Narrative:

It was the first officer's leg. I set the takeoff thrust; noting high itt on the right engine; although in the green range. This was normal for this airplane in that the right engine itt was consistently high. When I came back to the itt in my crosscheck; I noted the temp in the red at 910 degrees. I called and executed 'abort;' instead of calling 100 knots. I almost immediately reduced my initial heavy braking in order to bring the airplane to a smooth stop and turn off the runway at taxiway B; which would have been the next available taxiway in any case.later; we ran the engine with maintenance; noting that the itt at takeoff thrust was lower with the speed switches off than on; and that having the switches off largely corrected the right engine being somewhat slow to spool as well. Maintenance deferred the engine speed control system; and we eventually completed the flight. This airplane had a history of overtemps on that engine; with three other level III events over the last month; plus another dozen or so level I events. There were no corresponding overtemps on the left engine that I recall.this particular overtemp was largely my fault; in that I had mis-computed the thrust/anti-ice protection combination to be used for the takeoff. With a temp of 8 degrees in moderate rain; cowls only would have been the right choice. I applied the '[special airport] rule' of using both wings and cowls at the cowls only thrust setting. We discussed this during our briefing at the gate. Thus the decision; while incorrect; was not made in haste or negligence. We simply mis-remembered and mis-applied the rule. As I recall; the first officer stated that we should use wings and cowls because we would need that configuration anyway immediately upon becoming airborne. I looked; and said 'we've got a '-a' engine; and less than 1000 foot pressure altitude' and agreed. With the old performance planning system; use of wings and cowls for this temp and rain would have been fairly routine; with one critical difference. We used to have the right thrust and weight numbers for that configuration; and we don't any more.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CL-65 Flight Crew aborted their takeoff due to high ITT (Inlet Turbine Temperature) on the right engine. Later determined a contributing factor was their decision to utilize a Takeoff Thrust setting inappropriate for their decision to utilize both cowl and wing anti-ice bleeds.

Narrative: It was the First Officer's leg. I set the takeoff thrust; noting high ITT on the right engine; although in the green range. This was normal for this airplane in that the right engine ITT was consistently high. When I came back to the ITT in my crosscheck; I noted the temp in the red at 910 degrees. I called and executed 'abort;' instead of calling 100 knots. I almost immediately reduced my initial heavy braking in order to bring the airplane to a smooth stop and turn off the runway at Taxiway B; which would have been the next available taxiway in any case.Later; we ran the engine with maintenance; noting that the ITT at takeoff thrust was lower with the speed switches off than on; and that having the switches off largely corrected the right engine being somewhat slow to spool as well. Maintenance deferred the engine speed control system; and we eventually completed the flight. This airplane had a history of overtemps on that engine; with three other Level III events over the last month; plus another dozen or so Level I events. There were no corresponding overtemps on the left engine that I recall.This particular overtemp was largely my fault; in that I had mis-computed the thrust/anti-ice protection combination to be used for the takeoff. With a temp of 8 degrees in moderate rain; cowls only would have been the right choice. I applied the '[special airport] rule' of using both wings and cowls at the cowls only thrust setting. We discussed this during our briefing at the gate. Thus the decision; while incorrect; was not made in haste or negligence. We simply mis-remembered and mis-applied the rule. As I recall; the First Officer stated that we should use wings and cowls because we would need that configuration anyway immediately upon becoming airborne. I looked; and said 'We've got a '-A' engine; and less than 1000 foot pressure altitude' and agreed. With the old performance planning system; use of wings and cowls for this temp and rain would have been fairly routine; with one critical difference. We used to have the right thrust and weight numbers for that configuration; and we don't any more.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.