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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 889734 |
Time | |
Date | 201005 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | 67D.Airport |
State Reference | OH |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | Mixed |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Sail Plane |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | Initial Climb |
Flight Plan | None |
Aircraft 2 | |
Make Model Name | Sail Plane |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | Final Approach |
Flight Plan | None |
Person 1 | |
Function | Pilot Not Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Private |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 2.0 Flight Crew Total 40.95 Flight Crew Type 40.95 |
Person 2 | |
Qualification | Flight Crew Commercial Flight Crew Glider |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 3 Flight Crew Total 410 Flight Crew Type 3 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Conflict NMAC |
Miss Distance | Horizontal 50 Vertical 25 |
Narrative:
Our glider group takes off on runway 18 and landing on runway 36. This is a smooth and time saving operation. On that day; we were using this operation. There was a slight tailwind coming from the north for gliders departing on runway 18. There were six people involved in the incident. Two pilots were in a newer T tail glider. They had been flying in a training area for a spring checkout and were entering the landing pattern. This was unknown to the other people on the ground. Another of the pilots and myself were preparing to takeoff on runway 18 in a older straight tail glider. We towed the glider down to the end of the runway as normal and rotated it 180 degrees for takeoff on runway 18. We got into the glider as normal and went through the pre-takeoff checklist. I was not the pilot in command of this flight just a passenger; but still followed along as the other pilot proceeded through the checklist. The straight tail glider's radio was not working at the time. However; a radio is not required. The pre-takeoff checklist was completed. By then a tow plane had taxied in front of us and was preparing to be hooked up. We had our wing runner; who was also a friend; run over to the tow plane to tell the tow pilot our intentions for the flight. Normally this would have been done over the radio. After talking to the tow pilot; the wing runner returned to us and proceeded through his launch duties. We were hooked up and slack taken out of the rope. The wing runner then checked the landing pattern for traffic. Unseen to him; the T tail glider was on extended final for runway 36. The traffic was also unseen to the tow pilot and to the pilot in command and myself in the straight tail glider. The wing runner said; 'pattern is clear;' and gave us the normal thumbs up. As affirmative thumbs up was given back by the pilot in command. The pilot in command gave a rudder waggle (followed by a response waggle from the tow plane); and the wing runner gave the signal to the tow pilot to begin the tow. We began the takeoff roll as normal. We were less than 1000 ft down the runway. The pilot in command pulled back slightly on the stick and we were airborne. A few seconds later; the tow plane lifted off the ground. We were just passing the last of the hangars. All of a sudden; we saw the tow plane maneuver quickly to the left. We assumed right away that the tow plane was having engine troubles. The pilot in command was preparing to pull the release at any second. Then; off to my right; I saw the T tail glider about to touchdown. It was then that we realized that the tow plane was not having engine trouble; but that he had to make an evasive maneuver to stay clear of the traffic. After the evasive maneuver; the tow pilot went back to the right (over the main runway) and continued the tow as normal. The rest of the tow to 3000 ft; flight and landing was normal. Most incidents have several links in the chain that lead to the final incident. The first link was that the straight tail glider's radio was not functioning that day. We had no radio so the call outs made by the pilot in command of the T tail glider were not heard by us in the straight tail glider. The wing runner had to pass the information between us and the tow pilot instead of the regular radio communications. In order for the wing runner to tell the pilot our intentions; the tow pilot had to temporarily remove his headset. The tow pilot may have missed the transmissions from the T tail glider during this time. The wing runner also missed seeing the T tail glider enter downwind while he was talking to the tow pilot. The tow pilot most likely also missed seeing the T tail glider enter downwind at this time. By the time that the pilot in command of the straight tail glider got to the traffic portion of the pre-flight checklist; the T tail glider was most likely already on base leg or final; as was hard to see with the tow plane in front of us. Another link in the chain was the T tail gliderflew an extended downwind and an extended final. The T tail glider is a white glider making it nearly impossible to see especially when on final. The sky to the south of the airfield at the time had cirrus clouds making the T tail glider blend in even more. The final link to the chain was that there were other people up at the hangar at the time of the incident. Nobody spoke up about the traffic. It is true that these people were not necessarily looking for traffic; though. They did have an operating radio at the hangar but may have not been listening to all of the transmissions. It was all of these links in the chain that came together to allow the incident. The six individuals involved in the incident; I think will now exercise even more caution whenever they fly. We have a safety meeting every year. Pilots are required to attend before they can fly. Overall; this is a very safe place to operate. We had not had any incidents for several years. That is why when once does occur that we deal with the matter seriously. Everyone involved in the incident has been asked to submit a report. We believe that this is a good learning too for other pilots and that having filled out these reports will help us as a group to act on an even higher level of safety at all times.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A glider pilot at 67D (Reader Botsford Airfield) reported a NMAC between a landing glider and a tow plane with a glide attached.
