airplane I will have to face consequences. I told him that it was not safe even if it was legal. I told him I would make a decision the following day upon weather review. Conditions met MEL requirements; very good weather. Flight engineer loaded a total of 125000 pounds not realizing that he was using the ballast fuel as part of the required. In effect being 30000 pounds short. Prior to departure the checklist was read. On the fuel the flight engineer advised me that he was missing the fuel receipt. A minute later he told me that he found it. I asked him if the fuel uplift matched the fuel that we needed on board. He answered yes. At that point I was not concerned about fuel. The first officer did his weight and balance based on a total of 155000 pounds. Performance was calculated for those weights. He never realized we did not have the fuel. After takeoff and approximately 4:30 hours into the flight; the flight engineer told me that the fuel on the main tanks was not to schedule and realized his mistake. Due to the extra 10000 pounds that were added for an inoperative radar; I calculated that we had just enough fuel to reach destination. I told the flight engineer to maintain for as long as possible the fuel required for ballast. Upon landing; total fuel remaining was 30000 pounds. We were never in danger of actually running out of fuel before reaching destination. My concern was of aircraft instability. In order to maintain adequate fuel in the main tanks for arrival; 10000 pounds from the ballast fuel were transferred. I checked for aircraft instability and found no problems concerning control of aircraft. Approximately 90 percent of the flight was conducted over water. Flight was conducted under part 91. Contributing factors [were] crew fatigue/inadequate rest; pressure from the company to get the airplane out. Crew not qualified for the job to be performed adding pressure to the captain. Airplane undergoing heavy maintenance check and [us] not knowing how it would perform. Radar inoperative [was] adding more anxiety; [along with] the threat from director of operations. My error was not looking at the fuel totalizer and assuming that we had the fuel based on the flight engineer reporting that the uplift in gallons matched the required fuel load. The departure airport had very narrow time slots. This put more pressure. Weather in the afternoon turned into severe thunderstorms causing closure of airport.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A wide body transport Captain reported departing his international station on a ferry flight with a smaller fuel load than planned because of fatigue and time pressures.

Narrative: Crew was flown commercial to Singapore for a test flight of two aircraft on C-check. It took 24 hours of flight time and 30 hours elapsed by the time we arrived. No rest was provided and seating was coach; less than 24 hours elapsed before we were back at the airport. Time zone change: 12 hours. [I] advised Director of Operations that I had the wrong crew for the task at hand. First Officer with very little experience and never been to the Pacific. Flight Engineer [was] over 65 years with history of heart problems. The day prior to the test flight the aircraft was fueled with 30000 LBS to be used for ballast. The following day; the flight plan required 115000 LBS of fuel. I was told the Flight Engineer to load 125000 LBS on top of the 30000 LBS we already had. The extra 10000 pounds were for an inoperative radar. I was threatened by the Director of Operations that if I did not take the airplane I will have to face consequences. I told him that it was not safe even if it was legal. I told him I would make a decision the following day upon weather review. Conditions met MEL requirements; very good weather. Flight Engineer loaded a total of 125000 LBS not realizing that he was using the ballast fuel as part of the required. In effect being 30000 LBS short. Prior to departure the checklist was read. On the fuel the Flight Engineer advised me that he was missing the fuel receipt. A minute later he told me that he found it. I asked him if the fuel uplift matched the fuel that we needed on board. He answered yes. At that point I was not concerned about fuel. The First Officer did his weight and balance based on a total of 155000 LBS. Performance was calculated for those weights. He never realized we did not have the fuel. After takeoff and approximately 4:30 hours into the flight; the Flight Engineer told me that the fuel on the main tanks was not to schedule and realized his mistake. Due to the extra 10000 LBS that were added for an inoperative radar; I calculated that we had just enough fuel to reach destination. I told the Flight Engineer to maintain for as long as possible the fuel required for ballast. Upon landing; total fuel remaining was 30000 LBS. We were never in danger of actually running out of fuel before reaching destination. My concern was of aircraft instability. In order to maintain adequate fuel in the main tanks for arrival; 10000 LBS from the ballast fuel were transferred. I checked for aircraft instability and found no problems concerning control of aircraft. Approximately 90 percent of the flight was conducted over water. Flight was conducted under Part 91. Contributing factors [were] crew fatigue/inadequate rest; pressure from the company to get the airplane out. Crew not qualified for the job to be performed adding pressure to the Captain. Airplane undergoing heavy maintenance check and [us] not knowing how it would perform. Radar inoperative [was] adding more anxiety; [along with] the threat from Director of Operations. My error was not looking at the fuel totalizer and assuming that we had the fuel based on the Flight Engineer reporting that the uplift in gallons matched the required fuel load. The departure airport had very narrow time slots. This put more pressure. Weather in the afternoon turned into severe thunderstorms causing closure of airport.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.