Narrative:

During preflight; the blue hydraulic systems quantity indication on the lower ECAM hydraulic page was intermittently showing two amber 'X's indicating the quantity indication was inoperative. The defect was noted and entered into the ACARS. Subsequently; maintenance issued a deferral with the accompanying MEL notification. Contract maintenance arrived at the aircraft to comply with the conditions of the MEL. I was present on the flight deck the entire time contract maintenance was working the MEL. Contract maintenance reported that the system was 'okay' and that all three hydraulic system quantities had been verified serviceable. After examining the MEL I noticed that several items MEL were not being complied with. At this time; maintenance control issued a maintenance release and 'return to service' document. I immediately called maintenance control and informed them that the MEL had not been complied with; specifically; the determination of whether this defect was mechanical or electrical. When I asked the maintenance technician as to whether this was an electrical or mechanical failure he replied; 'it was none; neither.' I informed maintenance control of this fact. Additionally; the MEL was not complied with as it concerns the quantity low level ECAM warning verification. At this point; the maintenance technician had not drained the reservoir as instructed by the MEL. Maintenance control acknowledged my observations and informed me he would recall the contract maintenance personnel. This was a direct violation of fars as maintenance control had stated the aircraft was in an airworthy condition and the MEL had been completed and complied with and the aircraft returned to service when in fact the MEL had not been complied with and the aircraft was not in an airworthy condition. Contract maintenance returned to the aircraft to accomplish logbook item two. Item two was entered into the log with the maintenance gripe: 'mx had to return to aircraft to re-accommplish MEL placard items'. At this time; contract maintenance drained the blue hydraulic system reservoir of hydraulic fluid. Subsequently; the ECAM warning displayed a blue system hydraulic fluid lo lvl ECAM warning. The ECAM also displayed a blue hydraulic reservoir lo air press warning. This indicates that the maintenance technician was not following the MEL procedure to maintain a nitrogen air pressure of at least 22 psig while the reservoir was being drained. I left the flight deck to observe the maintenance activity. I observed the maintenance technician had installed a drain line to drain the blue reservoir; the blue reservoir access door was open; the quantity transmitter cannon plug was still installed and the head pressure gauge was reading less than 15 psig head pressure; all directly contrary to the MEL. At this point I again contacted maintenance control and informed them that the conditions of the MEL were not being complied with. I also contacted the duty manager and informed him of my situation. Specifically; I informed him that local maintenance was not performing the required maintenance tasks of the MEL and maintenance control was not responding to my observations and concerns. At this time; I noticed that contract maintenance had left the area. The aircraft ACARS printer received and printed the maintenance release document from maintenance control. This was another direct far violation as the maintenance technician and maintenance control had returned the aircraft to service and verified that the aircraft was in an airworthy condition when in fact it was not. As the aircraft had been returned to service; and the maintenance release reflected that the MEL items had been complied with; I again notified dispatch that I was still 'refusing the aircraft for flight'. I now entered into ACARS and the aircraft's electronic logbook; log items three; four and five reporting that yellow; blue and green hydraulic quantity indicators were inoperative and log item six which noted the defect that the hydraulic quantity indications circuit breaker was open and collared with a white locking collar. At this time the aircraft had been certified airworthy and returned to service by both the local contract maintenance technician and maintenance control while the green and yellow hydraulic quantity indicators were inoperative directly violating the MEL specification notes: item B.; C.; and D. And the circuit breaker hydraulic qty ind was open and collared without direction. I informed the duty manager of my concerns about the many safety and far violations. I also informed him once again; that by my direct observations; the conditions and procedures of the MEL had not been complied with and by my direct observations; the aircraft was not in an airworthy condition and was in fact in an unsafe condition and I was refusing the aircraft for flight. He informed me that he was working on the problem; seeking a resolution. Shortly thereafter; the purser informed me they had exceeded their contractual holding limits (we were now some 4.5 hours past our purposed departure time) and accordingly; all passengers would have to be deplaned and substitute flight attendants assigned. I was then informed by the attending passenger agent that the flight was canceled. I contacted the crew desk to make further arrangement for the flight crew. The first officer and I left the aircraft and proceeded to operations. A computer check of the maintenance status of the aircraft showed the maintenance release still in effect; stating the aircraft was in an airworthy condition. I immediately contacted the duty manager and informed him of the far violation and the fact that aircraft was not in an airworthy condition. The duty manager informed me that he would take care of the maintenance release and the maintenance condition of the aircraft. It was my clear understanding that the duty manager would contact maintenance control and inform them of my observation and assessment of the maintenance condition of the aircraft and the fact that the aircraft was in an un-airworthy condition. And; having de-initialized the aircraft's ACARS unit (unable to enter a maintenance request code or defect through ACARS); and not having access to enter a maintenance defect into the aircraft's electronic logbook via ACARS; and having experienced maintenance control's willingness to return the aircraft to service without taking into account my direct observations; I was left with the duty manager as my only way to communicate the maintenance defects I had directly observed. My refusal to fly the aircraft was due directly to the fact that the assigned maintenance procedure was not being complied with and the aircraft was not in an airworthy condition.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An A319 Captain reported numerous and repeated errors by contract maintenance personnel attempting to accomplish MEL directed maintenance action items associated with a malfunctioning Blue Hydraulic System. Reporter was also concerned that Maintenance Control Personnel were abetting the attempts to OK the aircraft for service despite failures to properly comply with the requirements of the MEL.