Narrative: Our glider group takes off on Runway 18 and landing on Runway 36. This is a smooth and time saving operation. On that day; we were using this operation. There was a slight tailwind coming from the north for gliders departing on Runway 18. There were six people involved in the incident. Two pilots were in a newer T tail glider. They had been flying in a training area for a spring checkout and were entering the landing pattern. This was unknown to the other people on the ground. Another of the pilots and myself were preparing to takeoff on Runway 18 in a older straight tail glider. We towed the glider down to the end of the runway as normal and rotated it 180 degrees for takeoff on Runway 18. We got into the glider as normal and went through the pre-takeoff checklist. I was not the pilot in command of this flight just a passenger; but still followed along as the other pilot proceeded through the checklist. The straight tail glider's radio was not working at the time. However; a radio is not required. The pre-takeoff checklist was completed. By then a tow plane had taxied in front of us and was preparing to be hooked up. We had our wing runner; who was also a friend; run over to the tow plane to tell the tow pilot our intentions for the flight. Normally this would have been done over the radio. After talking to the tow pilot; the wing runner returned to us and proceeded through his launch duties. We were hooked up and slack taken out of the rope. The wing runner then checked the landing pattern for traffic. Unseen to him; the T tail glider was on extended final for Runway 36. The traffic was also unseen to the tow pilot and to the pilot in command and myself in the straight tail glider. The wing runner said; 'pattern is clear;' and gave us the normal thumbs up. As affirmative thumbs up was given back by the pilot in command. The pilot in command gave a rudder waggle (followed by a response waggle from the tow plane); and the wing runner gave the signal to the tow pilot to begin the tow. We began the takeoff roll as normal. We were less than 1000 FT down the runway. The pilot in command pulled back slightly on the stick and we were airborne. A few seconds later; the tow plane lifted off the ground. We were just passing the last of the hangars. All of a sudden; we saw the tow plane maneuver quickly to the left. We assumed right away that the tow plane was having engine troubles. The pilot in command was preparing to pull the release at any second. Then; off to my right; I saw the T tail glider about to touchdown. It was then that we realized that the tow plane was not having engine trouble; but that he had to make an evasive maneuver to stay clear of the traffic. After the evasive maneuver; the tow pilot went back to the right (over the main runway) and continued the tow as normal. The rest of the tow to 3000 FT; flight and landing was normal. Most incidents have several links in the chain that lead to the final incident. The first link was that the straight tail glider's radio was not functioning that day. We had no radio so the call outs made by the pilot in command of the T tail glider were not heard by us in the straight tail glider. The wing runner had to pass the information between us and the tow pilot instead of the regular radio communications. In order for the wing runner to tell the pilot our intentions; the tow pilot had to temporarily remove his headset. The tow pilot may have missed the transmissions from the T tail glider during this time. The wing runner also missed seeing the T tail glider enter downwind while he was talking to the tow pilot. The tow pilot most likely also missed seeing the T tail glider enter downwind at this time. By the time that the pilot in command of the straight tail glider got to the traffic portion of the pre-flight checklist; the T tail glider was most likely already on base leg or final; as was hard to see with the tow plane in front of us. Another link in the chain was the T tail gliderflew an extended downwind and an extended final. The T tail glider is a white glider making it nearly impossible to see especially when on final. The sky to the south of the airfield at the time had cirrus clouds making the T tail glider blend in even more. The final link to the chain was that there were other people up at the hangar at the time of the incident. Nobody spoke up about the traffic. It is true that these people were not necessarily looking for traffic; though. They did have an operating radio at the hangar but may have not been listening to all of the transmissions. It was all of these links in the chain that came together to allow the incident. The six individuals involved in the incident; I think will now exercise even more caution whenever they fly. We have a safety meeting every year. Pilots are required to attend before they can fly. Overall; this is a very safe place to operate. We had not had any incidents for several years. That is why when once does occur that we deal with the matter seriously. Everyone involved in the incident has been asked to submit a report. We believe that this is a good learning too for other pilots and that having filled out these reports will help us as a group to act on an even higher level of safety at all times.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.