Narrative:

While acting as pilot flying on ILS runway 04 at laguardia I was aware of the following and properly briefed for the following prior to commencement of approach. The runway was wet - the ceiling and visibility were low - lga tower was simultaneously utilizing runway 13/31. Prepared for a possible missed approach/go-around in the event someone incurred onto 'our' landing runway or if the visibility/ceiling were to be lower than advertised - I had my fingers very close to the to/GA buttons. Upon reaching minimums I disconnected the afcs (autopilot) and subsequently attempted to disconnect the autothrust only to realize the throttles advancing and the nose beginning to pitch up due to the low slung engines - I also immediately realized the command bars and speed tape readjusting for the to/GA mode. Without further delay and having 1 to 2 seconds of either correcting the issue or properly executing a missed approach I immediately disconnected the autothrust - released back pressure enough to get back to glidepath but not too much to set off a sinkrate warning and landed safely in the touchdown zone well prior to my 'preset' go around point on lga's short (and wet) pavement. [I] stopped aircraft well prior to runway 13/31 intersection. The pilot not flying realized what was occurring at time nose was pitching up (saw the correction) and briefed issue after landing. So no action or intervention was required from the pilot not flying.event occurred because in my mind I was so preoccupied with the go around/missed approach possibility that I was fixated on the to/GA buttons; when in reality I should have looked at the big picture and realized the consequences of accidentally pressing the to/GA buttons when I am not supposed to. An unnecessary go-around could have ensued in the busy new york airspace with marginal weather conditions. In ground school and in the simulator training discuss this issue with students so someone else does not experience this type of occurrence. This can apparently happen to anyone of low or high experience. Understanding the automation and what happens when the wrong things are selected at the wrong time is key to avoiding such issues.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 First Officer reports inadvertently selecting TO/GA after a low visibility approach to minimums while attempting to disconnect autothrust. The error was quickly corrected and a safe landing ensued.

Narrative: While acting as pilot flying on ILS Runway 04 at LaGuardia I was aware of the following and properly briefed for the following prior to commencement of approach. The runway was wet - the ceiling and visibility were low - LGA Tower was simultaneously utilizing Runway 13/31. Prepared for a possible missed approach/go-around in the event someone incurred onto 'our' landing runway or if the visibility/ceiling were to be lower than advertised - I had my fingers very close to the TO/GA Buttons. Upon reaching minimums I disconnected the AFCS (Autopilot) and subsequently attempted to disconnect the autothrust only to realize the throttles advancing and the nose beginning to pitch up due to the low slung engines - I also immediately realized the command bars and speed tape readjusting for the TO/GA Mode. Without further delay and having 1 to 2 seconds of either correcting the issue or properly executing a missed approach I immediately disconnected the autothrust - released back pressure enough to get back to glidepath but not too much to set off a SINKRATE Warning and landed safely in the touchdown zone well prior to my 'preset' go around point on LGA's short (and wet) pavement. [I] stopped aircraft well prior to Runway 13/31 Intersection. The pilot not flying realized what was occurring at time nose was pitching up (saw the correction) and briefed issue after landing. So no action or intervention was required from the pilot not flying.Event occurred because in my mind I was so preoccupied with the Go Around/Missed Approach possibility that I was fixated on the TO/GA Buttons; when in reality I should have looked at the big picture and realized the consequences of accidentally pressing the TO/GA Buttons when I am not supposed to. An unnecessary go-around could have ensued in the busy New York Airspace with marginal weather conditions. In ground school and in the simulator training discuss this issue with students so someone else does not experience this type of occurrence. This can apparently happen to anyone of low or high experience. Understanding the automation and what happens when the wrong things are selected at the wrong time is key to avoiding such issues.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.