Narrative:

Near midair collision occurred when I was climbing at 300-350 ft 2/3 way down runway 30 on upwind leg. Wind was 280 at 15-20 KTS; altimeter setting 29.91; visibility greater than six miles; sky clear below FL120. Other aircraft [was] heading 260; and climbing. Separation at first sighting [was] approximately 2;000 ft horizontal [and] proximity at closest point horizontal approximately 300 ft; proximity at closest point vertical approximately 200 ft. Length of time in sight before closest proximity 20-30 seconds. Evasive action taken: none. Aircraft were not on a collision course. I crossed in front of and above the other aircraft.before taking runway 30 for departure; I cleared the final approach course visually and announced intentions on the CTAF. As I was rolling on to the runway and applying power; the other aircraft announced it was landing on runway 26. I looked to my right and established visual contact. I assumed his intention was a full stop. I proceeded; rotating about 700 ft down the runway. Watching the traffic roll out; I realized it was a touch and go and not a full stop; when the aircraft and its shadow separated. At that point I was not on a collision course; passing overhead then diverging and climbing 1;500 FPM at 100 KTS ahead of and above the aircraft. The closest point of approach appeared to be approximately 200 ft vertically and 300 ft horizontally. As such no corrective action was taken other than to continue to climb on heading to increase separation. The problem was caused by my judgment failure to realize the other aircraft had the option to go around until such time as he announced he was clear of the runway. I could have and should have prevented the problem by aborting my takeoff when he announced that runway 26 was active. I had taken an over-the-counter 'non-drowsy' allergy medication earlier that day. To prevent any recurrence; I intend to engage in remedial dual instruction on the subject of air traffic control procedures at class east airports and will never again trust an over-the-counter medication based on any claim of being 'non-drowsy.'

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Bellanca pilot departing Runway 30 reports NMAC with PA28 performing touch and go Runway 26. The intersection of these two runways occurs near the departure end of Runway 30 and the reporter did not abort believing the PA28 was a full stop landing.

Narrative: NMAC occurred when I was climbing at 300-350 FT 2/3 way down Runway 30 on upwind leg. Wind was 280 at 15-20 KTS; altimeter setting 29.91; visibility greater than six miles; sky clear below FL120. Other aircraft [was] heading 260; and climbing. Separation at first sighting [was] approximately 2;000 FT horizontal [and] proximity at closest point horizontal approximately 300 FT; proximity at closest point vertical approximately 200 FT. Length of time in sight before closest proximity 20-30 seconds. Evasive action taken: none. Aircraft were not on a collision course. I crossed in front of and above the other aircraft.Before taking Runway 30 for departure; I cleared the final approach course visually and announced intentions on the CTAF. As I was rolling on to the runway and applying power; the other aircraft announced it was landing on Runway 26. I looked to my right and established visual contact. I assumed his intention was a full stop. I proceeded; rotating about 700 FT down the runway. Watching the traffic roll out; I realized it was a touch and go and not a full stop; when the aircraft and its shadow separated. At that point I was not on a collision course; passing overhead then diverging and climbing 1;500 FPM at 100 KTS ahead of and above the aircraft. The closest point of approach appeared to be approximately 200 FT vertically and 300 FT horizontally. As such no corrective action was taken other than to continue to climb on heading to increase separation. The problem was caused by my judgment failure to realize the other aircraft had the option to go around until such time as he announced he was clear of the runway. I could have and should have prevented the problem by aborting my takeoff when he announced that Runway 26 was active. I had taken an over-the-counter 'non-drowsy' allergy medication earlier that day. To prevent any recurrence; I intend to engage in remedial dual instruction on the subject of air traffic control procedures at Class E airports and will never again trust an over-the-counter medication based on any claim of being 'non-drowsy.'

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.