Narrative: During preflight; the Blue Hydraulic Systems quantity indication on the lower ECAM Hydraulic page was intermittently showing two amber 'X's indicating the quantity indication was inoperative. The defect was noted and entered into the ACARS. Subsequently; maintenance issued a deferral with the accompanying MEL notification. Contract Maintenance arrived at the aircraft to comply with the conditions of the MEL. I was present on the flight deck the entire time Contract Maintenance was working the MEL. Contract Maintenance reported that the system was 'okay' and that all three hydraulic system quantities had been verified serviceable. After examining the MEL I noticed that several items MEL were not being complied with. At this time; Maintenance Control issued a maintenance release and 'Return to Service' document. I immediately called Maintenance Control and informed them that the MEL had not been complied with; specifically; the determination of whether this defect was mechanical or electrical. When I asked the Maintenance Technician as to whether this was an electrical or mechanical failure he replied; 'it was none; neither.' I informed Maintenance Control of this fact. Additionally; the MEL was not complied with as it concerns the Quantity Low Level ECAM Warning verification. At this point; the Maintenance Technician had not drained the reservoir as instructed by the MEL. Maintenance Control acknowledged my observations and informed me he would recall the Contract Maintenance Personnel. This was a direct violation of FARs as Maintenance Control had stated the aircraft was in an airworthy condition and the MEL had been completed and complied with and the aircraft returned to service when in fact the MEL had not been complied with and the aircraft was not in an airworthy condition. Contract Maintenance returned to the aircraft to accomplish logbook item two. Item two was entered into the log with the maintenance Gripe: 'MX HAD TO RETURN TO ACFT TO RE-ACCOMMPLISH MEL PLACARD items'. At this time; Contract Maintenance drained the Blue Hydraulic System reservoir of hydraulic fluid. Subsequently; the ECAM warning displayed a Blue System hydraulic fluid LO LVL ECAM warning. The ECAM also displayed a Blue Hydraulic reservoir LO AIR PRESS warning. This indicates that the Maintenance Technician was not following the MEL procedure to maintain a nitrogen air pressure of at least 22 PSIG while the reservoir was being drained. I left the flight deck to observe the maintenance activity. I observed the Maintenance Technician had installed a drain line to drain the blue reservoir; the blue reservoir access door was open; the quantity transmitter cannon plug was still installed and the head pressure gauge was reading less than 15 PSIG head pressure; all directly contrary to the MEL. At this point I again contacted Maintenance Control and informed them that the conditions of the MEL were not being complied with. I also contacted the Duty Manager and informed him of my situation. Specifically; I informed him that Local Maintenance was not performing the required maintenance tasks of the MEL and Maintenance Control was not responding to my observations and concerns. At this time; I noticed that Contract Maintenance had left the area. The aircraft ACARS printer received and printed the maintenance release document from Maintenance Control. This was another direct FAR violation as the Maintenance Technician and Maintenance Control had returned the aircraft to service and verified that the aircraft was in an airworthy condition when in fact it was not. As the aircraft had been returned to service; and the maintenance release reflected that the MEL items had been complied with; I again notified Dispatch that I was still 'refusing the aircraft for flight'. I now entered into ACARS and the aircraft's electronic logbook; log items three; four and five reporting that Yellow; Blue and Green hydraulic quantity indicators were inoperative and log item six which noted the defect that the Hydraulic Quantity Indications circuit breaker was open and collared with a white locking collar. At this time the aircraft had been certified airworthy and returned to service by both the Local Contract Maintenance Technician and Maintenance Control while the Green and Yellow Hydraulic Quantity indicators were inoperative directly violating the MEL SPEC NOTEs: Item B.; C.; and D. and the circuit breaker HYD QTY IND was open and collared without direction. I informed the Duty Manager of my concerns about the many safety and FAR violations. I also informed him once again; that by my direct observations; the conditions and procedures of the MEL had not been complied with and by my direct observations; the aircraft was not in an airworthy condition and was in fact in an unsafe condition and I was refusing the aircraft for flight. He informed me that he was working on the problem; seeking a resolution. Shortly thereafter; the Purser informed me they had exceeded their contractual holding limits (we were now some 4.5 hours past our purposed departure time) and accordingly; all passengers would have to be deplaned and substitute flight attendants assigned. I was then informed by the attending Passenger Agent that the flight was canceled. I contacted the crew desk to make further arrangement for the flight crew. The First Officer and I left the aircraft and proceeded to operations. A computer check of the maintenance status of the aircraft showed the maintenance release still in effect; stating the aircraft was in an airworthy condition. I immediately contacted the Duty Manager and informed him of the FAR violation and the fact that aircraft was not in an airworthy condition. The Duty Manager informed me that he would take care of the maintenance release and the maintenance condition of the aircraft. It was my clear understanding that the Duty Manager would contact Maintenance Control and inform them of my observation and assessment of the maintenance condition of the aircraft and the fact that the aircraft was in an un-airworthy condition. And; having de-initialized the aircraft's ACARS unit (unable to enter a maintenance request code or defect through ACARS); and not having access to enter a maintenance defect into the aircraft's electronic logbook via ACARS; and having experienced Maintenance Control's willingness to return the aircraft to service without taking into account my direct observations; I was left with the duty Manager as my only way to communicate the maintenance defects I had directly observed. My refusal to fly the aircraft was due directly to the fact that the assigned maintenance procedure was not being complied with and the aircraft was not in an airworthy condition.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.