Narrative:

Aircraft was dispatched with one left fuel boost pump inoperative. We referenced the MEL. The first officer read it and briefed me that we were to not operate the failed pump. Taxi out was rather busy as runways were changed and we had to obtain new weight and balance. I felt the resultant delay necessitated a PA. We confirmed the new stars; etc. Were loaded in the FMC. On takeoff we noted a master caution for low fuel pressure but; as we were above eighty knots; I decided to continue takeoff. Immediately after takeoff; we were vectored off the STAR; speed restrictions were deleted; etc; enough to keep us occupied. Enroute we were attempting to make up some time with shortcuts and avoiding some weather. With all that the master caution on takeoff just dropped out of my thoughts and I never fully investigated the cause. At top of descent; as power was reduced; I noticed a master caution light. I noted a left 'oil pressure low message' and a 'left generator fail message'. I simultaneously noted the nose yaw indicating differential thrust. We then executed the engine failure in flight and engine restart checklist and the engine successfully restarted.in reviewing this event in my mind I must believe that somehow we inadvertently ended up with our only good boost pump on the left turned off. I turned all the boost pump switches on after the engine rolled back and cannot say with certainty which pump was off but I suspect it was the good one. This error; as much as I hate to admit it; is the only logical explanation. We should not have had an 'inlet fuel pressure low' message at any time. If the engine failed it probably should not have restarted. What caused it? Complacency and fatigue combined with 'get home itis'. The first officer was trying to make a close connection home. Complacency led to my not reading the MEL myself. The switches should have been operated normally. The failed boost pump was secured with pulled/collared circuit breaker's). Complacency let to me not fully investigating the master caution. We are somewhat numb to fuel related warnings as the center fuel pumps can lead to a pressure low message on takeoff if there was little center tank fuel required. I somehow categorized the warning we got as one of those and I now believe it was a fuel pressure low caution. I saw what I expected. Preventive measures? Whenever possible switches should be operated in the normal positions and items secured via circuit breaker's. That is probably current policy and a good policy. The MEL could give 'crew members should be alert for ...' types of messages i.e. 'With one pack inoperative crew members should be alert for potential loss of pressurization if the remaining pack fails or with one boost pump inoperative crew members should be alert for inlet pressure low messages indicating failure of the remaining boost pump'.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An MD80 Captain reported being dispatched with one main tank fuel boost pump inoperative. During takeoff an Inlet Fuel Pressure Low caution was observed and the takeoff continued. Distractions after takeoff prevented the crew from investigating the caution. When power was reduced for descent the engine flamed out and was successfully restarted.

Narrative: Aircraft was dispatched with one left fuel boost pump inoperative. We referenced the MEL. The First Officer read it and briefed me that we were to not operate the failed pump. Taxi out was rather busy as runways were changed and we had to obtain new weight and balance. I felt the resultant delay necessitated a PA. We confirmed the new STARS; etc. were loaded in the FMC. On takeoff we noted a Master Caution for low fuel pressure but; as we were above eighty knots; I decided to continue takeoff. Immediately after takeoff; we were vectored off the STAR; speed restrictions were deleted; etc; enough to keep us occupied. Enroute we were attempting to make up some time with shortcuts and avoiding some weather. With all that the Master Caution on takeoff just dropped out of my thoughts and I never fully investigated the cause. At top of descent; as power was reduced; I noticed a master caution light. I noted a Left 'oil pressure low message' and a 'left generator fail message'. I simultaneously noted the nose yaw indicating differential thrust. We then executed the engine failure in flight and engine restart checklist and the engine successfully restarted.In reviewing this event in my mind I must believe that somehow we inadvertently ended up with our only good boost pump on the left turned off. I turned all the boost pump switches on after the engine rolled back and cannot say with certainty which pump was off but I suspect it was the good one. This error; as much as I hate to admit it; is the only logical explanation. We should not have had an 'inlet fuel pressure low' message at any time. If the engine failed it probably should not have restarted. What caused it? Complacency and fatigue combined with 'get home itis'. The First Officer was trying to make a close connection home. Complacency led to my not reading the MEL myself. The switches should have been operated normally. The failed boost pump was secured with pulled/collared CB's). Complacency let to me not fully investigating the Master Caution. We are somewhat numb to fuel related warnings as the center fuel pumps can lead to a pressure low message on takeoff if there was little center tank fuel required. I somehow categorized the warning we got as one of those and I now believe it was a Fuel Pressure low caution. I saw what I expected. Preventive measures? Whenever possible switches should be operated in the normal positions and items secured via CB's. That is probably current policy and a good policy. The MEL could give 'Crew members should be alert for ...' types of messages i.e. 'with one pack inoperative crew members should be alert for potential loss of pressurization if the remaining pack fails or with one boost pump inoperative crew members should be alert for inlet pressure low messages indicating failure of the remaining boost pump'.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.