Narrative:

As soon as the gear handle was up; and the gear was retracted; the to configuration warning EICAS and aural warning was activated; as well as the rudder ratio; aileron lockout; and several other EICAS messages. In addition; off flags appeared in the first officer's (PNF) airspeed; altimeter and vvi [vertical velocity indicator]. Upon initially verifying that the captain's (PF) indications were correct; I directed the captain to follow her instruments. We slowed the climb to insure no exceedence of airplane flap limits; and cleaned the plane up. After about 20 seconds; the first officer's instrument panel cleared up; and the aural warnings silenced. We continued climb out and I quickly took out the aom and determined that the first officer's air data computer failed. Upon climbing out to 21;000; we elected to wait until the ATC calls settled down to discuss the situation. I got a satcom link to the dispatcher and asked for maintenance control to be brought in on the call. After describing the situation we agreed that the FMC had failed; and somehow kicked on again. The maintenance history showed that 4 days earlier; the air data computer was replaced for similar failure. Upon discussion with dispatch; the decision was made by the captain and crew to return to our departure airport. We discussed the decision for overweight landing vs. Dumping; and the decision was to dump; declare an emergency; and bring the airplane to landing weight. We reviewed the brake temp chart; and looked at the airspeed/weight; and saw that we would have to not touch the brakes until 130K; with an approach speed of well over 160. We decided that the best course of action was to not land in the thermal melt zone [tmz] area; and that we would hold for just over an hour; and the plane would get to the gate at the same time (due to the limit of no taxi/tow for over an hour after mz landing). We got a SELCAL from dispatch on satcom; asking us to verify the info. We told him which charts we were using; and he seemed to understand the decision; and was calling for info. About 30 minutes later; the duty flight manager called via dispatch telling us we should land; that the aom info is based on use of maximum breaking; (not in the book); and basically told us we should land. We got the impression he was pressuring us to land overweight in the tmz chart for reasons not related to safety (i.e.; flight attendants going illegal; etc). After a 10 minute discussion with him; I told him we were going to depart holding in five minutes for the approach. Approach and landing were uneventful; and on taxi in the brake temperature light come on; as well as brake temperatures of 6 and 5s. The fodm should not have called to try to convince us of something that is not in the book; unless it is for safety reasons. Had we blown any tires; I am sure he would have questioned it as the fom basically states that unless the need is dire (and air data computer failure is not dire); flight crews should steer away from overweight landings.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: After suffering an ADC computer failure shortly after takeoff; the flight crew of a B767-300; in coordination with maintenance and dispatch; agreed to return to the departure airport for maintenance. A call from a Flight Manager disputing the decision was deemed inappropriate by the reporters.

Narrative: As soon as the gear handle was up; and the gear was retracted; the TO CONFIG Warning EICAS and aural warning was activated; as well as the RUDDER RATIO; AILERON LOCKOUT; and several other EICAS messages. In addition; OFF flags appeared in the First Officer's (PNF) Airspeed; Altimeter and VVI [Vertical Velocity Indicator]. Upon initially verifying that the Captain's (PF) indications were correct; I directed the Captain to follow her instruments. We slowed the climb to insure no exceedence of airplane flap limits; and cleaned the plane up. After about 20 seconds; the First Officer's instrument panel cleared up; and the aural warnings silenced. We continued climb out and I quickly took out the AOM and determined that the First Officer's Air Data Computer failed. Upon climbing out to 21;000; we elected to wait until the ATC calls settled down to discuss the situation. I got a SATCOM link to the dispatcher and asked for Maintenance Control to be brought in on the call. After describing the situation we agreed that the FMC had failed; and somehow kicked on again. The Maintenance History showed that 4 days earlier; the ADC was replaced for similar failure. Upon discussion with Dispatch; the decision was made by the Captain and crew to return to our departure airport. We discussed the decision for overweight landing vs. dumping; and the decision was to dump; declare an emergency; and bring the airplane to landing weight. We reviewed the Brake Temp chart; and looked at the airspeed/weight; and saw that we would have to not touch the brakes until 130K; with an approach speed of well over 160. We decided that the best course of action was to not land in the Thermal Melt Zone [TMZ] area; and that we would hold for just over an hour; and the plane would get to the gate at the same time (due to the limit of no taxi/tow for over an hour after MZ Landing). We got a SELCAL from Dispatch on SATCOM; asking us to verify the info. We told him which charts we were using; and he seemed to understand the decision; and was calling for info. About 30 minutes later; the duty Flight Manager called via dispatch telling us we should land; that the AOM info is based on use of MAX breaking; (not in the book); and basically TOLD us we should land. We got the impression he was pressuring us to land overweight in the TMZ chart for reasons not related to safety (I.E.; Flight attendants going illegal; etc). After a 10 minute discussion with him; I told him we were going to depart holding in five minutes for the approach. Approach and landing were uneventful; and on taxi in the BRAKE TEMP light come on; as well as BRAKE TEMPS of 6 and 5s. The FODM should NOT have called to try to convince us of something that is NOT in the book; unless it is for safety reasons. Had we blown any tires; I am sure he would have questioned it as the FOM basically states that unless the need is dire (and ADC FAILURE is not dire); flight crews should steer away from overweight landings.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.