Narrative:

Aircraft X was on a route from airport to kord (chicago O'hare). The affected points involved in the incident were as follows: 54n150w (fifty four degrees north one five zero degrees west) direct 50n140w direct widen (a boundary waypoint on the ZSE (seattle center) sector 3 and ZOA (oakland center) sector OC7 boundary. The aircraft was at FL370. At latitude/longitude 5237n14605w the aircraft was given a shortcut direct widen; changing the boundary point it was to cross into a transitional sector in vancouver center airspace (affected sector is named holberg). When briefed by the relieved controller for OC1/2; I was advised that the aircraft was on a shortcut direct widen; and when I transferred the aircraft to vancouver holberg sector I transferred the aircraft at its cleared boundary point direct widen; the receiving controller for the transfer correctly read back the boundary point. Later I was advised that vancouver center contacted the oceanic supervisor; and that the aircraft had not crossed the boundary where they were expecting it (which was the boundary point reflected in the flight plan; and not the actual route of flight with the issued shortcut). I advised the supervisor that I had in fact transferred the aircraft at the point it crossed the boundary; and had advised the vancouver controller of the correct actual route of flight. I cannot speak for the vancouver controller but the information was correctly passed and reflected the aircraft's route of flight. A revised flight plan was not sent to vancouver for the reroute; as there is no automated connection for atops with the vancouver flight plan system; but I manually coordinated the aircraft's route when I transferred it to vancouver. From my personal interpretation of the event; the issue was on the basis of the assumption of the vancouver controller that the aircraft was on its flight plan route and not on the shortcut; but was issued the information of the aircraft's actual route of flight (the shortcut). This is not the first time an event like this has happened. When we reroute aircraft into vancouver airspace; there is no means to update aircraft flight plan data beyond lengthy corrections to an aircraft's flight plan; creating a teletype message; and sending it to vancouver's flight data section; which may or may not receive it in time to be effective. Automated interfacility data exchange (aidc) is an automatic means by which flight plan data and the aircraft's actual route of flight are transmitted to different facilities via automation. Vancouver does not have this feature online at this moment. Extra vigilance; additional training; and procedures will never hurt on addressing this issue; as it is not uncommon. A random latitude/longitude point is not a common point to transfer aircraft to vancouver; and they have to manually take down the data. I feel that human error may have been the cause of confusion on where the aircraft X was to cross vancouver's boundary; and [lack of] extra vigilance on their part may have been one of the main causal factors.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZOA Oceanic Controller reported an adjacent international facility was confused about a boundary crossing point; lack of interfacility automation was cited as a contributing factor.

Narrative: Aircraft X was on a route from airport to KORD (Chicago O'Hare). The affected points involved in the incident were as follows: 54N150W (fifty four degrees north one five zero degrees west) direct 50N140W direct WIDEN (a boundary waypoint on the ZSE (Seattle Center) Sector 3 and ZOA (Oakland Center) Sector OC7 boundary. The aircraft was at FL370. At latitude/longitude 5237N14605W the aircraft was given a shortcut direct WIDEN; changing the boundary point it was to cross into a transitional sector in Vancouver Center Airspace (affected sector is named Holberg). When briefed by the relieved controller for OC1/2; I was advised that the aircraft was on a shortcut direct WIDEN; and when I transferred the aircraft to Vancouver Holberg Sector I transferred the aircraft at its cleared boundary point direct WIDEN; the receiving controller for the transfer correctly read back the boundary point. Later I was advised that Vancouver Center contacted the Oceanic Supervisor; and that the aircraft had not crossed the boundary where they were expecting it (which was the boundary point reflected in the flight plan; and not the actual route of flight with the issued shortcut). I advised the Supervisor that I had in fact transferred the aircraft at the point it crossed the boundary; and had advised the Vancouver Controller of the correct ACTUAL route of flight. I cannot speak for the Vancouver Controller but the information was correctly passed and reflected the aircraft's route of flight. A revised flight plan was not sent to Vancouver for the reroute; as there is no automated connection for ATOPS with the Vancouver flight plan system; but I manually coordinated the aircraft's route when I transferred it to Vancouver. From my personal interpretation of the event; the issue was on the basis of the assumption of the Vancouver Controller that the aircraft was on its flight plan route and not on the shortcut; but was issued the information of the aircraft's actual route of flight (the shortcut). This is not the first time an event like this has happened. When we reroute aircraft into Vancouver airspace; there is no means to update aircraft flight plan data beyond lengthy corrections to an aircraft's flight plan; creating a teletype message; and sending it to Vancouver's flight data section; which MAY OR MAY NOT receive it in time to be effective. Automated Interfacility Data Exchange (AIDC) is an automatic means by which flight plan data and the aircraft's ACTUAL route of flight are transmitted to different facilities via automation. Vancouver does not have this feature online at this moment. Extra vigilance; additional training; and procedures will never hurt on addressing this issue; as it is not uncommon. A random latitude/longitude point is not a common point to transfer aircraft to Vancouver; and they have to manually take down the data. I feel that human error may have been the cause of confusion on where the Aircraft X was to cross Vancouver's boundary; and [lack of] extra vigilance on their part may have been one of the main causal factors.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.