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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 893310 |
Time | |
Date | 201006 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Parked |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Fuel Line Fittings & Connectors |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical |
Narrative:
I met inbound crew for flight at gate. The captain had informed me that he was not flying the aircraft any further due to pressurization issues. When I looked at the logbook the pressurization problems were repetitive over several days; I also refused the aircraft. We were given a new aircraft. This aircraft comes from being in the hangar for 2 days due to an in-flight fire warning on the left engine. The culprit was an engine anti-ice valve; repairs completed. The first officer did his walk around and the aircraft was in proper order. After we got fueled we got a call from a very observant ground worker telling us the left engine was dripping fuel. We called maintenance and first officer went to investigate. He confirmed fuel dripping from left engine cowl slowly. I went to look about 10 minutes later (maintenance had still not arrived) and fuel was dripping but at what I would call a quick rate. The maintenance folks arrived; popped the cowling and spent some time tracking the source and reported to me that there was a leaking seal and a cracked line. As time wore on; the leak got progressively worse. My opinion is after the aircraft left the hangar; the fuel in the lines started to warm up and the warmer it got the worse the leak. This is an unacceptable situation and has further decreased my confidence of our fleet. Based on my observations after the cowling was opened; I am convinced that we would have had a severe fire on that engine after takeoff. Please; hats off and many thanks from me personally to that observant ground crew. We need to stop micro managing our mechanics; provide ample amount of parts to operate our fleet; increase amount of times allowed for all overnight checks and heavy checks.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A Ground Crew worker noticed an MD80 engine fuel leak after the crew's preflight and notified them about it. Maintenance later discovered a leaking seal and a cracked fuel line.
Narrative: I met inbound crew for flight at gate. The Captain had informed me that he was not flying the aircraft any further due to pressurization issues. When I looked at the logbook the pressurization problems were repetitive over several days; I also refused the aircraft. We were given a new aircraft. This aircraft comes from being in the hangar for 2 days due to an in-flight fire warning on the left engine. The culprit was an engine anti-ice valve; repairs completed. The First Officer did his walk around and the aircraft was in proper order. After we got fueled we got a call from a very observant ground worker telling us the left engine was dripping fuel. We called maintenance and First Officer went to investigate. He confirmed fuel dripping from left engine cowl slowly. I went to look about 10 minutes later (maintenance had still not arrived) and fuel was dripping but at what I would call a quick rate. The maintenance folks arrived; popped the cowling and spent some time tracking the source and reported to me that there was a leaking seal and a cracked line. As time wore on; the leak got progressively worse. My opinion is after the aircraft left the hangar; the fuel in the lines started to warm up and the warmer it got the worse the leak. This is an unacceptable situation and has further decreased my confidence of our fleet. Based on my observations after the cowling was opened; I am convinced that we would have had a severe fire on that engine after takeoff. Please; hats off and many thanks from me personally to that observant ground crew. We need to stop micro managing our mechanics; provide ample amount of parts to operate our fleet; increase amount of times allowed for all overnight checks and heavy checks.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.