Narrative:

An aircraft was holding short of runway 8 awaiting an IFR release. Aircraft X was on a 4 mile final for runway 15 and issued a land and hold short clearance for the IFR aircraft awaiting departure on runway 8. He acknowledged and accepted the clearance. The departure was told about aircraft X on final for runway 15 and the issuance of the lahso instruction and also about aircraft Y on an 7-8 mile final (est.) for runway 8 and then cleared for aircraft Y on approximately a two mile final for runway 8. When aircraft X reached what appeared to me as appropriate taxi speed on the runway; he was issued a right turn at taxiway B3 and told to contact ground control. At this time aircraft Y was not inside a two mile final for runway 8. After issuing the taxi instructions to aircraft X; which they did not acknowledge; I noticed that the aircraft began to move erratically on the runway. It appeared as though the pilot began to add power and increase his rate of taxi down the runway toward the B3 tie-in which; at the time I issued the taxi instructions to him; was approximately 1500 ft down the runway from his position. The pilot further lost control of the aircraft and began to 'porpoise' on the runway attempting to gain control of the aircraft. I then turned to look and see where aircraft Y was in relation to the runway in an effort to send him around fearing that aircraft X would lose control of the aircraft and need assistance. Aircraft Y was flaring over the numbers of runway 8 and it was my opinion that the situation would become more dangerous if I issued go-around instructions to aircraft Y. Aircraft Y landed and passed through the intersection of runways 8/15 as the pilot of aircraft X advised that he was going around in an effort to regain control of the aircraft. Aircraft X was airborne and climbing out of about 150 ft approximately 1000 ft north of the intersection of the runways on runway 15 when aircraft Y passed through the intersection. Aircraft Y taxied to the gate without incident and aircraft X returned for landing without further incident. Recommendation; due to the complexity of the traffic at the time of the incident and the amount of aircraft in the airspace other than the aircraft directly involved in the event; I am not sure there would have been many different ways to solve the issue. The aircraft Y could have been sent around to avoid getting to close to aircraft X but then would have run the risk of losing separation and getting dangerously close to the aircraft while airborne. Aircraft Y was also in a critical phase of flight and may not have accepted the go-around instructions. If the pilot of aircraft X was uncomfortable with the approach speed of the aircraft or the issuance of lahso instructions; it would have been wise to advise me of the situation in a timely manner in order to find a different path to solving the conflict. Due to the proximity of the runways and the types of operations at the airport; it is necessary for pilots to abide by lahso instructions and comply with control instructions when safety is not a factor. In this case; the pilot appeared to have the aircraft under control when instructions were given but then proceeded to lose control of the aircraft apparently attempting to comply with lahso and/or taxi instructions. Perhaps sending aircraft X around would have avoided the situation; but there was no way of knowing the pilot would lose control of the aircraft on the runway and sending him around would have created conflicts with other aircraft in the airspace operating to and from the airport.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BUR Controller described a LAHSO conflict event when Aircraft X landing Runway 15 was issued LAHSO instructions subject to Aircraft Y landing Runway 8. Aircraft X experienced control problems and elected to go-around as the arrival was passing the runway intersection.

Narrative: An aircraft was holding short of Runway 8 awaiting an IFR release. Aircraft X was on a 4 mile final for Runway 15 and issued a Land and Hold Short clearance for the IFR aircraft awaiting departure on Runway 8. He acknowledged and accepted the clearance. The departure was told about Aircraft X on final for Runway 15 and the issuance of the LAHSO instruction and also about Aircraft Y on an 7-8 mile final (est.) for Runway 8 and then cleared for Aircraft Y on approximately a two mile final for Runway 8. When Aircraft X reached what appeared to me as appropriate taxi speed on the runway; he was issued a right turn at Taxiway B3 and told to contact Ground Control. At this time Aircraft Y was not inside a two mile final for Runway 8. After issuing the taxi instructions to Aircraft X; which they did not acknowledge; I noticed that the aircraft began to move erratically on the runway. It appeared as though the pilot began to add power and increase his rate of taxi down the runway toward the B3 tie-in which; at the time I issued the taxi instructions to him; was approximately 1500 FT down the runway from his position. The pilot further lost control of the aircraft and began to 'porpoise' on the runway attempting to gain control of the aircraft. I then turned to look and see where Aircraft Y was in relation to the runway in an effort to send him around fearing that Aircraft X would lose control of the aircraft and need assistance. Aircraft Y was flaring over the numbers of Runway 8 and it was my opinion that the situation would become more dangerous if I issued go-around instructions to Aircraft Y. Aircraft Y landed and passed through the intersection of Runways 8/15 as the pilot of Aircraft X advised that he was going around in an effort to regain control of the aircraft. Aircraft X was airborne and climbing out of about 150 FT approximately 1000 FT North of the intersection of the runways on Runway 15 when Aircraft Y passed through the intersection. Aircraft Y taxied to the gate without incident and Aircraft X returned for landing without further incident. Recommendation; due to the complexity of the traffic at the time of the incident and the amount of aircraft in the airspace other than the aircraft directly involved in the event; I am not sure there would have been many different ways to solve the issue. The Aircraft Y could have been sent around to avoid getting to close to Aircraft X but then would have run the risk of losing separation and getting dangerously close to the aircraft while airborne. Aircraft Y was also in a critical phase of flight and may not have accepted the go-around instructions. If the pilot of Aircraft X was uncomfortable with the approach speed of the aircraft or the issuance of LAHSO instructions; it would have been wise to advise me of the situation in a timely manner in order to find a different path to solving the conflict. Due to the proximity of the runways and the types of operations at the airport; it is necessary for pilots to abide by LAHSO instructions and comply with control instructions when safety is not a factor. In this case; the pilot appeared to have the aircraft under control when instructions were given but then proceeded to lose control of the aircraft apparently attempting to comply with LAHSO and/or taxi instructions. Perhaps sending Aircraft X around would have avoided the situation; but there was no way of knowing the pilot would lose control of the aircraft on the runway and sending him around would have created conflicts with other aircraft in the airspace operating to and from the airport.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.